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REPOE 


'y  <c*^-5J5t._^-^£*-j 


SPECIAL  COMMITTEE, 


RECENT  MILITARY  DISASTERS  , 


FORTS    HENRY    ANT)   DONELSON. 


THK  EVACUATION  OF  NASIIVILLK. 


HON.  ir.  S.  FOOTE,  Chaikman, 

H.  c.  Mclaughlin,  riFRk-. 


RICHMOND: 

ENQUIRER     BOOK     ANDJOB     PRJ: 

TTISR,    WtSK,     ALLRGRR    IND    SMitU 

1  8  G  2  . 


•^    N 


RESOLUTIONS  CREATING   THE  COMMITTEE. 


Resolved,  That  a  Special  Committee  be  instructed  to  in- 
quire into  the  military  disasters  at  Fort  Ilcnry  and  Fort 
Donelson,  and  the  surrender  of  Nashville  into  the  hands  of 
the  encjny,  and  to  report  the  result  of  their  investigations 
as  early  as  practicable. 

Resolved,  (On  motion  of  lion.  Thos.  J.  Foster  of  Ala.,) 
That  the  special  committee  appointed  to  investigate  the  late 
military  disasters  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donclson,  and  the 
surrender  of  Nashville  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  be  also 
instructed  to  investigate  the  causes  of  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Henry ;  to  ascertain  by  whom  said  Fort  was  located ; 
whether  the  commanding  General  had  previously  examined 
the  site  of  said  Fort ;  whether  the  hills  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  river  were  properly  fortified,  or  v/cre  they  fortified  at 
all,  and  if  not,  Avh}''  they  \vere  not  fortified  at  the  time  when 
labor  and  troops  from  Alabama  yjere  dispatched  to  Fort 
Henry  for  that  purpose.  *      ' 

Resolved,  (On  motion  of  Hon.  II.  C.  Burnett,)  That  the 
committee  appointed  to  investigate  the  causes  of  our  recent 
disasters  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  &c.,  &c.,  be  instructed 
to  report  to  this  House  who  was  the  senior  General  command- 
ing at  Fort  Donelson  during  the  engagements  at  that  point; 
who  was  second  in  command  and  who  third  in  command ; 
also,  why  it  was  that  the  two  senior  Generals  in  command 
abandoned  the  position,  leaving  the  junior  General  to  sur- 
render. Also  to  report  why  the  transports  then  in  the 
vicinity  of  Fort  Donelson  were  not  used  in  removing  our 
forces  from  the  presence  of  an  overwhelming  foe. 


xMEMBERS  OF  THE  COMMITTEE. 


Henry  S.  Foote,  Tenn.,  Chairman,  ^si^' 

Thos.  J.  Foster,  Ala.,  .■'■'   ' 

E.  Barksdale,  Miss,, 
Thos.  B.  Hanley,  Ark., 
H.  W.  Bruce,  Kentucky. 

II.  C.  McLaughl 


SPECIAL  REPORT  ON  THE  SURRENDER  OF  FORT 
DONELSON,  &c. 


Mr.  Foote,  on  leave  reported  from  the  Special  Committee 
appointed  to  examine  into  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson, 
&c.,  reports  as  follows: 

The  Special  Committee  appointed  to  examine  into  the 
causes  of  the  recent  military  disaster  at  Fort  Donelson,  and 
into  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  surrender  of  the 
citj  of  Nashville  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy, — to  w^hich 
committee  various  other  collateral  matters  have  been  sub- 
sequently referred, — beg  leave  to  report  that  they  have,  in 
the  performance  of  the  duties  assigned  them,  found  it 
necessary  to  accumulate  a  large  mass  of  testimony,  all  of 
which  is  herewith  reported  to  this  House  for  such  action  in 
regard  to  the  same  as  shall  be  deemed  expedient.  It  is 
recommended  by  the  Committee  that  the  House  do  cause 
said  testimony,  together  with  such  other  as  may  be  taken,  to 
be  printed  for  the  use  of  the  members. 

H.  S.  Foote,  Chairman,  &c., 
Thos.  B.  Hanlcy, 
Thos.  J.  Foster, 
H.  W.  Bruce, 
E.  Barksdale. 
The  report  was  agreed  to. 
A  true  copy. 

Teste:     II.  C.  McLaughlin,  Clerk, 


MESSAGE  OF   THE  PRESIDENT. 


Executive  Department,  April  1st,  1862. 

To  the  Hon.  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatatives  : 

Sir  :  I  herewith  transmit  to  the  House  of  Representatives 
a  communication  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  affording  as 
far  as  practicable  the  information  sought  by  the  ''  Resolu- 
tion of  Inquiry,  adopted  by  the  House  of  Representatives, 
in  regard  to  the  disasters  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  etc., 
etc,;"  and  replying  to  the  '*  additional  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  adopted  March  31,  1862,  calling 
for  the  official  response  of  General  A,  S.  Johnston  to  the 
interrogatijries  propounded  to  him  in  regard  to  those  sub- 
jects ;  and  also  for  a  copy  of  the  supplementary  report  of 
General  Pillow  in  regard  to  the  affairs  at  Fort  Donelson,  &c., 
&c."  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


315:: 


LETTER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 


Confederate  States  of  America,  \ 

War  Department,       > 

Richmond,  March  31,  18G2.  ) 

His  Excellency  f  the  President : 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  answers, 
prepared  by  my  predecessor  in  office,  to  the  resolutions  of 
inquiry,  adopted  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  regard 
to  the  disasters  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  &c.,  kc. 

I  have  just  had  the  honor  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  addi- 
tional resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  this  day 
adopted,  calling  for  the  official  response  of  General  Albert 
S.  Johnston  to  the  interrogatories  propounded  to  him  in  re- 
gard to  those  subjects,  and  also  for  a  copy  of  the  supple- 
mentary report  of  General  Pillow,  in  regard  to  the  affair  at 
Fort  Donelson,  &c.,  &c. 

I  have  the  honor  to  reply,  that  the  department  is  informed 
that  General  Johnston  is  engaged,  as  rapidly  as  the  circum- 
stances of  his  command  -will  permit,  in  preparing  an  answer 
to  these  inquiries,  and  it  is  not  deemed  expedient  to  submit 
General  Pillow's  supplementary  report,  in  advance  of  the 
other  military  documents  by  which  it  should  be  accompanied. 
Only  a  copy  of  this  report  has  been  submitted  to  the  depart- 
ment. The  original  is  in  possession  of  General  Johnston, 
and  will  be  forwarded  by  him,  with  the  accompanying  docu- 
ments, in  connection  with  his  own  report. 
Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

GEO.  W.  RANDOLPH, 
Secretary  of  War 


ANSWERS  OF   THE  WAR    DEPARTMENT    TO  IN- 
TERROGATORIES OF  SPECIAL  COMMITTEE. 


I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  answers  to  cer- 
tain enquiries  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  of  which 
copies  were  furnished  to  this  department  on  the  11th  inst. 
Much  delay  has  intervened  in  the  hope  of  receiving  such 
reports  from  the  army  in  Tennessee  as  would  render  it  pos- 
sible to  make  full  and  satisfactory  answers.  Some  of  these 
reports  are  still  delayed,  and  it  is  therefore  considered  due 
to  the  House  to  give  all  the  information  now  possessed  by 
the  department,  and  to  add  hereafter,  whatever  further  de- 
tails may  be  received.  The  inquiries  and  answers  have  been 
numbered  for  the  sake  of  convenience. 

1  and  2.  At  what  period  was  it  that  the  Confederate 
forces  under  Gen.  Johnston  first  established  themselves  in 
the  city  of  Bowling  Green,  and  what  was  our  force  at  that 
time  and  within  the  period  of  a  week  ? 

What  was  the  force  of  the  enemy  at  that  period  between 
Bowling  Green  and  the  Ohio  River,  and  where  located  ? 

General  Johnston  first  established  himself  with  the  Con- 
federate forces  at  Bowling  Green  early  in  October,  the  pre- 
cise day  not  known. 

There  is  nothing  on  file  in  the  department  showing  the 
number  of  his  forces  and  those  of  the  enemy  at  that  period. 
It  is,  however,  known  that  the  enemy's  force  was  largely  in 
excess  of  that  of  General  Johnston. 

3.  What  prevented  General  Johnston,  at  that  time,  from 
making  a  forward  movement  towards  the  Ohio  river  ?  Was 
he  restrained  by  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  or 
was  he  left  to  his  own  discretion  in  the  matter  ? 

The  cause  which  prevented  General  Johnston  from  making 
a  forward  movement  at  that  time  towards  the  Ohio  river,  was 
thus  stated  by  him  in  a  letter  of  22d  October,  1861  :  '<  We 
have  received  but  little  accession  to  our  ranks  since  the 
Confederate  forces  crossed  the  line.     In  fact,  no  such  en- 


10 

thusiastic  demonstration  as  to  justify  any  movements  not 
■warranted  by  our  ability  to  maintain  our  own  communica- 
tions." 

General  Johnston  was  left  to  his  own  discretion  in  all  his 
military  movements,  and  was  never  at  any  time  restrained 
by  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  from  moving 
his  forces  in  any  manner  he  deemed  advisable. 

4,  5,  and  6.  What  forces,  if  any,  were  sent  from  Bowling 
Green  to  Fort  Donelson  previous  to  the  first  battle  at  that 
place,  and  under  vrhose  command  ? 

What  number  of  forces  did  Gen'l  Johnston  retain  at  Bow- 
ling Green  up  to  the  time  of  its  evacuation  ? 

Did  General  Johnston  reinforce,  or  attempt  to  reinforce, 
the  Confederate  army  at  Fort  Donelson  during  the  progress 
of  the  conflicts  at  that  place  ? 

To  these  inquiries  the  only  information  that  can  be  given 
must,  necessarily,  be  derived  from  the  official  report  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston,  which  has  been  called  for,  but  not  yet  re- 
ceived at  the  Department.  It  will  be  submitted  as  soon  as 
received. 

7.  Is  it  within  the  knowledge  of  the  War  Department 
that  any  applications  were  made  by  the  commanders  of  our 
forces  at  Foit  Donelson,  during  the  progress  of  the  con- 
flicts at  that  place  ? 

It  is  now  Icnown  to  the  Department,  through  the  reports  of 
Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow,  and  the  supplementary  report  of 
General  Pillow,  that  no  such  applications  for  reinforcements 
were  made. 

8.  Was  General  Johnston  restrained  by  orders  from  the 
War  Department  from  sending  reinforcements,  or  was  he 
left  to  his  ow)i  discretion  in  that  regard? 

No  orders  on  the  subject  were  issued  from  the  Depart- 
ment. GenU  Johnston's  discretion  on  the  subject  was  unre- 
strained. 

9.  10,  and  11.  What  means  of  transportation  had  Gen'l 
Johnston  at  Dowling  Green  to  enable  him  to  reinforce  Fort 
Donelson,  during  the  contests,  had  he  been  disposed  to  do 

80? 

When  were  the  fortifications  at  Fort  Donelson  and  Fort 
Henry  constructed,  and  in  what  mode? 

Was  thoie  any  military  reconnoissance  along  the  banks 
of  the  Oumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers,  with  the  view  to 
judicious  Belections  of  places  for  fortifications,  before  the 
sites  for  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  were  selected." 


n 

On  these  subjects  nothing  is  recorded  in  the  books  of  the 
War  Department. 

12.  Did  Gcn'l  Johnston  fall  back  from  BoAvling  Green  in 
accordance  "witli  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  or 
was  he  left  to  his  own  discretion  in  the  matter  ? 

Gen'l  Johnston  received  no  instructions  from  the  War 
Department  on  this  subject.  He  acted  on  this,  as  on  all 
other  questions  of  military  movements  and  operations,  in 
accordance  with  his  own  judgment.  lie  counseled  with 
Generals  Beauregard  and  Hardee  before  withdrawing  from 
Bowling  Green. 

13  and  14.  Why  was  Nashville  surrendered  to  the  enemy  ? 

Did  General  Johnston  proceed  upon  his  own  discretion, 
or  under  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  in  regard 
to  the  act  of  surrendering  that  city  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy  ? 

The  reasons  for  evacuating  the  city  of  Nashville,  arc 
given  by  General  Johnston  in  his  letter  of  25th  February, 
of  which  a  copy  is  hereto  annexed.  In  doing  this,  he  acted 
on  his  own  judgment,  and  without  instructions  from  the 
War  Department. 

15.  When  Gcn'l  Johnston,  about  the  1st  October  last, 
made  a  call  upon  several  of  the  States  of  the  southwest,  in- 
cluding the  State  of  Tennessee,  for  large  numbers  of  troops, 
why  was  that  call  revoked?  Was  the  act  of  revocation  in 
pursuance  of  an  order  of  the  War  Department,  or  upon  his 
own  judgment  merely? 

General  Johnston  received  no  orders  on  the  subject  from 
the  War  Department;  but,  in  a  private  and  coniidential  let- 
ter to  him,  he  was  informed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  that 
the  Government  did  not  approve  of  calling  for  unarmed  men 
for  a  less  period  than  the  war ;  that  the  Government  could 
procure  unarmed  men  for  the  war  in  numbers  as  large  as 
it  could  supply  with  arms ;  that  it  gave  the  preference  to 
''war"  men  over  "twelve  months"  men  in  distributing  arms; 
that  unarmed  twelve  months  men  were  the  most  costly  and 
least  useful  troops  that  could  be  called  for;  and,  that  it  was 
desirable  he  should  call  for  no  more  men  for  a  less  period 
than  three  years  or  the  war,  unless  they  came  with  arms. 

IG.  Has  the  Department  received  any  official  report  of 
the  affair  at  Fort  Henry  or  Fort  Donelson,  or  touching  the 
surrender  of  Nashville  ?     If  so,  communicate  the  same. 

The  Department  has  already  communicated  all  the  re- 
ports received  by  it  of  the  above  mentioned  affairs,  except  a 


13 

copy  unofficially  communicated,  of  a  supplementary  report 
of  General  Pillow  to  General  Johnston,  which  is  retained 
until  the  original  as  well  as  other  reports  arc  received  from 
General  Johnston,  so  that  the  whole  subject  may  be  sub- 
mitted together.  The  only  report  of  the  surrender,  or 
rather  the  evacuation,  of  Nashville,  is  contained  in  the  let- 
ter of  Gen'l  A.  S.  Johnston,  above  mentioned,  and  of  which 
a  copy  is  annexed. 

It  is,  however,  known  to  the  Department  that  General 
Johnston  is  engaged  as  actively  as  the  exigencies  of  his 
command  will  permit,  in  preparing  for  the  Congress  full  in- 
formation on  all  the  points  suggested  in  the  above  enquiries, 
and  it  is  hoped  that  the  report  will  be  received  at  a  very 
early  day. 


LETTER  OF  GENERAL  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 


Headquarters  Western  Department,  ) 
MuRFREESBORo',  Tenn.,  Feb.  25,  1862.      \ 

Hon.  J.  P.  Benjamin, 

Secretary  of  War, 

Richmond,  Va. : 

Sir  :  The  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  compelled  me  to  withdraw 
the  remaining  forces  under  my  command  from  the  north 
bank  of  the  Cumberland  and  to  abandon  the  defence  of 
Nashville,  Avhich,  but  for  that  disaster,  it  was  my  intention 
to  protect  to  the  utmost.  Not  more  than  11,000  effec- 
tive men  were  left  under  my  command,  to  oppose  a  column 
of  General  Buell's  of  not  less  than  40,000  troops,  moving 
by  Bowling  Green,  while  another  superior  force,  under  Gen- 
eral Thomas,  outflanked  me  to  the  east,  and  the  army  from 
Fort  Donelson,  with  the  gun-boats  and  transports,  had  it 
in  their  power  to  ascend  the  Cumberland,  now  swollen  by 
recent  flood,  so  as  to  intercept  all  communication  with  the 
South.  The  situation  left  me  no  alternative  but  to  evacu- 
ate Nashville,  or  sacrifice  the  army.  By  remaining  the 
place  would  have  been  unnecessarily  subjected  to  destruc- 
tion, as  it  is  indefensible,  and  no  adequate  force  would  have 
been  left  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  in  Tennessee. 

Under  these  circumstances  I  moved  the  main  body  of  my 
command  to  this  place  on  the  17th  and  18th  insts.,  and  left 
a  brigade  under  General  Floyd  to  bring  on  such  stores  and 
property  as  were  at  Nashville,  with  instructions  to  remain 
until  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  then  to  rejoin  me. 
This  has  been  in  a  great  measure  effected,  and  nearly  all  the 
stores  would  have  been  saved,  but  for  the  heavy  and  unusual 
rains,  which  have  washed  away  the  bridges,  swept  away  por- 
tions of  the  railroad,  and  rendered  transportation  almost 
impossible.      General  Floyd  has  arrived  here.     The  rear 


14 

guard  left  Nashville  on  the  night  of  the  23d.  Edgefield, 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  opposite  the  city, 
was  occupied  yesterday  by  the  advanced  picket  of  the  enemy. 

I  have  remained  here  for  the  purpose  of  augmenting  my 
forces  and  securing  the  transportation  of  the  public  stores. 
By  the  junction  of  the  command  of  General  Crittenden  and 
the  fugitives  from  Fort  Donelson,  which  have  been  reor- 
ganized as  far  as  practicable,  the  force  now  under  my  com- 
mand will  amount  to  about  17,001)  men.  General  Floyd, 
with  about  2,500  troops,  has  been  ordered  to  Chattanooga, 
to  defend  the  approaches  towards  Northern  Alabama  and 
Georgia,  and  the  communication  between  the  INIississippi 
and  Atlantic,  and  with  the  view  to  increase  his  forces  by 
such  troops  as  may  be  sent  forward  from  the  neighboring 
States. 

The  Quartermaster's,  Commissary's  and  Ordnance  stores, 
which  are  not  required  for  immediate  use,  have  been  ordered 
to  Chattanooga,  and  those  which  will  be  necessary  on  the 
march  have  been  forwarded  to  lluntsville  and  Decatur.  1 
have  ordered  a  depot  to  be  established  at  Atlanta  for  the 
manufacture  of  supplies  for  the  Quartermaster's  Depart- 
ment, and  also  a  Laboratory  for  the  manufacture  of  percus- 
sion caps  and  ordnance  stores,  and  at  Chattanooga  depots 
for  distribution  of  these  supplies.  The  machinery  will  be 
immediately  sent  forward. 

Considering  the  peculiar  topography  of  this  State,  and  the 
great  power  which  the  enemy's  means  of  transportation  af- 
ford, upon  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  force  under  my  command  cannot  successfully  cover 
the  whole  line  against  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  I  am 
compelled  to  elect,  whether  he  shall  be  permitted  to  occupy 
Middle  Tennessee,  or  turn  Columbus,  take  Memphis,  and 
open  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi.  To  me  the  defence  of 
the  Valley  appears  of  paramount  importance,  and  conse- 
quently I  will  move  this  corps  of  the  army,  of  which  I  have 
assumed  the  immediate  command,  toward  the  left  bank  of 
the  Tennessee,  crossing  the  river  near  Decatur,  in  order  to 
enable  me  to  co-operate  or  unite  with  General  Beauregard, 
for  the  defence  of  Memphis  and  the  Mississippi. 

The  Department  has  sent  eight  regiments  to  Knoxville 
for  the  defence  of  East  Tennessee,  and  the  protection  of  that 
region  will  be  confided  to  them  and  such  additional  forces  as 
may  be  hereafter  sent  from  the  adjacent  States.  General 
Buckner  was  ordered  by  the  Department  to  take  command 


15 

of  the  troops  at  Knoxville,  but  as  he  was  at  that  time  in 
presence  of  the  enemy,  the  order  was  not  fulfilled.  As  it 
would  be  almost  impossible  for  me  under  present  circum- 
stances to  superintend  the  operations  at  Knoxville  and  Chat- 
tanooga, I  would  respectfully  suggest  that  the  local  com- 
manders at  those  posts  should  receive  orders  from  the  De- 
partment directly,  or  be  allowed  to  exercise  their  discretion. 
With  great  respect. 

Your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed,)  A.  S.  JOHNSTON, 

General  0.  S.  A. 


SUPPLEMENTAL  REPORT  OP  BRIGADIER-GENE- 
RAL FLOYD. 


fi*^ 


Knoxville,  Tennessee, 
March  20,  1862. 


H.  P.  Brewster, 

A.  A,   General 


Sir — Your  communication  of  the  16th  inst.  from  Decatur 
reached  me  here  to-day,  where  I  came  in  compliance  vrith 
an  order  from  Major  General  Smith,  who  felt  his  position 
endangered  from  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 

In  that  communication  you  say  :  "  Under  date  of  March 
the  11th,  the  Secretary  of  War  says  :  '  The  reports  of  Gen- 
erals Floyd  and  Pillow  are  unsatisfactory,  and  the  President 
directs  that  hoth  these  Generals  be  relieved  from  command 
till  further  orders.'  He  further  directs  General  Johnston 
*  in  the  meantime  to  request  them  to  add  to  their  reports 
Buch  statements  as  they  may  deem  proper  on  the  following 
points  : 

'  Ist.  The  failure  to  give  timely  notice  of  the  insufficiency 
of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Donelson  to  repel  attack. 

*  2d.  The  failure  of  any  attempt  to  save  the  army,  by 
evacuating  the  post,  when  found  to  be  untenable. 

'  3d.  Why  they  abandoned  the  command  to  their  inferior 
officer,  instead  of  executing  themselves  whatever  measure 
was  deemed  proper  for  the  entire  army. 

'  4th.  What  Avas  the  precise  mode  by  which  each  effected 
liis  escape  from  the  post,  and  what  dangers  were  encountered 
in  the  retreat. 

*  5th.  Upon  what  principle  a  selection  was  made  of  par- 
ticular troops,  being  certain  regiments  of  the  senior  Gene- 
ral's Brigade,  to  whose  use  all  the  transportation  on  hand 
was  appropriated. 


17 

*  6th.  A  particular  designation  of  the  regiments  saved 
and  the  regiments  abandoned,  which  formed  part  of  the  se- 
nior general's  brigade.' " 

In  obedience  to  this  order,  I  am  directed  by  General 
Johnston  to  request  your  compliance  with  the  wishes  of  the 
President  in  these  particulars,  with  as  little  delay  as  possi- 
ble, and  forward  the  report  to  these  headquarters. 

Under  the  same  direction  General  Johnston  h'ls  required 
a  report  from  Colonel  Forrest,  detailing  particularly  the 
time  and  manner  of  his  escape  from  Fort  Donelson,  the 
road  he  took,  the  number  of  enemies  he  met  or  saw  in  mak- 
ing his  escape,  and  the  difficulties  which  existed  to  prevent 
the  remainder  of  the  army  from  following  the  route  taken 
by  him  in  his  escape  with  his  command. 

I  give  at  once  the  additional  information  which  seems  to 
be  asked  for  in  the  communication  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  which  you  refer. 

The  first  charge  is  as  follows  : 

*'  The  failure  to  give  timely  notice  of  the  insufficiency  of 
the  garrison  of  Fort  Donelson  to  repel  attack." 

I  presume  the  General  knew,  before  I  was  ordered  to  Fort 
Donelson,  that  neither  the  works  nor  the  troops  sent  there 
could  withstand  the  force  which  he  knew  the  enemy  had  in 
hand,  and  which  could  be  brought  speedily  to  that  point.  I 
knew  perfectly  well  that  if  the  whole  force  under  General 
Johnston's  command  at  Bowling  Green  had  been  sent  to  Fort 
Donelson,  it  would  prove  utterly  insufficient  to  repel  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  up  the  Cumberland  river.  General 
Johnston's  entire  force,  including  the  troops  at  Donelson,  as 
I  understood  it,  did  not  exceed  thirty  thousand  (30,00(1)  men. 
I  knew  what  I  believe  every  body  else  did,  for  it  was  made 
public  through  the  newspapers,  that  the  enemy  had  in  Ken- 
tucky alone  one  hundred  and  nineteen  (11 9)  regiments,  and 
that  he  had  nearly,  if  not  quite,  as  many  at  Cairo,  St.  Louis 
and  the  towns  near  the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland.  It  was 
also  known  that  the  enemy  had  unlimited  means  of  trans- 
portation for  concentrating  troops.  How  then  was  it  possi- 
ble for  G.eneral  Johnston's  whole  army  to  meet  that  force, 
which  was  known  to  be  moving  towards  the  mouths  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  ?  The  sequel  proved 
that  this  information  was  correct,  for  not  only  were  the 
troops  occupying  Kentucky  sent  up  the  Cumberlmd,  but 
large  additions  were  made  to  them  from  Missouri  and  Illi*. 
nois,  as  stated  by  prisoners  and  by  the  official  reports  of 
2 


18 

their  own  commanders.  I  could  not,  under  a  sense  of  duty, 
call  for  reinforcements,  because  the  force  under  General 
Johnston  was  not  strong  enough  to  afford  a  sufficient  num- 
ber to  hold  the  place.  I  considered  the  place  illy  chosen, 
out  of  position,  and  entirely  indefensible  by  any  reinforce- 
ments which  could  be  brought  there  to  its  support.  It  had 
but  thirteen  guns,  and  it  turned  out  that  but  three  of  these 
were  effective  against  iron-clad  steamers.  I  thought  the 
force  already  there  sufficient  for  sacrifice,  as  well  as  enough 
to  hold  the  place  until  Bowling  Green  could  be  evacuated 
■with  its  supplies  and  munitions  of  war.  This  I  supposed  to 
be  the  main  object  of  the  movement  to  Donelson,  and  the 
only  good  that  could  be  effected  by  desperately  holding  that 
post  with  the  entirely  inadequate  means  in  hand  for  defence 
of  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers. 

With  a  less  force  than  fifty  thousand  (50,000)  men,  the 
position  at  Fort  Tonelson  was,  in  my  judgment,  quite  un- 
tenable, and  even  with  that  force  it  could  have  been  held  for 
only  a  short  time,  unless  a  force  of  twenty  thousand  (20,000) 
men  Avas  supporting  it  at  Clarksville,  and  twenty-five  thou- 
sand (25,000)  more  at  least  had  been  stationed  at  Nashville. 
While  these  were  my  own  views  and  opinions,  I  nevertheless 
transmitted  to  General  Johnston  the  exact  state  of  affairs  at 
the  fort  at  every  stage  of  the  conflict. 

My  vicAvs  and  opinions  upon  the  defence  of  Fort  Donel- 
son,  and  the  means  of  extricating  the  army  from  the  trap  in 
■which  necessity  had  thrown  them  there,  had  been  sec  forth 
in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  General  from  Clarksville  before 
I  received  orders  to  go  to  Fort  Donelson,  bearing  date  12th 
of  February.     I  annex  a  copy  of  that  letter  : 

Clarksville,  Tenn.,  Feb.  12,  1862. 

General  Johnston  : 

Sir  : — There  is  but  little  known  satisfactorily  of  the  enemy 
or  their  movements  ;  up  to  10  o'clock  last  night  all  Avas  quiet 
as  usual  at  the  Fort.  General  Buckner  is  now  there.  I 
have  thought  the  best  disposition  to  make  of  the  troops  on 
this  line  Avas  to  concentrate  the  main  force  at  Cumberland 
City — leaving  at  Fort  Donelson  enough  to  make  all  possible 
resistance  to  any  attack  Avhich  may  be  made  zipon  the  Fort, 
but  no  more.  The  character  of  the  country  in  the  rear  and 
to  the  left  of  the  Fort  is  such  as  to  make  it  dangerous  to 
concentrate  our  Avhole  force  there ;  for,  if  their  gun-boats 


19 

should  pass  tlie  Fort  and  command  tlie  river,  our  troops 
•would  be  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  a  force  from  the  Ten- 
nessee. In  this  event,  their  road  would  be  open  to  Nash- 
ville, without  any  obstruction  whatever.  The  position  at 
Cumberland  City  is  better  ;  for  there  the  railroad  diverges 
from  the  river  which  would  afford  some  little  facility  for 
transportation  in  case  of  necessity  ;  and  from  thence  the 
open  country  southward  towards  Nashville  is  easily  reached. 
Besides,  from  that  point  we  threaten  the  flank  of  any  force 
Bent  from  the  Tennessee  against  the  Fort,  I  am  making 
every  possible  effort  to  concentrate  the  forces  here  at  Cum- 
berland City.  I  have  been  in  the  greatest  dread  ever  since 
I  reached  this  place  at  their  scattered  condition.  The  force 
is  inadequate  to  defend  a  line  of  forty  miles  in  length  which 
can  be  attacked  from  three  different  directions.  We  can 
only  be  formidable  by  concentration.  A  strong  guard  is  all 
that  can  be  left  here,  and  this  no  longer  than  your  movement 
can  be  made.  I  shall  begin  to-day,  if  the  engineers  report 
favorably,  to  blockade  the  river  at  the  piers  of  the  railroad 
bridge.  I  have  taken  up  an  idea  that  a  ''raft,"  secured 
against  this  bridge,  can  render  the  river  impassable  for  the 
gun-boats.  If  this  is  possible,  it  will  be  an  immense  relief 
to  the  movements  above.  I  am  quite  sure  this  blockade  can 
be  made  at  a  lower  stage  of  water ;  but  the  present  stage  of 
water  renders  this  experiment  somewhat  doubtful,  still  1  will 
make  every  exertion  to  effect  the  blockade,  if  possible,  I 
received  by  telegraph  your  authority  to  make  any  disposi- 
tion of  the  troops  which,  in  my  judgment  was  best,  and 
acknowledged  it  by  a  dispatch  immediately.  I  am  acting 
accordingly. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  ob't  serv't, 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 
Brigadier  General,  C.  S.  A. 

Charge  2nd. — "  The  failure  of  any  attempt  to  save  the 
Army  by  cvacuaiing  the  post  when  found  to  he  untenable.''^ 

I  have  been  unfortunate  if  I  have  failed  to  show  in  my 
report  of  the  battle  at  Fort  Donelson  that  the  fight  on  the 
15th  of  February,  outside  of  our  entrenchments,  was  noth- 
ing but  an  "  attempt  to  save  the  army  by  evacuating  the 
Fort,"  which  the  position  and  numbers  of  the  enemy  had 
already  rendered  untenable.  In  my  report  of  the  27th  of 
February,  I  attempted  to  explain  why  we  left  our  entrench- 
ments on  the  loth   to  give  battle,  and  the   object  I  had  ia 


20 

view  in  doing  so.  I  said  '*  I  had  already  seen  the  impossi' 
bility  of  holding  ou_t  for  any  length  of  time  -with  our  inade- 
quate numbers  and  indefensible  position.  There  was  no 
place  in  our  entrenchments  but  could  be  reached  by  the 
enemy's  artillery  from  their  boats  or  their  batteries.  It 
was  but  fair  to  infer  that  whilst  they  kept  up  a  sufficient  fire 
upon  our  entrenchments,  to  keep  our  men  from  sleep  and 
prevent  repose,  their  object  was  merely  to  give  time  to  pass 
a  column  above  us  on  the  river,  both  on  the  right  and  the 
left  banks  and  thus  to  cut  off  all  our  communications  and  to 
prevent  the  possibility  of  egress.  I  then  saw  clearly  that 
but  one  course  Avas  left  by  which  a  rational  hope  could  be 
entertained  of  saving  the  garrison  or  a  part  of  it.  That 
was  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  his  position  on  cur  left  and 
thus  to  pass  our  people  into  the  open  country  lying  south- 
ward towards  Nashville." 

Upon  the  failure  of  this  enterprise,  the  causes  of  which 
are  fully  set  forth  in  my  report,  it  obviously  became  impos- 
sible to  *'  save  the  army  by  evacuating  the  post ;"  the 
"  attempt"  to  save  the  army  had  been  made.  I  thought 
then,  and  still  think,  that  a  more  earnest  "  attempt"  could 
not  be  made  by  an  equal  number  of  men  to  accomplish  any 
enterprise  by  force  of  arms.  To  extricate  the  army,  then, 
involved  the  necessity  of  anoth«rr  battle  that  night,  more 
desperate  than  that  of  the  morning,  because  the  enemy  had 
been  greatly  reinforced,  and  held  their  former  position  with 
fresh  troops.  There  is  such  a  thing  as  human  exhaustion, 
an  end  of  physical  ability  in  man  to  march  and  fight ;  how- 
ever little  such  a  contingency  may  seem  possible  to  those 
Avlio  sleep  quietly  upon  soft  beds,  who  fare  sumptuously 
every  day,  and  have  never  tried  the  exposure  of  protracted 
battles  and  hard  campaigns.  This  point  had  been  reached 
by  our  men;  the  conflict,  toil,  and  excitement  of  unsus- 
pended  battle,  running  through  eighty-four  hours,  was 
enough  to  wear  out  the  physical  strength  of  any  men  ;  espe- 
cially so,  when  the  greater  part  of  the  time  they  were  ex- 
posed to  a  storm  of  sleet,  snow,  and  continued  frost,  and 
opposed  to  a  force  five  or  six  times  greater  than  their  own, 
without  shelter  or  fire.  Many  of  the  men  had  been  frost- 
bitten ;  and  a  great  many  were  so  overcome  by  fatigue  and 
want  of  sleep  as  to  be  unable  to  keep  open  their  eyes  standing 
on  their  feet,  in  the  face  and  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

In  fact  the  men  were  totally   out  of  condition  to  fight. 
There  were  but  two  roads  by  which  it  was  possible  to  retire. 


31 

If  they  went  by  tlie  upper  road  they  would  certainly  have 
a  strong  position  of  the  enemy  to  cut  through,  besides 
having  to  march  over  the  battle  field  strewn  with  corpses ; 
and  if  they  retired  by  the  lower  road  they  would  have  to 
wade  through  water  three  feet  deep ;  which  latter  ordeal  the 
medical  director  stated  would  be  death  to  more  than  half  of 
the  command  on  account  of  the  severity  of  the  weather  and 
their  physical  prostration.  It  was  believed  in  council  that 
the  army  could  not  retire  without  sacrificing  three-fourths 
of  it.  The  consultation  which  took  place  among  the  officers 
on  the  night  of  the  loth  was  to  ascertain  whether  a  further 
struggle  could  be  maintained,  and  it  was  resolved  in  the 
negative  unconditionally  and  emphatically.  General  Buck- 
ner,  whose  immediate  command  was  the  largest  in  the  fort, 
was  positive  and  unequivocal  in  his  opinion  that  the  fight 
could  not  bo  renewed.  I  confess  I  was  myself  strongly 
influenced  by  this  opinion  of  General  Backner;  for  I  have 
not  yet  seen  an  ofiiccr  in  whoso  superior  military  ability, 
clear  discriminating^  judgment,  in  whose  calm  unflinching 
courage  and  unselfish  patriotism  I  more  fully  confide  than 
in  his.  The  loss  to  the  Confederacy  of  so  able,  brave  and 
accomplished  a  soldier  is  irreparable. 

From  my  own  knowledge  of  the  condition  of  the  men,  I 
thought  that  but  few  of  them  were  in  condition  to  encounter 
a  night  conflict.  So  the  plan  of  renewing  the  battle  was 
abandoned ;  and  thus  the  necessity  of  surrender  was  pre- 
sented. All  agreed  that  the  necessity  existed.  That  con- 
clusion having  been  reached,  nothing  remained  but  to  con- 
sider the  manner  of  it ;  and  that  is  fully  set  forth  in  my 
former  report. 

The  third  charge  is,  '"  why  they  abandoned  the  contmand 
to  their  inferior  oflScer,  .instead  of  executing  themselves 
whatever  measure  was  deemed  proper  for  the  entire  arm3^" 

The  *' abandonment  of  command"  here  imputed,  I  sup- 
pose to  mean  the  act  of  transferring  to  General  Buckner, 
who  was  willing  to  execute  it,  the  performance  of  the  for- 
malities of  surrender.  The  surrender  was  a  painful  and 
inexorable  necessity  which  could  not  be  avoided,  and  not  a 
''measure  deemed  proper  for  the  entire  army."  On  the 
contrary,  my  proposition  to  take  away  as  large  a  portion  of 
the  forces  as  possible  met,  I  am  sure,  with  the  approbation 
of  the  whole  council.  One  of  the  reasons  which  induced  me 
to  make  this  transfer  to  General  Buckner  was  in  order  thai 
I  might  be  untrammelcd  in   the  effort,  I  was  determined  to 


22 

malce  to  extricate  as  many  of  the  command  as  possible  from 
tlic  fort,  to  which  object  I  devoted  myself  during  the  night 
of  the  15th.  So  that  I  accomplished  the  fact  of  bringing  off 
troops  from  the  position,  I  thought  little  of  the  manner  of 
doing  so.  AH  possibility  of  further  fighting  was  over.  Not 
another  gun  was  to  be  fired,  no  personal  risk  Avas  to  be  in- 
curred, certain  and  absolute  freedom  from  all  personal  dan- 
ger was  secured  to  those  who  surrendered ;  further  danger, 
conflict  and  toil  could  befall  those  only  who  should  attempt 
to  escape  and  those  I  chose  to  lead. 

Nothing  was  to  be  done  by  those  who  remained  but  to  hoist 
the  white  flag,  and  to  surrender.  This  I  would  not  do,  for 
the  "measure"  of  surrender  had  not  been  thought  of  by 
myself  or  any  officer  present  in  the  council  as  one  proper 
for  the  "  entire  army,"  I  supposed  it  to  be  an  unquestiona- 
ble principle  of  military  action,  that  in  case  of  disaster  it  is 
better  to  save  a  part  of  a  command  than  to  lose  the  Avhole. 
The  alternative  proposition  which  I  adopted  in  preference  to 
surrendering  the  "  entire  army,"  was  to*  make  my  way  out 
of  the  beleagured  camp  with  such  men  as  were  still  able  to 
make  another  struggle,  if  it  could  be  accomplished ;  and  if 
it  could  not  be,  then  to  take  any  consequences  that  did  not 
involve  a  surrender. 

The  fifth  charge  is,  "  upon  what  principle  a  selection  was 
made  of  particular  troops,  being  certain  regiments  of  the 
senior  General's  brigade,  to  whose  use  all  the  transportation 
on  hand  was  appropriated." 

The  answer  to  this  charge  leads  directly  to  that  of  the 
fourth,  and  I  therefore  respond  first  to  this.  I  presume  it 
is  well  established  that  a  senior  general  can  select  any  troopa 
under  his  command  for  any  service  or  purpose  or  plan  he 
may  choose  to  execute ;  and  if  the  means  were  offered  of 
extricating  only  a  portion  of  men  from  a  general  surrender, 
I  presume  the  selection  of  this  portion  would  rest  with  him 
rather  than  with  any  other  person  or  persons.  This  would' 
be  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  charge  in  question,  if  I  chose 
to  rely  upon  it,  which  I  do  not.  My  real  answer  I  will  give 
fully.  It  is  untrue  that  "  all  the  transportation  on  hand  wa* 
appropriated  to  certain  regiments  of  the  senior  Generars  bri- 
gade." It  is  untrue  that  a  selection  was  made  of  "  particular 
troops."  I  am  sure  that  quite  as  many  men  belonging  to  other 
brigades  were  provided  with  "means  of  escape,"  "by  the  trans- 
portation on  hand"  as  Avere  of  the  senior  General's  brigade. 

Late  at  night  it  was  ascertained  that  two  steamboats  would- 
probably  reach  the  landing  before  day-light.     Then  I  de- 


23 


termmed  to  let  Col.  Forrest's  cavalry  proceed  on  their 
march  by  the  river  road,  which  was  impassable  for  anything 
but  cavalry,  on  account  of  the  back  water  and  over-liow 
whilst  I  would  remain  behind  and  endeavor  to  get  away  as 
many  men  as  possible  by  the  boats.  The  boats  came  a  short 
time  before  day-light,  when  I  hastened  to  the  river  and  be- 
gan to  ferry  the  men  over  to  the  opposite  shore  as  rapidly 
as  possible.     •  "^ 

The  men  were  taken  on  indiscriminately  as  they  came  tc 
the  boats;  but  in  the  first  instance   more  of  the '' Seni^i 
Gcnerars  Brigade"  were  present  than  of  other  troops,  from 
this  circumstance,  namely :  That  when  I  determined  not  to 
surrender,  I  caused  my  brigade  to  be  drawn  up  in  line  and 
to  await  my  final  preparation  for  a  forward  movement    This 
was  promptly  done,  and  as  they  were  nearest  the  leit  flank 
where  the  fight  would  first  begin,  so  likewise  were  they 
nearest  to  the  river  landing.     From  this  circumstance,  it 
happened  that  the  troops  from  my  immediate  command  were 
among  the  first  to  enter  the  boats;  but  all  the  men  from  all 
portions  ot  the  army,  who  were  present  and  could  be  gotten 
on  board,  were  taken  indiscriminately  as  far  as  I  had  any 
knowledge.     No  man  of  the  army  was  excluded  to  make 
room  for  my  brigade.     On  the  contrary,  all  who  came  wore 
taken  on  board,  until  some  time  after  day-li.rht   when  I  re- 
ceived a  message  from  General   Buckner  that'any  further 
delay  at  the  wharf  would  certainly  cause  the  loss  of  the  boat 
with  all  on  board.     Such  was  the  want  of  all  order  and  dis- 
cipline by  this  time  on  shore,  that  a  wild  rush  was  made  at 
the  boat,  which  the  captain  said  would  swamp  her  unless  he 
pushed  off  immediately.     This  was  done,  and  about  sunrise 
the  boat   on  which  I  was  (the  other  having  gone)  left  the 
shore  and  steered  up  the  river.     By  this  -  precise  mode  "  I 
effected  my  "escape,"  and  after  leaving  the  wharf  the  De- 
partment will  be  pleased  to  hear,  that  I  encountered  no  dan- 
gers whatever  from  the  enemy. 

I  had  announced  in  council  my  determination  to  take  my 
own  brigade  and  attempt  a  retreat;  and  this,  I  presume,  is 
What  IS  referred  to  in  the  charge  of  "selecting  certain  reffi- 
ments  of  the  Senior  Gcnerars  Brigade."  I  -selected"  this 
command,  because  they  had  been  with  me  in  the  most  tryinff 
service  for  seven  months,  had  been  repeatedly  under  fire 
had  been  exposed  to  every  hardship  incident  to  a  campai<^n' 
had  never  on  any  occasion  flinched  or  faltered,  had  ne?er 
uttered  a  complaint ;  and  I  knew  were  to  be    relied  on  for 


94 

any  enterprise  that  could  be  accomplislied.  In  announcing 
this  intention,  it  was  far  from  my  purpose  to  exclude  any 
troops  who  might  think  proper,  or  might  be  physically  able, 
to  join  me  in  making  the  movement. 

The  sixth  charge  is — "  A  particular  designation  of  the 
regiments  saved,  and  the  regiments  abandoned,  which  formed 
part  of  the  Senior  General's  brigade." 

My  brigade  consisted  of  the  36th  Reginffent  Va.  Vols., 
the  5!)th  llcg't  Va.  Vols.,  the  51st  Regiment  Va.  Vols.,  the 
^th  Rcg't  Va.  Vols.,  and  the  2()th  Reg't  Miss.  Vols.  No 
one  of  these  regiments  was  cither  wholly  saved  or  wholly 
left.  I  could  obtain  no  reports  from  regiments  until  I  ar- 
rived at  Murfreesboro'.  There  our  morning  reports  show 
the  aggregate  of  each  regiment  present  respectively  to  have 
been  of  the  36th  Rcg't  Va.  Vols.,  243;  5iith  Reg"t  Va. 
Vols.,  285;  5 1st  Reg't  Va.  Vols.,  274;  5Dth  Regiment  Va. 
Vols.,  184;  the  2Uth  Reg't  Miss.  Vols,  handed  in  no  report 
at  Murfreseboro',  and  what  there  was  of  it  was  ordered  away 
by  General  Johnston  ;  but  I  am  informed  that  their  morning 
report  will  show  over  three  hundred  (300)  as  present.  These 
reports  were  made  before  those  who  had  been  ferried  over 
the  river  at  Donelson  had  come  up. 

A  considerable  number  of  men  from  each  of  these  regi- 
ments were  "  saved,"  and  many  of  each  were  left  behind. 
Of  my  own  brigade,  a  great  many  who  were  left  effected 
their  escape  by  every  means  they  could  command,  and  joined 
their  regiments  and  companies,  except  the  20th  Regiment 
Miss.  Vols.,  which,  by  General  Johnston's  order  were  de- 
tached and  sent  home  to  recruit.  This  regiment,  at  the  last 
accounts  I  had  of  it,  immediately  after  the  fight  of  Fort 
Donelson,  numbered,  as  already  stated,  about  three  hundred 
(300)  men ;  but  I  have  no  accurate  information  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  loss  I  felt  most  seriously,  was  that  of  my  three 
artillery  companies  of  Virginia  troops,  so  remarkable  for 
their  efficiency  and  real  gallantry,  who  had  followed  me  so 
faithfully  throughout  my  service  in  Virginia,  and  who 
fought  so  bravely  during  the  whole  of  the  trying  conflict  at 
Donelson. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 

[Copy.]  Brig.  General  C.  S.  A. 

Peter  Otey, 

A.  A.  General. 


LETTER   OF    GEN.   JOHN  B.  FLOYD   TO   CHAIR- 
MAN OF  SPECIAL  COMMITTEE. 


*Abingdon,  March  25th,  1862. 

Hon.  Henry  S.  Foote, 

Chairman,  &fc  ,  House  of  Representatives  : 

Sir  :  Just  as  I  Avas  getting  ready  to  leave  Knoxville, 
where  I  had  been  ordered  by  Major  General  Smith,  to  as- 
sist with  my  command  in  the  defence  of  that  locality,  I  re- 
ceived your  letter,  sent  back  from  Decatur  whither  it  had 
been  first  sent. 

I  had,  the  day  before,  received  the  order  from  the  War 
Department,  relieving  me  from  my  command,  and  a  letter, 
preferring  certain  charges  against  me,  for  which  I  suppose 
this  punishment  was  inflicted.  To  these  charges  I  was  re- 
quired to  answer,  which  I  have  done ;  and,  as  they  cover  the 
points  of  inquiry  pending  before  your  honorable  committee, 
I  have  thought  proper  to  send  you,  in  answer  to  your  in- 
quiries, for  the  information  of  your  committee,  a  copy  of  my 
answer  to  the  charges  of  the  War  Department.  The  delay 
in  responding  to  these  inquiries  has  grown  out  of  my  failure 
to  got  the  official  documents  requiring  the  answer  until 
within  a  few  days  past. 

I  regret  that  my  first  report  should  have  proved  so  unsat- 
isfactory to  the  authorities  of  the  Confederacy.  It  was,  to 
be  sure,  written  very  hurriedly  in  my  tent,  at  night,  after 
a  long  day's  march,  and  after  the  business  of  that  day  and 
the  preparations  for  the  march  of  the  next  were  completed. 
But  I  supposed  that  a  simple  narrative  of  the  ti'ansactions 
which  led  through  the  terrible  and  most  sanguinary  fight  of 
Fort  Donelson  to  the  painful,  but  unavoidable  necessity  of 
a  small  force  yielding  at  last  to  an  overwhelming  one,  was 
all  tliat  could  be  expected  officially  at  my  hands.  If  I  had 
been  at  leisure,  and  had  determined  to  go  into  a  detailed 
statement  of  all  the  facts  and  incidents  within  my  know- 


2G 

ledge,  I  should  equally  have  failed  to  cover  the  points 
raised  in  the  accusations  preferred  against  me  by  the  De- 
partment. I  never  dreamed,  for  a  moment,  that  I  had  done 
anything,  or  had  neglected  any  duty,  for  which,  in  my  re- 
port of  that  battle,  I  should  find  it  necessary  to  present  a 
defence  against  grave  and  dishonoring  charges.  But  far 
less  did  I  suppose  it  possible  that  I  should  be  held  responsi- 
ble for  failing  to  defend  the  Cumberland  river  and  the  capi- 
tal of  Tennessee,  with  the  insignificr.nt  means  put  at  my 
command,  against  an  overwhelming  force,  at  least  six  times 
my  own  in  numbers,  advancing  )yith  perfect  preparation  by 
land  and  water. 

It  ought  to  have  been  understood  that  this  fort  could  not 
withstand  the  force  which  the  enemy  were  certain  to  bring 
against  it.  It  was  ill-conceived,  badly  executed,  and  still 
worse  located,  with  only  thirteen  guns  of  all  calibres,  the 
greater  part  of  them  small,  and  therefore  useless.  It  had 
in  fact  only  three  effective  guns,  and  an  important  portion 
of  its  defensive  works  was  not  commenced  until  the  enemy 
had  made  his  appearance  before  it  in  force.  It  was  to  sus- 
tain a  continued  attack  from  the  gunboat  fleet,  known  for 
months  to  have  been  preparing  in  the  West  by  the  enemy 
for  operations  against  our  western  rivers,  and  numbering 
at  least  ten  (10,)  carrying  each  probably  sixteen  to  twenty 
guns  of  the  largest  calibre.  These  gunboats  were  to  be 
seconded  by  a  land  force,  drawn  from  an  army  in  the  West 
well  known  to  be  organized  on  the  most  formidable  scale, 
amounting,  in  the  aggregate,  to  200,1)00  men,  all  so  stationed 
as  to  be  easily  concentrated  on  the  banks  of  the  Cumber- 
land, or  any  other  western  river,  in  the  space  of  one  week, 
heavy  columns  of  which,  at  the  time  I  was  sent  to  Fort 
Donelson,  were  known  to  be  moving  upon  the  Cumberland 
river. 

The  naked  fort,  as  I  have  described  it,  constituted  the 
entire  preparation  of  the  Confederate  Government  for  meet- 
ing the  advance  of  this  most  formidable  array  up  the  Cum- 
berland river.  The  little  intrenchments  or  rifle  pits  around 
the  encampments,  constructed  to  defend  our  people  against 
the  land  attack,  were  not  completed  until  the  morning  of 
the  13th  February,  the  men  working  all  the  night  before 
upon  them,  the  enemy  having  appeared  in  force  and  begun 
the  attack  on  the  preceding  day. 

I  have  caused  a  diagram  of  the  fort  and  defences  around 
it  to  be  made,  which  I  append  to  this  communication.     You 


27 

will  see  from  it,  that  the  river  bounded  our  position  etitirelj 
on  the  north,  and  the  encampment  and  batteries  of  the 
enemy  surrounded  us  on  every  other  side. 

Again,  referring  you  particularly  to  my  supplemental  re- 
port of  the  2Uth  inst.,  heretofore  forwarded  through  General 
A.  S.  Johnston  to  the  War  Department,  a  copy  of  which  is 
herewith  sent,  as  containing  minute  answer  to  the  points  of 
inquiry  embraced  in  your  letter  to  me, 
I  have  the  honor  to  be, 

With  the  highest  respect, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 
Brigadier  General  C.  S.  A. 


GENERAL  PILLOW'S  REPORT  OF    THE  BATTLES 
AT  FORT  DONELSON. 


0  (^^ 

41  '^■' 


Columbia,  Tennessee,  ) 

February  18,  1862.      \ 

Captain  Clarence  Derrick, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General : 

On  the  9tli  instant,  General  A.  S.  Johnston  ordered  me 
to  proceed  to  Fort  Donelson  and  take  command  at  that  post. 

On  the  10th  instant,  I  arrived  at  that  place.  In  detailing 
the  operations  of  the  forces  under  mj  command  at  Fort 
Donelson,  it  is  proper  to  state  the  condition  of  that  work, 
and  of  the  forces  constituting  its  garrison,  Whon  I  ar- 
rived, I  found  the  work  on  the  river  battery  unfinished  and 
wholly  too  weak  to  resist  the  force  of  heavy  artillery. 

I  found  a  10-inch  Columbiad  and  a  32-pounder  rifled  gun 
had  not  been  mounted.  Deep  gloom  was  hanging  over  the 
command,  and  the  troops  were  greatly  depressed,  and  de- 
moralized by  the  circumstances  attending  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Henry  and  the  raanner  of  retiring  from  that  place. 

My  first  attention  was  given  to  the  necessity  of  strength- 
ening this  work,  and  mounting  the  two  heavy  guns,  and 
to  the  construction  of  defensive  works  to  protect  the  rear  of 
the  river  battery. 

I  imparted  to  the  work  all  the  energy  which  it  was  possi- 
ble to  do ;  working  day  and  night  with  the  whole  command. 
The  battery  was  without  a  competent  number  of  artillerists, 
and  those  that  were  there  were  not  well  instructed  in  the 
use  of  the  guns. 

To  provide  for  this  want  I  placed  the  artillery  companies 
under  active  course  of  instruction,  in  the  use  of  their  guns. 
I  detailed  Capt.  Ross,  with  his  company  of  light  artillerists 
to  the  command  of  one  of  the  river  batteries. 


These  heavy  guns  being  mounted,  and  provision  made  for 
working  them,  and  a  proper  supply  of  ammunition  having 
been  procured,  by  my  orders,  from  Nashville,  I  felt  myself 
prepared  to  test  the  effect  of  the  fire  of  heavy  metal  against 
the  enemy's  gun-boats,  though  the  work  stood  much  in  need 
of  more  heavy  pieces.  The  armament  of  the  batteries  con- 
sisted of  eight  (8)  32-pounders ;  three  (3)  32-pounder  car- 
ronades,  one  (1)  8-inch  Columbiad,  and  one  (1)  rifle  gun  of 
32-pounder  calibre. 

The  selection  of  the  site  for  the  work  was  an  unfortunate 
one.  While  its  command  of  the  river  was  favorable,  the 
site  was  commanded  by  the  heights  above  and  below  on  the 
river,  and  by  a  continous  range  of  hills  around  the  work  to 
its  rear.  A  field  work  of  very  contracted  dimensions  had 
been  constructed  for  the  garrison  to  protect  the  battery,  but 
the  field  works  were  commanded  by  the  hills  already  referred 
to,  and  lay  open  to  a  fire  of  artillery  from  every  direction 
except  from  the  hills  below. 

To  guard  against  the  effects  of  fire  of  artillery  from  these 
heights,  a  line  of  defensive  works,  consisting  of  rifle  pits 
and  abattis  for  infantry,  detached  on  our  right,  but  con- 
tinuous on  our  left,  with  defences  for  our  light  artillery 
were  laid  off  by  Major  Gilmer,  Engineer  of  Gen.  A.  S. 
Johnston's  stafi",  but  on  duty  with  me  at  the  post,  around  the 
rear  of  the  battery,  and  on  the  heights  from  which  artillery 
could  reach  our  battery,  and  inner  field  work,  enveloping 
the  inner  work  and  the  town  of  Dover,  where  our  principal 
supplies  of  Commissary  and  Quartermaster  stores  were  in 
depot. 

These  works  pushed  with  the  utmost  possible  energy  were 
not  quite  completed,  nor  were  my  troops  all  in  position,  al- 
though nearly  so,  when  Brigadier  General  Floyd,  my  senior 
officer,  reached  that  station.  The  works  were  laid  off  with 
great  judgment  and  skill  by  Major  Gilmer, — were  well 
executed  and  designed  for  the  defence  of  the  rear  of  the 
work ;  the  only  objection  being  to  the  length  of  the  line, 
which,  however,  was  unavoidable  from  the  surroundings. 

The  length  of  the  line  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  force 
for  its  defence  was  a  source  of  embarrassment  throughout 
the  struggle  which  subsequently  ensued  in  the  defence  of 
the  position. 

I  had  placed  Brigadier  General  Buckner  in  command  of 
the  right  wing,  and  Brigadier  General  B.  R.  Johnson  in 
command  of   the   left.     By    extraordinary  eflorts,  we  had 


99 

barely  got  these  worjcs  in  defensible  condition,  -wlien  tbe 
enemy  made  an  advance  in  force  around  and  against  the 
entire  line  of  outer  work. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TRENCHES. 

The  assault  was  commenced  by  the  enemy's  artillery 
against  the  centre  of  our  left  wing,  which  was  promptly  re- 
sponded to  by  Capt,  Greene's  battery  of  field  artillery. 

After  several  hours  of  firing  between  the  artillery  of  the 
two  armies,  the  enemy's  infantry  advanced  to  the  conflict, 
all  along  the  line,  which  was  kept  up  and  increased  in 
volume  from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the  other,  for  several 
hours,  when,  at  last,  the  enemy  made  a  vigorous  assault 
against  the  right  of  our  left  wing,  the  position  assaulted 
being  a  height  commanded  by  Col.  Ileiman  and  defended  by 
his  brigade,  consisting  of  the  lOth  Tennessee,  under  com- 
mand of  Lieut.  Col.  McGavock,  Col.  Vorhies',  Col.  Hughes', 
and  Col.  Head's  regiments,  Tennessee  volunteers,  and  de- 
fended by  Capt.  INIaury's  field  battery. 

This  assault  was  vigorously  made,  and  the  position  as 
vigorously  defended,  and  resulted  in  the  repulse  of  the 
enemy  here  and  everywhere  around  the  line.  The  result  of 
the  day's  work  pretty  well  tested  the  strength  of  our  defen- 
sive lines,  and  established,  beyond  question,  the  gallantry  of 
the  entire  command,  all  of  which  fought  gallantly  their  por- 
tion of  the  line. 

The  loss  sustained  by  our  forces  in  this  engagement  was 
not  large,  our  men  being  mostly  under  shelter  in  the  rifle 
pits,  but  we,  nevertheless,  had  quite  a  number  killed  and 
wounded,  but  owing  to  the  continued  fighting  which  followed, 
it  was  impossible  to  get  any  official  report  of  the  casualties 
of  the  day. 

On  the  same  day  our  battery  on  the  river  was  engaged 
with  one  of  tlie  enemy's  gun-boats,  which  occasioned  quite 
a  lively  cannonading  for  more  than  an  hour,  in  which  the 
gallant  Capt.  Dixon  of  the  engineer  corps  was  killed  in- 
stantly at  the  battery.  This  officer  had  been  on  duty  for 
some  months  at  the  post,  and  had  shown  great  energy  and 
professional  skill,  and  by  his  gallant  bearing  on  that  day, 
while  directing  the  operations  of  the  day,  under  my  orders, 
had  justly  earned  for  himself  high  distinction.  His  death 
was  a  serious  loss  to  the  service,  and  was  a  source  of  no 
little  embarrassment  in  our  after  operations. 


31 

On  the  12t]i  we  had  quiet,  but  we  saw  the  smoke  of  a 
large  number  of  gun-boats  and  st3am-boats  below.  We 
also  received  reliable  information  of  the  arrival  of  a  large 
number  of  new  troops,  greatly  increasing  the  strength  of 
the  enemy's  forces,  already  said  to  be  from  2(J  to  3U,U00 
strong. 

BATTLE  WITH  THE  GUN-BOATS, 

On  the  13th  these  reinforcements  were  seen  advancing  to 
their  position  in  the  line  of  investment,  and  while  this  was 
being  done  six  of  the  enemy's  iron-cased  gun-boats  were  seen 
advancing  up  the  river,  five  of  which  were  abreast  and  in 
line  of  battle,  and  the  sixth  some  distance  to  the  rear. 
When  these  gun-boats  arrived  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of 
our  battery,  they  opened  fire  on  the  battery. 

My  orders  to  the  officers.  Captain  Shuster  and  Captain 
Standewitz  who  commanded  the  lower  battery  of  eight  guns, 
and  Captain  Ross  who  commanded  the  upper  battery  of  four 
guns,  were  to  hold  their  fire  until  the  enemy's  boats  should 
come  within  point  blank  range  of  their  guns.  This  they 
did,  though  the  ordeal  of  holding  their  fire,  while  the  ene- 
my's shot  and  shell  fell  thick  around  tlieir  position  was  a  se- 
vere restraint  to  their  patriotic  impulses ;  but  nevertheless, 
our  batteries  made  no  response  until  the  enemy's  gun-boats 
got  within  range  of  these  guns.  Our  entire  line  of  batte- 
ries then  opened  fire ;  the  guns  of  both  parties  were  well 
served ;  the  enemy  constantly  advancing,  delivering  direct 
fire  against  our  batteries  from  his  line  of  five  gun-boats, 
while  the  sixth  boat,  moving  up  in  rear,  kept  the  air  filled  with 
shells  which  fell  thick  and  close  around  the  position  of  our 
batteries.  The  fight  continued,  tlic  enemy  steadily  advancing 
slowly  up  the  river,  the  shot  and  shell  from  fifteen  heavy 
rifled  guns  tearing  our  parapets  and  plunging  deep  in  the 
earth  around  and  over  our  batteries,  for  nearly  two  hours, 
and  until  his  boats  had  reached  within  the  distance  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  our  batteries. 

Having  come  in  such  close  conflict,  I  could  distinctly  see 
the  effects  of  our  shots  from  the  heavy  guns  to  one  of  his 
boats,  when  she  instantly  shrunk  back  and  drifted  helpless 
below  the  line.  Several  shot  struck  another  boat  tearing  her 
iron  case  and  splintering  her  timbers  and  making  them  crack 
as  if  by  a  stroke  of  lightning,  when  she  too  fell  back. 

Then  a  third  received  several  severe  shocks, making  her  metal 
ring,  and  her  timbers  crack  when  the  whole  line  gave  way, 


3« 

and  fell  rapidly  back  from  our  fire,  until  they  passed  out  of 
range.  Thus  ended  the  first  severe  and  close  conflict  of  our 
heavy  guns  with  the  enemy's  gunboats,  testing  their  strength 
and  the  power  of  our  heavy  guns  to  resist  them. 

The  shot  from  our  32-pounder  guns  produced  but  little 
effect ;  they  struck  and  rebounded  apparently  doing  but  little 
damage ;  but  I  am  satisfied  by  close  observation  that  the 
timbers  of  the  frame  work  did  not,  and  could  not  withstand  the 
shock  of  the  lO-inch  Columbiad,  or  32-pounder  rifled  gun. 

These  gunboats  never  renewed  the  attack.  I  learned  from 
citizens  living  on  the  river  below  that  one  of  the  injured 
boats  sunk,  and  that  others  had  to  be  towed  to  Cairo.  This 
information  may  or  may  not  be  true ;  but  it  is  certain  that 
all  of  the  boats  were  repulsed  and  driven  back  after  a  most 
vigorous  and  determined  attack,  and  that  two  of  the  boats 
were  badly  damaged,  and  that  a  third  was  raorc  or  less 
injured. 

It  is  diflficult  to  over-estimate  the  gallant  bearing  and 
heroic  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of  our  batteries,  who 
so  well  and  so  persistently  fought  our  guns,  until  the  enemy's 
determined  advance  brought  his  boats  and  guns  into  such 
close  and  desperate  conflict. 

Where  all  did  their  duty  so  well  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
discriminate.  The  Captains  have  already  received  and  their 
Lieutenants  (whose  names  for  want  of  official  reports,  I 
cannot  give)  all  deserve  the  highest  commendation. 

Lieut.  George  S.  Martin,  Avhose  company  is  at  Columbus, 
Ky.,  but  who  was  ordered  to  that  post  by  Major  General 
Polk,  commanded  one  of  the  guns,  and  particularly  attracted 
my  attention  by  the  energy  and  judgment  with  which  he 
fought  his  gun. 

The  wadding  of  his  gun  having  given  out,  he  pulled  off" 
his  coat  and  rammed  it  down  his  gun  as  wadding,  and  thus 
kept  up  the  fire  until  the  enemy  were  finally  repulsed. 

On  the  evening  of  this  day,  we  received  information  of 
the  arrival  of  additional  reinforcements  of  infantry,  cavalry 
and  light  artillery  by  steamboat,  all  of  which  were  disem- 
barked a  short  distance  below  our  position. 

BATTLE  OF    DOVER. 

On  the  14th  inst.,  theenemy  were  busy  throwing  his  forces 
of  every  arm  around  us,  extending  his  line  of  investment 
entirely  around  our  position,  and  completely  enveloping  us. 


33 

On  the  evening  of  this  day  we  ascertained  that  the  enemy 
had  received  by  steamboat  additional  reinforcements. 

We  were  now  surrounded  by  an  immense  force,  said  by 
prisoners  whom  we  had  taken  to  amount  to  fifty-two  regi- 
ments, and  every  road  and  possible  avenue  of  departure  cut 
off,  with  the  certainty  that  our  sources  of  supply  by  river 
AYOuld  soon  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy's  batteries,  placed  upon 
the  river  above  us.  At  a  meeting  of  General  Officers,  called 
by  General  Floyd,  it  was  determined  unanimously  to  give 
the  enemy  battle  next  day  at  daylight  so  as  to  cut  open  a 
route  of  exit  for  our  troops  to  the  interior  of  the  c:>untry, 
and  thus  to  save  our  army.  We  had  knowledge  that  the 
principal  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  were  massed  in  en- 
campments in  front  of  the  extreme  left  of  our  position,  com- 
manding the  two  roads  leading  to  the  interior,  one  of  which 
we  must  take  in  retiring  from  our  position. 

We  knew  be  had  amassed  in  encampment  anothei-  large 
force  on  the  Winn's  Ferry  Road,  opposite  the  centre  of  our 
left  wing ;  Avhile  still  another  was  massed  nearly  in  front  of 
the  left  of  our  right  wing.  His  fresh  arrival  of  troops  being 
encamped  on  the  bank  of  the  river  two  and  a  half  miles 
below  us,  from  which  latter  encampment  a  stream  of  fresh 
troops  was  constantly  pouring  around  us  on  his  line  of  in- 
vestment and  strengthening  his  general  encampment  on  the 
extreme  right. 

At  each  of  his  encampments,  and  on  each  road,  he  had  in 
position  a  battery  of  field  artillery  and  24-pounder  iron  guns 
on  siege  carriages.  Between  these  encampments  on  the 
roads  was  a  thick  undergrowth  of  brush  and  black-jack, 
making  it  impossible  to  advance  or  manoeuvre  any  consider- 
able body  of  troops. 

The  plan  of  attack  agreed  upon  and  directed  by  General 
Floyd  to  be  executed  was  that,  with  the  main  body  of  the 
forces  defending  our  left  wing,  I  should  attack  the  right 
wing  of  the  enemy,  occupy ig  and  resting  on  the  heights 
reaching  to  the  bank  of  the  river,  accompanied  by  Col.  For- 
rest's Brigade  of  Cavalry.  That  General  Buckner,  with  the 
forces  under  his  command,  and  defending  the  right  of  our 
line,  should  strike  the  enemy's  encampment  and  forces  on 
the  Winn's  Ferry  road.  That  the  forces  under  Col,  Ileiman 
should  hold  his  position  and  that  each  command  should  leave 
in  the  trenches  troops  to  hold  the  trenches.  In  this  order  of 
battle,  it  was  easy  to  be  seen  that  if  my  attack  was  successful 
and  the  enemy  was  routed,  tliat  his  retreat  would  be  along  hia 
3 


S4 

line  of  investment  towards  the  Winn's  Ferry  encampment, 
and  tlicnce  towards  his  reserve  at  the  gun-boats  below.  In 
other  words,  my  success  would  roll  the  enemy's  force  in  re- 
treat over  upon  General  Buckner,  when  by  his  attack  in 
flank  and  rear,  we  could  cut  up  the  enemy  and  put  him 
completely  to  rout. 

Accor  'ingly,  dispositions  were  made  to  attack  the  enemy. 
At  five  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  I  moved  out  of 
my  position  to  engage  the  enemy.  In  less  than  one  half 
hour  our  forces  were  engaged. 

The  enemy  was  prepared  to  receive  me  in  advance  of  his 
encampment,  and  he  did  receive  me  before  I  had  assumed  a 
line  of  battle,  and  while  I  was  moving  against  him  without 
any  formation  for  the  engagement. 

For  the  first  half  hour  of  the  engagement,  I  was  much 
embarrassed  in  getting  the  command  in  position  properly  to 
engage  the  enemy.  Having  extricated  myself  from  the  po- 
sition, and  fairly  engaged  the  enemy,  we  fought  him  for 
nearly  two  hours  before  I  made  any  decided  advance  upon 
him.  He  contested  this  field  most  stubbornly.  The  loss  of 
both  nrmies  on  this  position  was  heavy — the  enemy's  par- 
ticularly so,  as  I  discovered  by  riding  over  the  field  after  the 
battle.  The  enemy  having  been  forced  to  yield  this  portion 
of  the  field  retired  slowly  towards  the  Winn's  Ferry  road — 
Buckner's  point  of  attack.  He  did  not  retreat,  but  fell  back 
fighting  us  and  contesting  every  inch  of  ground. 

The  fight  was  hotly  contested  and  stubborn  on  both  sides 
and  consumed  the  day  till  12  o'clock,  to  drive  the  enemy  as 
far  back  as  the  centre  where  General  Buckner  was  to  Hank 
him.  While  my  command  was  slowly  advancing  and  driving 
back  the  enemy,  I  was  anxiously  expecting  to  hear  General 
Buckner's  command  open  fire  in  his  rear,  which  not  taking 
place,  1  was  apprehensive  of  some  misapprehension  of  orders 
and  come  from  the  field  of  battle  Avithin  the  work  to  ascer- 
tain what  was  the  matter.  I  there  found  the  command  of 
General  Buckner  massed  behind  the  ridge  within  the  work 
taking  shelter  from  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the  Winn's 
Ferry  road,  it  having  been  forced  to  retire  before  the  bat- 
tery as  I  learned  from  him. 

My  force  was  still  slowly  advancing,  driving  the  enemy 
before  the  battery.  I  directed  General  Buckner  immediately 
to  move  his  command  round  to  the  rear  of  the  battery,  turn- 
ing its  left,  keeping  in  the  hollow,  and  attack  and  carry  it. 
Before  the  movement  was  executed,  my  forces,  forming  the 


35 

attacking  party  on  the  right,  with  Col.  Forrest's  regiment 
of  cavalry,  had  reached  the  position  of  the  battery.  Col. 
Forrest's  cavalry  gallantly  charged  a  large  body  of  infantry 
supporting  the  battery,  driving  it  and  forcing  the  battery- to 
retire,  and  taking  six  pieces  of  artillery — four  brass  pieces 
and  two  24-pounder  iron  pieces.  In  pursuing  the  enemy 
falling  back  from  this  position,  General  Buckner's  forces 
became  united  with  mine  and  engaged  the  enemy  in  a  hot 
contest  of  nearly  an  hour  with  large  forces  of  fresh  troops 
that  now  met  us. 

This  position  of  the  enemy  being  carried  by  our  joint 
forces,  I  called  off  the  further  pursuit,  after  seven-and  jv- 
half  hours  of  continuous  and  bloody  conflict. 

■  Alter  the  troo^is  were  called  off  from  the  pursuit,  orders 
were  immediately  given  to  the  different  commands  to  form 
and  retire  to  their  original  positions  in  the  entrenchments. 

The  operations  of  the  day  forced  the  entire  command  of 
the  enemy  around  to  our  right  and  in  front  of  General 
Buckner's  position  in  the  entrenciiments,  and  when  he 
reached  his  position  he  found  the  enemy  advancing  rapidly 
to  take  possession  of  his  portion  of  our  works.  He  had  a 
stubborn  conflict,  lasting  one  and  a  half  hour,  to  regain  his 
position  ;  and  the  enemy  actually  got  possession  of  the  ex- 
treme right  of  his  works,  and  held  them  so  firmly  that  he 
could  not  dislodge  him.  The  position  thus  gained  by  the 
enemy  Avas  a  most  important  and  commanding  one,  being 
immediately  in  rear  of  our  river  batteries,  and  fieldwork  for 
its  protection.  From  it  he  could  readily  turn  the  entrench- 
ed work  occupied  by  General  Buckner,  and  attack  him  in 
reverse,  or  he  could  advance  under  cover  of  our  intervening 
ridge,  directly  upon  our  battery  and  field  work.  While  the 
enemy  held  the  position,  it  was  manifest  we  could  not  hold 
the  main  Avork  or  battery. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  two  armies  at  nightfall 
after  nine  hours  of  conflict  on  the  15th  instant,  in  which  our 
loss  was  severe,  and  leaving  not  less  than  one  thousand  of  the 
enemy  dead  upon  the  field.  We  left  upon  the  field  nearly 
all  of  his  wounded,  because  we  could  not  remove  them.  We 
left  his  dead  unburied,  because  we  could  not  bury  them. 
Such  carnage  and  conflict  has,  perhaps,  never  before  occur- 
red on  this  continent.  We  took  about  three  hundred  pri- 
soners and  a  large  number  of  arms. 

We  had  fought  the  battle  to  open  the  way  for  our  army, 
and  to  relieve  us  from  an  investment  which  would  necessa- 


56 

rilv  reduce  us  and  the  position  wc  occupied  by  famine.  Wc 
had  accomplished  our  object,  but  it  occupied  the  whole  day, 
and  before  we  could  prepare  to  leave,  after  taking  in  the 
wounded  and  dead,  the  enemy  had  thrown  around  us  again, 
in  the  night,  an  immense  force  of  fresh  troops,  and  reoccu- 
pied  his  original  position  in  the  line  of  investment,  thus 
again  cutting  off  our  retreat. 

We  had  only  about  13,Uli()  troops  all  told;  of  these  we 
had  lost  a  large  proportion  in  the  three  battles.  The  com- 
mand had  been  in  the  trenches  night  and  day  for  five  days, 
exposed  to  the  snow  and  sleet,  and  mud  and  ice  water,  with- 
out shelter  and  without  adequate  covering,  and  without 
sleep.  In  this  condition  the  General  oflficers  held  a  consul- 
tation to  determine  what  we  should  do.  General  Buckner 
gave  it  as  his  decided  opinion  that  he  could  not  hold  his  po- 
sition a  half  hour  against  an  assault  of  the  enemy,  and  said 
he  was  satisfied  the  enemy  would  attack  him  at  daylight  the 
next  morning. 

The  proposition  was  then  made  by  the  undersigned  to 
again  fight  our  way  through  the  enemy's  lines  and  cut  our 
way  out.  General  Buckner  said  his  command  was  so  worn 
out  and  cut  to  pieces  and  demoralized,  that  he  could  not 
make  another  fight;  that  it  would  cost  the  command  three- 
fourths  its  present  numbers  to  cut  its  way  out,  and  that  it 
was  wrong  to  sacrifice  three-fourths  of  a  command  to  save 
one-fourth  ;  that  no  officer  had  a  right  to  cause  such  a  sacri- 
fice. General  Floyd  and  Major  Gilmer,  I  understood  to 
concur  in  this  opinion.  I  then  expressed  the  opinion  that 
we  could  hold  out  another  day,  and  in  that  time  we  could 
get  steamboats  and  set  the  command  over  the  river,  and 
probably  save  a  large  portion  of  it.  To  this  General  Buck- 
ner replied  that  the  enemy  would  certainly  attack  us  in  the 
moaning,  and  that  he  could  not  hold  his  position  a  half 
hour.  The  alternative  of  these  propositions  was  a  surren- 
der of  the  position  and  command.  General  Floyd  said  he 
would  not  surrender  the  command,  nor  would  he  surrender 
himself  a  prisoner.  I  had  taken  the  same  position.  Gene- 
ral Buckner  said  he  was  satisfied  nothing  else  could  be  done, 
and  that,  therefore,  he  would  surrender  the  command,  if 
placed  in  command.  General  Floyd  said  he  would  turn 
over  the  command  to  him,  if  he  could  be  allowed  to  with- 
draw his  command.  General  Buckner  consented  to  this. 
Thereupon  the  command  was  turned  over  to  me,  I 
passing  it   instantly  to  General  Buckner,  saying  I  would 


87 

neither  surrender  the  command  nor  myself.  I  directed 
Colonel  Forrest  to  cut  his  way  out.  Under  these  circum- 
stances General  Buckner  accepted  the  command,  and  sent 
a  flag  of  truce  to  the  enemy  for  an  armistice  of  six  hours  to 
negotiate  for  terms  of  capitulation.  Before  this  flag  and 
communication  were  delivered,  I  retired  from  thp  garrison. 

Before  closing  my  report  of  the  operations  of  the  army 
at  DoRclson,  I  must,  in  justice  to  tlie  ofhcers  and  commands 
under  my  immediate  command,  say  that  harder  figliting  or 
more  gallant  conduct  in  officers  and  men  I  have  never  wit- 
nessed. In  the  absence  of  oflicial  reports  of  brigadier  and 
regimental  commanders,  of  which  I  am  deprived  by  the  cir- 
cumstances detailed  in  this  report,  I  may  not  be  able  to  do 
justice  to  the  diiferent  corps.  I  will  say,  however,  that  the 
forces  under  my  immediate  cominand,  during  the  action, 
bore  themselves  most  gallantly  throughout  the  long  and 
bloody  conflict.  I  speak  with  especial  commendation  of  the 
brigades  commanded  by  Colonels  Baldwin  and  Wharton, 
McCausland,  Simonton  and  Drake,  and  of  Captains  Maney 
and  Green,  who  fought  their  guns  under  the  constant  and 
annoying  fire  of  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters,  and  of  the 
concentrated  line  from  his  field  batteries,  from  which  both 
commands  suff"ered  severely.  Captain  Maney  Avas  himself 
wounded,  and  had  several  laeutenants  killed  and  wounded, 
and  many  of  his  company  also  killed  and  wounded.  Such 
was  the  case  also  with  Captains  Graves  and  Porter.  If  I 
should,  hereafter,  receive  the  reports  of  regimental  and  bri- 
gade commanders,  giving  me  detailed  information  of  the 
conduct  and  bearing  of  ofiicers  and  men,  I  will  make  a  sup- 
plemental report.  The  absence  of  official  reports  deprives 
rae  of  the  means  of  giving  lists  of  the  killed  and  wounded 
of  the  different  commands.  I  am  satisfied  that  in  such  a 
series  of  conflicts  our  loss  was  heavy.  I  know  the  enemy's 
was,  from  passing  over  the  field  of  battle,  in  the  evening 
immediat.^ly  after  the  battle,  in  company  with  General 
Floyd.  His  loss  in  killed  was  terrible,  exceeding  anything 
I  have  ever  seen  upon  a  battle  field. 

Our  total  force  in  the  field  did  not  exceed  in,0!)()  men, 
while  from  what  I  saw  of  the  enemy's  force,  and  from  in- 
formation derived  from  many  prisoners  of  the  enemy,  we 
are  sure  he  had  between  30,000  and  40,000  men  in  the 
field. 

I  must  acknowledge  many  obligations  to  Major  Gilmer, 
Engineer,  for  especial  and  valuable  services  rendered  me  in 


laying  off  these  works,  and  the  energy  displayed  hy  him  ins 
directing  their  construction,  and  for  his  counsel  and  advice. 
I,  likewise,  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Captain  Gus.  A, 
Henry,  jr.,  my  A.  A.  General;  to  Colonel  John  C.  Burch, 
my  Aid-de-camp  ;  to  Major  Field,  to  Lieutenant  Nichol- 
son, to  Lieutenant  Chas.  F.  Martin,  and  Colonel  Brandon, 
my  Volunteer  Aids-de-camp  ;  to  Major  Hays,  my  Assistant 
Commissary,  and  ]Major  Jones,  my  Assistant  Quartermaster, 
for  the  prompt  manner  in  which  they  executed  my  orders, 
under  trying  circumstances,  throughout  the  long  and  con- 
tinued conflicts,  and  to  Major  Gilmer,  who  accompanied  mc 
to  the  field,  and  was  on  duty  with  me  the  entire  day.  Also 
to  Captain  Parker,  of  my  Staff,  whom  I  assigned  to  the 
command  of  Captain  Ross'  field  battery,  with  new  recruits 
as  gunners,  and  who  fought  and  served  them  well.  The 
conduct  of  these  officers  coming  under  my  immediate  atten- 
tion and  observation,  met  my  hearty  approval  and  com- 
mendation. Colonel  Brandon  was  severely  wounded  early 
in  the  action.  Colonel  Baldwin's  Brigade  constituted  the 
front  of  the  attacking  force,  sustained  immediately  by  Col. 
Wharton's  Brigade. 

These  two  brigades  deserve  especial  commendation  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  sustained  the  first  shock  of  battle, 
and  under  circumstances  of  great  embarrassment  threw 
themselves  into  position  and  followed  up  the  conflict  through- 
out the  day.  Being  mostly  with  these  two  brigades,  I  can 
speak  from  personal  knowledge  of  the  gallant  conduct  and 
bearing  of  the  two  Brigade  Commanders,  Col.  Baldwin  and 
Wharton.  I  must  also  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Brig- 
adier-General B.  R.  Johnson,  who  assisted  me  in  the  com- 
mand of  the  forces  with  which  I  attacked  the  enemy  and 
•who  bore  himself  gallantly  throughout  the  conflict,  but 
having  received  no  official  report  from  him,  I  cannot  give  the 
detailed  operations  of  his  command.  I  have  pleasure  in 
being  able  to  say  that  Col.  Forrest,  Avhose  command  greatly 
distinguished  its  commander  as  a  bold  and  judicious  officer 
and  reflected  the  highest  honor  upon  itself,  passed  safely 
through  the  enemy's  line  of  investment,  and  trust  it  will 
yet  win  other  honors  in  defence  of  our  rights  and  the  just 
eause  of  our  country. 

GIDEON  J.  PILLOW, 

Brig.  GmH  C.  S.  A.. 


RESPONSE  OF  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  GIDEON  J. 
PILLOW  TO  THE  ORDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY 
OF  WAR,  OF  MARCH  11,  1862. 


Captain  H.  P.  Brewster, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General : 

Sir  :  In  my  supplemental  report  which  is  furnished 
through  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  I  have,  as  I  conceived,  sub- 
stantially answered  the  points  indicated  in  the  order  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  as  unsatisfactory  to  the  President.  But 
to  be  more  specific,  and  to  reply  directly  to  these  points,  I 
beg  to  say,  that — 

1st.  General  Floyd  reached  Fort  Donelson  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  13th  of  February,  and  being  my  senior  offi- 
cer assumed  command.  Up  to  that  time  we  had  no  need  of 
additional  forces,  for  at  that  time,  the  enemy  had  only  about 
20,000  troops,  and  we  had  a  force  fully  sufficient  to  defend 
the  place  against  that  force,  and  I  did  not,  and  could  not 
know  with  what  force  they  meant  to  invest  us.  We  were 
attacked  -by  that  force  on  the  13th  around  our  whole  line, 
and  after  three  or  four  hours  of  vigorous  assault  we  re- 
pulsed his  forces  every  where. 

After  General  Floyd's  arrival,  being  second  in  command, 
I  could  not,  without  a  violation  of  military  usage,  apply  for 
reinforcements.  But  I  do  not  seek  to  shelter  mj-self  from 
responsibility  by  this  consideration.  Though  the  enemy's 
force  greatly  exceeded  ours,  we  felt  that  we  could  hold  our 
position  against  him,  until  his  large  force  of  fresh  troops  ar- 
rived on  the  13th,  14th  and  15th.  These  arrivals  of  about 
thirty  thousand  troops  made  it  manifest  that  we  could  not 
hold  the  position  against  such  overwhelming  numbers,  par- 
ticularly as  they  were  then  enabled  to  completely  invest  us, 
and  cut  off  our  communication  by  river. 


40 

It  was  tli^n  impossible  to  get  reinforcements  from  Bowling 
Green  or  elsewhere  in  time  to  relieve  us.  It  required  three 
days  hy  railroad  and  river  for  the  forces  which  did  come  to 
us  to  get  there,  owing  to  the  shortness  of  transportation. 

I  apprised  GeneralJohnston  of  the  arrival  of  the  enemy's 
large  reinforcements  ;  giving  him  every  arrival.  But  I  had 
just  come  from  Bowling  Green,  and  was  of  opinion,  that 
the  force  received  for  that  position  was  inadequate  for  its 
defence  against  a  large  assaulting  force,  and  I  knew  General 
Johnston  could  not  give  me  any  reinforcements,  unless  he 
abandoned  that  place,  a  measure  which  I  did  not  consider  it 
my  province  to  suggest.  Knowing  this  I  felt  it  my  duty  to 
make  the  best  possible  defence  with  the  forces  we  had.  We 
had  one  additional  regiment  or  battalion  there  which  Gene- 
ral Floyd  sent  to  Cumberland  city  to  protect  public  stores 
that  had  been  forwarded  to  that  place.  These  are  the 
reasons  why  no  application  had  been  made  for  reinforce- 
ments. 

2d.  In  response  to  the  second  point  made  by  the  Secre- 
tary's order  I  have  to  say  that  arrangements  were  all  made, 
orders  given  to  the  whole  command  to  evacuate  the  work, 
and  troops  were  under  orders  to  march  out  when  informa- 
tion was  received  that  we  were  re-invested.  Up  to  this  time 
the  General  Officers  were  all  agreed  upon  the  line  of  action 
necessary  and  proper  under  the  circumstances.  (See  sup- 
plemental report.)  It  was  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  change 
of  policy  in  the  new  state  of  the  case,  that  a  diiference  of 
opinion  arose  between  the  General  Officers.  I  was  for  cut- 
ting our  way  out.  Generals  Floyd  and  Buckner  thought 
surrender  was  a  necessity  of  the  position  of  the  army. 

In  response  to  the  point  made  by  the  Secretary's  order  that 
it  was  not  satisfactorily  explained  how  a  part  of  the  com- 
mand was  withdrawn  and  the  balance  surrendered,  I  have  to 
say :  On  the  night  and  evening  of  the  1 5th  of  February, 
after  the  battle,  in  expectation  of  evacuating  the  place  that 
night.  General  Floyd  had  sent  oif  every  steamboat  we  had 
with  the  prisoners  and  our  sick  and  wounded.  As  matters 
turned  out  this  was  most  unfortunate,  but  I  do  not  perceive 
that  the  act  could  be  censured,  for  it  was  a  measure  prepara- 
tory to  evacuation,  and  no  one  could  have  foreseen  the 
course  of  events  which  late  that  night  defeated  that  measure. 
The  act,  however,  was  that  of  my  senior  officer,  and  I  was 
not  even  consulted  about  its  propriety. 

When  we  ascertained,  between  three  and  four  o'clock  that 


41 

night,  that  we  were  reinrested,  and  the  question  of  our  po- 
sition became  one  of  vital  interest  to  the  commanding  offi- 
cers, we  had  not  a  single  boat ;  neither  skiff,  yawl,  nor  even 
flat,  or  other  ferry-boat.  There  was  no  means  of  crossing 
the  river.  The  river  was  full  and  the  weather  intensely 
cold.  About  day-break  the  steamer  General  Anderson  and 
one  other  little  boat  came  down.  One  of  the  boats  had  on 
board  about  40  >  raw  troops.  I  had  then  crossed  the  river 
in  a  small  hand  flat,  about  four  feet  wide  by  twelve  hnig, 
which  Mr.  Rice,  a  citizen  oLDover,  (acting  as  my  Volun- 
teer Aid-dc-camp)  had,  by  some  means,  brought  over  from 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  these  steamers  General  Floyd,  acting 
I  presume,  under  the  agreement  between  him  and  General 
Buckner,  before  the  command  was  turned  over,  crossed  over 
to  the  opposite  shore  as  many  of  his  troops  as  he  could,  un- 
til he  was  directed  by  General  Buckncr's  staff  officers  to 
leave,  as  the  gun-boats  of  the  enemy  were  approaching. 
This  information  was  given  me  by  General  Floyd,  when  we 
met  at  Clarksville.  My  horses  were  brought  across  the 
river  on  one  of  the  boats  that  brought  over  the  troops.  My- 
self and  staff  then  made  our  way  to  Clarksville  by  land. 
These  facts  explain  hoAV  a  portion  of  the  command  was 
withdrawn,  when  the  residue  could  not  be.  I,  however,  had 
no  kind  of  agency  in  it. 

3d.  In  response  to  the  third  point,  upon  which  informa- 
tion is  called  for  by  the  Secretary's  order,  viz. :  Upon  what 
principles  the  senior  officer  avoided  responsibility  by  trans- 
ferring the  command  ?  I  have  only  to  say  that  I  urged  from 
first  to  last  the  duty  of  cutting  through  the  enemy's  line 
with  the  entire  command.  I  was  not  sustained,  but  was 
alone  in  my  position,  and  with  General  Buckner's  avowal 
that  his  troops  could  not  make  another  fight,  and  without 
the  assistance  of  either  General  in  the  command,  and  in  an 
enterprise  of  great  difficulty  and  peril,  I  could  scarcely  hope 
to  cut  through  the  enemy's  line  unaided.  Yet  it  was  against 
my  conviction  of  duty  to  surrender.  Under  the  circum- 
stances in  which  I  was  placed,  I  saw  no  means  of  defeating 
the  surrender,  and,  therefore,  considering  myself  only  tech- 
nically the  recipient  of  the  command,  when  turned  over  by 
General  Floyd,  I  promptly  passed  or' declined  to  accept  it. 
It  was  in  this  sense  that  I  said  in  my  original  report  that 
when  the  command  was  turned  over  to  me,  I  passed  it.  In 
point  of  fact,  however,   the  command  was  turned  over  by 


42 

General  Floyd  to  General  Euckner.  In  proof  of  Avliich  I 
embcdy  in  this  report  a- despatch  from  General  Floyd  to 
General  A.  S.  Johnston,  on  the  morning  of  the  IGth  of 
February.  I  also  embody  an  order  of  General  Buckuer, 
after  he  had  assumed  command,  to  Brigadier  General  B.  R, 
Johnson. 

GENERAL    FLOVd's    DESPATCH. 

CuMRERLAND    CiTY,  ) 

%  Feb.  16,  1862.    5 

To  General  Johnson  : 

This  morning,  at  2  o'clock,  not  feeling  willing  myself  to 
surrender,  I  turned  over  the  command  to  General  Buckner, 
■who  determined  a  surrender  of  the  fort  and  the  army,  as 
any  further  resistance  would  only  result  in  the  unavailing 
spilling  of  blood.  I  succeeded  in  saving  half  of  my  own 
command  by  availing  myself  of  two  little  boats  at  the  wharf, 
all  that  could  be  commanded.  The  remainder  of  the  entire 
reserve  of  the  army  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
enemy's  force  was  largely  augmented  yesterday  by  the  arri- 
val of  thirteen  transports,  and  his  force  could  not  have  been 
less  than  fifty  thousand.  I  have  attempted  to  do  my  duty, 
in  this  trying  and  difficult  position,  and  only  regret  that  my 
exertions  have  not  been  more  successful, 

(Signed)  J.  B.  FLOYD. 

ORDER  OF  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  BUCKNER  TO  BRIGADIER  GENERAL 
B.  R.  JOHNSON. 


Headquarters 
Dover,  Feb.  16,  1862. 


Sir  :  The  command  of  the  forces  in  this  vicinity  has  de- 
volved upon  me  by  order  of  General  Floyd.  I  have  sent  a 
flag  to  General  Grant,  and  during  the  correspondence,  and 
until  further  orders,  refrain  from  any  hostile  demonstrations, 
with  a  view  to  preventing  a  like  movement  on  the  enemy's 
part.  You  will  endeavor  to  send  a  flag  to  the  enemy's  posts 
in  front  of  your  position,  notifying  them  of  the  fact  that  I 
have  sent  a  communication  to  General  Grant  from  the  right 
of  our  position,  and  desire  to  know  his  present  headquarters. 
Respectfully,  your  ob't  serv't, 
(Signed)  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier  General  C.  S.  A. 


43 

These  orders  show  that  all  parties  understood  that  the 
command  was  turned  over,  not  to  myself,  but  to  General 
Buckner,  The  reason  for  this  was  obvious.  Both  Generals 
Floyd  and  Buckner  Averc  of  opinion  that  a  surrender  of  the 
command  was  a  necessity  of  its  position, 

The}^  had  both  heard  me  say  that  I  would  die  before  I  would 
surrender  the  command.  General  Buckner  had  said  that, 
if  placed  in  comTnand,  he  would  make  the  surrender,  and  he 
had  agreed  with  General  Floyd  that  he  might  witlitlraw  his 
brigade.  This  understanding  and  agreement;  and  my  posi- 
tion, necessarily  excluded  me  from  actual  command. 

Having  gone  into  the  council  of  general  officers,  and  taken 
part  in  its  deliberations,  I  felt  bound  by  its  decision,  although 
against  my  conviction  of  duty.  I,  therefore,  d.termincd  not 
to  assume  nor  accept  the  command.  I  still  think' 
that  in  acquiescing  in  the  decision,  as  a  necessity  of  my 
position,  I  acted  correctly,  although  my  judgment  Avas 
wholly  against  the  surrender.  1  had  no  agency  whatever 
in  withdrawing  any  portion  of  the  command,  except  to  di- 
rect Colonel  Forrest  to  cut  his  way  out  with  the  cavalry,  all 
of  which  I  had  organized  into  a  brigade  under  him. 

5th  and  6th.  In  response  to  the  5th  and  6th  enquiries  of 
the  Secretary's  order,  I  reply  I  do  not  know  what  regiments 
of  General  Floyd's  brigade  were  surrendered,  nor  which 
were  withdrawn,  nor  do  I  know  upon  what  principle  the  se- 
lection was  made. 

For  further  information  reference  is  made  to  my  original 
and  supplemental  reports. 

Before  closing  this  response  to  the  Honorable  Secretary's 
order,  I  deem  it  not  improper  to  say  that  the  only  doubt  I 
felt  in  any  opinion  I  expressed,  position  assumed,  or  act  I 
did,  was  as  to  the  propriety  of  retiring  from  the  garrison, 
when  I  could  not  control  the  fate  of  the  command,  whose 
surrender  was  not  my  act,  nor  Avith  my  approval.  Upon 
this  point  I  consulted  Generals  Floyd  and  Buckner.  For 
these  reasons,  and  knowing  that  the  general  officers  Avould 
n  ot  be  permitted  to  accompany  the  men  in  captivity,  I 
finally  determined  to  retire,  hoping  I  might  be  able  to  render 
some  service  to  the  country. 

Very  respectfully, 

GID.'J.  PILLOW, 
Brigadier  General  C.  S.  A. 


SUPPLEMENTAL  REPORT   OF   THE  BATTLES  AT 
DONELSON. 


Headquarters  3rd  Division,      ) 
Decatur,  Alabama,  March  14,  1863.  ) 

Colonel  W.  W.  Mackall, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General : 

The  position  we  occupied  -was  invested  on  the  11th  Feb- 
ruary, by  a  force  which  we  estimated  to  be  about  20,000 
strong.  This  force  had  approached  us  partly  by  water,  but 
mainly  by  land  from  Fort  Henry.  I  considered  the  force 
we  had  sufficient  to  repulse  the  assault  of  this  force.  We 
repulsed  every  where  a  vigorous  assault  made  by  the  enemy 
against  our  position.  Fresh  troops,  however,  continued  [to 
arrive]  every  day,  by  water  until  the  14th.  We  are  satisfied 
the  enemy's  forces  were  not  short  of  30,000  men.  Our 
impressions  of  his  strength  were  confirmed  by  information 
derived  from  prisoners  we  had  taken  on  that  day. 

That  evening  the  enemy  landed  thirteen  steamboat  loads 
of  fresh  troops.  It  was  now  manifest  that  we  could  not  long 
maintain  our  position  against  such  overwhelming  numbers. 
I  was  satisfied  that  their  last  troops  were  of  General  Buell's 
command.  We  felt  the  want  of  reinforcements,  but  we  did 
not  ask  for  them,  because  we  knew  they  were  not  to  be  had. 
I  had  just  come  from  Bowling  Green,  and  knew  that  General 
Johnston  could  not  spare  a  man  from  his  position.  He  had, 
in  fact,  already  so  weakened  himself  that  he  could  not  have 
maintained  his  position  against  a  vigorous  assault.  Under 
these  circumstances,  deeming  it  utterly  useless  to  apply  for 
reinforcements,  we  determined  to  make  the  best  possible 
defence  with  the  force  in  hand.  Our  investment  by  a  force 
of  30,000,  on  the  14th  being  completed,  and  the  enemy  on 
that  evening  having  received  thirteen  boat  loads  of  fresh 


45 

troops,  a  council  of  General  Officers  was  convened  by  Gen- 
eral Floyd,  at  which  it  was  determined  to  give  the  enemy 
battle  at  day  light  next  day,  so  as  to  cut  up  the  investing 
force,  if  possible,  before  the  fresh  troops  were  in  position. 

In  that  council,  I  proposed  as  the  plan  of  attack,  that 
with  the  force  in  the  entrenchments  of  our  left  wing,  and 
Col.  Hanson's  regiment  (of  General  Buckner's  Division,)  I 
would  attack  the  enemy's  main  force  on  his  right,  and  if 
successful,  that  would  roll  the  enemy  on  his  line  of  invest- 
ment to  a  point  opposite  General  Buckner's  position,  when 
he  would  attack  him  in  flank  and  rear,  and  drive  him  with 
our  united  commands  back  upon  his  encampments  at  the 
river.  To  this  proposition,  so  far  as  alloAving  me  to  have 
Col.  Hanson's  regiment.  General  Buckner  objected,  and  I 
waived  the  point,  saying  I  only  asked  the  assistance  of  that 
regiment  because  my  portion  of  the  labor  to  be  performed 
was  by  far  the  greatest,  and  that  upon  my  success  depended 
the  fortunes  of  the  day,  and  that  a  very  large  portion  of  the 
force  I  had  to  fight  Avere  fresh  troops  and  badly  armed. 
General  Buckner  then  proposed,  as  a  modification  of  my  plan 
of  battle,  that  he  should  attack  the  enemy  simultaneously 
with  my  attack,  that  his  attack  should  be  against  the  posi- 
tion on  the  Winn's  Ferry  Road,  where  he  had  a  battery 
nearly  opposite  the  centre  of  the  left  wing,  and  that  he  would 
thus  lesson  the  labors  for  my  command  and  strike  the  enemy 
in  a  more  vital  point.  To  this  modification,  I  agreed  as  an 
improvement  upon  my  proposed  plan.  In  carrying  out  this 
plan  thus  agreed  upon,  it  became  proper  for  Colonel  Hei- 
man's  Brigade  to  maintain  its  position  in  the  line,  otherwise 
the  enemy  might  turn  the  right  of  General  Buckner's  posi- 
tion, and  take  his  forces  on  the  right  flank  and  thus  defeat 
our  success.  It  was  arranged  accordingly.  General  Floyd 
approved  this  plan  of  battle  and  ordered  that  it  should  be 
carried  out  next  morning  at  day  light.  I  then  sent  for  all 
the  commanders  of  brigades  to  explain  to  them  our  situation 
(being  invested),  our  purpose  and  plan  of  battle,  and  to 
assign  to  each  brigade  its  position  in  my  column,  all  of  which 
was  done,  and  I  gave  orders  to  have  my  whole  force  under 
arms  at  four  and  a  half  o'clock,  and  to  be  ready  to  march 
out  of  our  works  precisely  at  5  o'clock. 

At  4  o'clock  I  was  with  my  command,  all  of  which  was  in 
position,  except  Col.  Davidson's  Brigade,  none  of  which  were 
present.  I  immediately  directed  General  B.  R.  Johnson, 
who  was  present,  and  to  whose  immediate  command  Colonel 


46 

Davidson's  Brigade  belonged,  to  dispatch  officers  for  that  bri- 
gade, and  to  ascertain  the  causes  of  its  deLay.  He  did  so. 
I  likewise  sent  several  officers  of  my  staff  upon  the  same 
duty.  Both  sets  of  officers  made  the  same  report,  viz  :  That 
Col.  Davidson  had  failed  to  give  any  orders  to  the  colonel's 
of  his  brigade,  and  that  Colonel  Davidson  was  sick. 

It  is  proper  to  state  that  he  Avas  complaining  of  being 
unwell  when  the  orders  were  received.  The  instructions  to 
the  brigade  commanders  were  given  about  2  o'clock  that 
morning.  My  command  was  delayed  in  its  advance  about 
half  an  hour  by  the  necessity  of  bringing  up  this  brigade. 

My  column  was  finally  ready  and  put  in  motion  about  fif- 
teen minutes  after  5  o'clock.  I  moved  with  the  advance  and 
directed  General  B.  R.  Johnson  to  bring  up  the  rear.  The 
command  of  Colonel  Davidson's  Brigade  devolved  upon  Col- 
onel Simonton,  which,  owing  to  the  reasons  already  stated, 
was  brought  into  column  in  the  rear,  and  into  action  last 
under  General  Johnson,  to  whose  report  for  its  good  be- 
havior on  the  field  I  particularly  refer,  having  in  my  original 
report  omitted  to  state  its  position  on  the  field.  Many  of 
these  incidents,  not  deemed  essential  to  the  proper  under- 
standing of  the  main  features  of  the  battle  of  the  loth  of 
February,  were  omitted  in  my  orginal  report,  but  are  now 
given  as  parts  of  its  history.  In  my  original  report  I  gave 
the  after  operations  in  the  battle  of  the  15th  February,  and 
shall  now  pass  over  all  the  events  occurring  until  the  council  of 
General  Officers  held  on  the  eight  of  the  loth.  The  lodge- 
ment of  the  enemy's  force,  in  the  rifle  pits  of  General  Buck- 
ner's  extreme  right,  late  in  the  evening  of  the  15th  February, 
induced  General  Floyd  to  call  a  meeting  of  General  Officers 
at  my  headquarters  that  night. 

We  had  fought  the  batile  of  the  15th  to  open  the  way 
(through  the  enemy's  line  of  investment)  to  retire  to  the 
interior.  The  battle  had  occupied  the  day,  and  we  were, 
until  about  12  o'clock  that  night,  bringing  in  the  wounded. 
At  about  one  o'clock  we  had  all  the  commanders  of  regi- 
ments and  brigades  assembled,  and  given  orders  to  the  entire 
command  to  be  under  arms  at  4  o'clock  to  march  out  on  the 
road  leading  towards  Charlotte.  I  had  given  instructions 
to  Major  llaynes,  my  Commissary,  and  Major  Jones,  my 
Quartermaster,  immediately  after  our  evacuation  of  the 
place,  to  burn  all  their  stores.  About  3  o'clock,  (perhaps  a 
little  earlier,)  we  received  intelligence  from  the  troops  in  the 
trenches  that  they  heard  dogs  barking  around  on  the  outside 


47 

of  our  lines,  and  tbey  thought  the  enemy  were  reinvesting 
our  position.  General  Floyd  immediately  directed  me  to 
send  out  scouts  to  ascertain  the  facts.  This  duty  was  per- 
formed. When  the  scouts  returned,  they  reported  the  enemy 
in  full  force,  occupying  his  original  positions,  and  closing 
up  the  routes  to  the  interior.  Not  being  satisfied  with  the 
truth  of  the  report,  I  directed  Colonel  Forrest  to  send  out 
a  second  set  of  scouts,  and  at  the  same  time  directed  him  to 
send  two  intelligent  men  up  the  bank  of  the  river  to  ex- 
amine a  valley  of  overflowed  ground  laying  to  the  rear,  and 
the  right  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  if  the  valley  of  over- 
flowed ground  could  be  crossed  by  infantry  and  cavalry,  and 
to  ascertain  if  the  enemy's  forces  reached  the  river  bank. 

The  one  set  of  scouts  returned  and  confirmed  the  previous 
reports,  viz. :  that  the  woods  were  full  of  the  enemy,  occu- 
pying all  of  his  previous  positions  in  great  numbers.  The 
scouts  sent  up  the  river  to  examine  the  overflow,  reported 
that  the  overflow  valley  was  not  practicable  for  infantry  ; 
that  the  soft  mud  was  about  half  leg  deep,  and  that  the  water 
was  about  saddle  skirt  deep  to  the  horses,  and  that  there  was 
a  good  deal  of  drift  in  the  way.  We  then  sent  for  a  citizen 
whose  name  is  not  remembered,  said  to  know  that  part  of 
the  country  well,  and  asked  his  opinion ;  he  confirmed  the 
reports  of  the  river  scouts.  In  addition  to  the  depth  of  the 
water,  the  weather  was  intensely  cold ;  many  of  the  troops 
were  frost-bitten,  and  they  could  not  have  stood  a  passage 
through  a  sheet  of  water.  With  these  facts  all  before  Gen- 
erals Floyd,  Buckner  and  myself,  the  two  former  having 
remained  at  my  quarters  all  the  intervening  Avhile,  General 
Floyd  said,  well,  gentlemen,  what  is  best  now  to  be  done  ?- 
Neither  General  Buckner  nor  myself  having  answered 
promptly.  General  Floyd  repeated  his  enquiry,  addressing 
himself  to  me  by  name  My  reply  was,  that  it  was  difficult 
to  determine  what  was  best  to  be  done,  but  that  I  was  in 
favor  of  cutting  our  way  out.  lie  then  asked  General 
Buckner  what  he  thought  we  ought  to  do.  General  Buck- 
ner said  his  command  was  so  worn  down  and  cut  up  and 
demoralized  that  he  could  not  make  another  fight ;  that  he 
thought  we  would  lose  three-fourths  of  the  command  we  had 
left  in  cutting  our  way  out,  and  that  it  was  wrong ;  that  no 
ofiicerhad  the  right  to  sacrifice  three-fourths  of  the  command 
to  save  one-fourth ;  that  we  had  fought  the  enemy  from  the 
trenches,  we  had  fought  his  gun -boats,  and  had  fought  him 
in  the  open  field  to  cut  our  way  through  his  line  of  invest- 


48 

ment ;  tlicat  we  were  again  invested  with  an  immense  force 
of  fresh  troops ;  tliat  the  army  had  done  all  it  was  possible 
to  do,  and  that  duty  and  honor  required  no  more. 

General  Floyd  then  remarked  that  his  opinion  coincided 
with  General  Biickner.  Brigadier-General  B.  11,  Johnson 
had  previously  retired  from  the  council  to  his  quarters  in 
the  field,  and  was  not  present.  In  my  original  report  I 
stated  it  was  my  impression  Major  Gilmer  wa-*  consulted  and 
concurred  in  the  opinion  of  Generals  Buckner  and  Floyd, 
but  from  subsequent  conversation  with  Major  Gilmer,  I  learn 
from  him  that  he  had  retired  to  another  room  and  laid  down, 
and  was  not  present  at  this  part  of  the  conference,  and  I  am 
therefore  satisfied  that  I  was  mistaken  in  the  statement  in 
regard  to  him. 

The  proposition  to  cut  our  way  out  being  thus  disposed 
of,  I  remarked  that  we  could  hold  our  position  another  day 
and  fight  the  encjmy  from  our  trenches,  that  by  night  our 
steamboats  that  had  taken  off  the  prisoners  and  our  own 
wounded  men  would  return ;  that  during  tlie  next  night  we 
could  set  our  troops  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  that 
we  could  make  our  escape  by  Clarksville,  and  thus  save  the 
army.  To  this  proposition  General  Buckner  said,  gentle- 
men, you  know  the  enemy  occupy  the  rifle  pits  on  my  right 
and  can  easily  turn  my  position,  and  attack  me  in  rear  or 
move  down  on  the  river  battery.  I  am  satisfied  he  will 
attack  me  at  day  light,  and  I  cannot  hold  my  position  a  half 
an  hour.  Regarding  General  Buckner's  reply  as  settling 
this  proposition  in  the  negative,  for  I  had  quite  enough  to 
do,  with  my  heavy  losses  in  the  battle  of  the  previous  day 
to  defend  my  own  portion  of  the  line,  and  I  could  give  him 
no  reinforcements,  I  then  said,  gentlemen,  if  we  cannot  cut 
our  way  out  nor  fight  on,  there  is  no  alternative  left  uS  but 
capitulation,  and  1  am  determined  that  I  will  never  surren- 
der myself  a  prisoner ;  I  will  die  first.  General  Floyd  re- 
marked that  that  was  his  determination ;  that  he  would  die 
before  he  would  do  either.  General  Buckner  said  that  such 
determination  was  personal,  and  that  personal  considerations 
should  never  influence  official  action.  General  Floyd  said 
he  acknowledged  it  Avas  personal  witli  him,  but  nevertheless 
such  was  his  determination.  Thereupon,  General  Buckner 
said  that  being  satisfied  that  nothing  else  could  be  done,  if 
he  was  placed  in  command,  he  would  surrender  the  command 
and  take  the  fate  of  the  command.  General  Floyd  imme- 
diately said,   Genei'al  Buckner  if  I  place  you  in  command 


49 

will  you  permit  me  to  draw  out  my  brigade  ?  General  Buck- 
ner  promptly  replied,  yes,  provided  you  do  so  before  the 
enemy  act  upon  my  communication.  General  Floyd  imme- 
diately remarked,  General  I'illow,  I  turn  over  the  command'. 
I  replied  instantly,  I  pass  it.  General  Buckner  said,  I 
assume  it ;  bring  me  a  bugler,  pen,  ink  and  paper.  General 
Buckner  had  received  pen,  ink  and  paper,  and  sat  down  to 
the  table  and  commenced  writinp^,  when  1  left  and  crossed 
the  river,  passing  outside  the  garrison  before  General  Buck- 
ner prepared  his  communication  to  the  enemy,  and  went  to 
Clarksville  by  land  on  horse  back.  I  did  not  know  what  ho 
had  written  until  I  saw  the  published  correspondence  with 
General  Grant.  It  may  be  asked,  if  I  was  in  favor  of  cut- 
ting our  way  out,  why,  when  the  command  was  turned  over 
to  me,  I  did  not  cut  it  out  ?  My  reply  is,  that  though  tech- 
nically speaking,  the  command  devolved  on  me  when  turned 
over  by  General  Floyd,  it  was  turned  over  to  General  Buck- 
ner in  point  of  fact.      All  parties  so  understood  it. 

In  proof  of  this.  General  Floyd,  under  hia  agreement 
with  General  Buckner,  actually  withdrew  a  large  portion  of 
his  brigade  by  setting  them  across  the  river  in  the  steamer 
General  Anderson,  that  arrived  just  before  day  light.  In 
further  proof  of  this,  I  embody  in  thivS  report  an  order  of 
General  Buckner  to  General  B.  R.  Johnson,  after  he  had 
assumed  command. 

Order — A  copy. 

Headquarters,  ^ 
Dover,  Feb.  16,  1862.      S 

Sir  :  The  command  of  the  forces  in  this  vicinity  has  de- 
volved upon  me  by  order  of  General  Floyd  I  have  sent  a 
flag  to  General  Grant,  and  during  the  corresp_ondcnce,  and 
until  further  orders,  refrain  from  any  hostile  demonstrations, 
with  a  view  to  preventing  a  like  movement  on  the  enemy's 
part.  You  will  endeavor  to  send  a  flag  to  the  enemy's  posts 
in  front  of  your  position,  notifying  them  of  the  fact  that  I 
have  sent  a  communication  to  General  Grant  from  tho  right 
of  our  position,  and  desire  to  know  his  present  headquarters. 
Respectfully,  your  ob't  serv't, 
(Signed)  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier  General  C  S.  A. 

In  addition  to  this,  General  Floyd  was  my  senior,  and  of 
high  character  and  acknowledged  ability.     General  Buck- 
ner, though  my  junior  in  rank,  possessed  a  high  reputation 
4 


m 

OS  an  officer  of  talents  and  experience.  With  the  judgment 
of  both  against  my  position,  if  I  had  acted  upon  my  own 
convictions,  and  had  fallen  or  involved  the  command  in 
heavy  less,  I  was  apprehensive  it  would  be  regarded  as  an 
act  of  rashness,  and  brought  upon  me  the  censure  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  the  condemnation  of  the  country.  Besides, 
without  their  as:^istnnce  in  command,  and  with  the  moral 
\\eight  of  their  oj)inions  with  the  troops  against  the  step,  I 
did  not  regard  it  j)racticable  to  make  a  successful  efforc  to 
cut  out.  I  declined  to  assume  the  command  when  turned 
over  by  General  Floyd,  because  it  was  against  my  convic- 
tions of  duty  to  surrender  the  command,  and  under  the  de- 
cisions of  Genei-als  Floyd  and  Buckner,  (a  majority  of  the 
council.)  I  could  do  nothing  but  surrender  it.  It  is  proper 
to  say  that  thedifterence  of  opinion  between  Generals  Floyd, 
Buckner  and  myself  upon  this  branch  of  the  subject  con- 
sisted in  this,  viz.  :  they  thought  that  it  would  cost  three- 
fourths  of  the  command  to  cut  out.  I  did  not  think  the  loss 
would  be  so  great.  If  it  had  been  settled  that  the  sacrifice 
would  be  as  much  as  three-fourths,  I  should  have  agreed 
with  them  that  it  was  wrong  to  make  the  attempt.  Again, 
I  believe  we  could  have  maintained  our  position  another  day, 
and  have  saved  the  array  by  getting  back  our  boats  and  set- 
ting the  command  across  the  river;  but,  inasmuch  as  Gen- 
eral Buckner  was  of  opinion  that  he  could  not  hoi  .  his  posi- 
tion half  an  hour,  and  I  could  not  possibly  do  more  than 
hold  my  own  portion  of  the  line,  I  had  no  alternative  but 
to  submit  to  a  decision  of  a  majority  of  my  brother  General 
Officers.  While  I  thus  differed  with  them  in  opinion,  I  still 
think  I  did  right  in  acquiescing  in  opinion  with  them.  We 
all  agreed  in  02)inion  that  we  could  not  long  maintain  the 
position  against  such  overwhelming  numbers  of  fresh  troops 
as  were  daily  arriving.  We  all  agreed  that  the  army  had 
performed  prodigies  of  valor,  and  that  if  possible  further 
sacrifice  should  be  avoided  Men  will  differ  or  agree  accor- 
ding to  their  mental  organization.  I  censure  not  their  opin- 
ions, nor  do  I  claim  merit  for  my  own.  The  whole  matter 
is  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  government. 

Since  my  original  report  was  prepared  I  have  seen  and 
read  the  official  report  of  General  Grant  and  Commodore 
Foote.  From  these  reports  I  learn  that  the  damage  done 
the  enemy's  fleet  of  gun-boats  on  the  13th  was  greater  by 
far  than  was  represented  in  my  original  report.  Four  of 
the  enemy's  gun-boats  were  badly  disabled,  receiving  over 


51 

one  hundred  sliots  from  our  battery,  many  of  whicli  went 
entirely  through,  from  stem  to  stern,  tearing  the  frame  of 
the  boats  and  machinery  to  pieces,  killing  and  wounding 
fifty-five  of  their  crews,  among  whom  was  the  Commodore 
himself.  There  can,  therefore,  no  longer  be  a  doubt  as  to 
the  vulnerability  of  these  to  heavy  shots,  but  it  required  a 
desperate  fight  to  settle  the  question,  and  there  is  danger  that 
the  public  mind  will  run  from  one  extreme  to  the  other,  and 
arrive  at  a  conclusion  underrating  the  power  of  the  enemy's 
gun-boats.  In  estimating  the  loss  inflicted  upon  the  enemy, 
on  the  1 5th  February,  I  saw  that  the  whole  field  of  battle 
for  a  mile  and  a  half  was  covered  with  his  dead  and  wounded, 
and  believe  that  his  loss  could  not  fall  short  of  five  thousand 
men. 

I  am  satisfied  from  published  letters  of  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  enemy,  and  from  acknowledgements  of  the  North- 
ern press,  that  his  loss  was  much  greater  than  was  originally 
estimated  in  my  report.  I  stated  in  my  original  report  that 
after  we  had  driven  the  enemy  from,  and  captured  his  bat- 
tery on  the  Winn's  Ferry  Road,  and  were  pursuing  him 
around  to  our  right,  and  after  we  had  met  and  overcome  a 
fresh  force  of  the  enemy  on  the  rout  towards  his  gun-boats, 
I  called  ofi"  the  pursuit,  but  in  the  hurry  in  which  that  report 
was  prepared,  I  omitted  to  state  my  reasons  for  so  doing.  I 
kncAv  that  the  enemy  had  twenty  boat  loads  of  fresh  troops 
at  his  landing,  then,cnly  about  three  miles  distant.  I  knew 
from  the  great  loss  my  command  had  sustained  during  the 
protracted  fight  of  over  seven  hours,  my  command  was  in 
no  condition  to  meet  a  large  body  of  fresh  troops,  who  I  had 
every  reason  to  believe  were  then  rapidly  approaching  the 
field.  General  Buckner's  command,  so  far  as  labor  was  con- 
cerned, was  comparatively  fresh,  but  its  demoralization,  from 
being  repulsed  by  the  battery,  had  unfitted  it  to  meet  and 
fight  a  large  body  of  fresh  troops.  I,  therefore,  called  ofi"  the 
pursuit,  and  explained  my  reasons  to  General  Floyd,  who  ap- 
proved the  order.  This  explanation  is  now  given  as  neces- 
sary to  a  proper  understanding  of  that  order.  It  is  further 
proper  to  say  that  from  the  moment  of  my  arrival  at  Donel- 
son,  I  had  the  whole  force  engaged  night  and  day  in  the 
work  of  strengthening  my  position  until  the  fighting  com- 
menced, and  when  the  fighting  ceased  at  night,  it  was  again 
at  work. 

I  did  not,  therefore,  and  could  not  get  a  single  morning 
report  of  the  strength  of  my  command.     The  four  Virginia 


52 

regiments  did  not  exceed,  I  am  confident  350  each  for  duty. 
The  Texas  regiment  did  not  number  301)  men  ;  several  Mis- 
sissippi regiments  were  nearly  equally  reduced,  while  those  of 
Colonels  Voorhies,  Abernathy  and  Hughes  (new  regiments) 
were  almost  disbanded  by  measles,  and  did  not  exceed  200 
each  for  duty.  Colonel  Browder's  regiment  had  but  sixty 
men.  and  it  was  by  my  order  placed  under  Captain  Parker 
to  work  artillery.  All  others  w^ere  greatly  reduced  by 
wastage.  The  whole  force,  therefore,  was  greatly  less  than 
would  1)0  supposed  from  the  number  of  nominal  regiments. 
Of  this  force,  General  Floyd,  under  his  agreement  with 
General  Buckner,  before  he  turned  over  the  command,  drew 
out  a  large  portion  of  his  brigade,  (how  many  I  do  not  know), 
by  taking  possession  of  the  steamer  xVnderson,  which  arrived 
at  Dover  just  before  day,  and  setting  them  across  the  river. 
A  large  portion  of  the  cavalry,  under  orders,  passed  out.  All 
of  the  cavalry  was  ordered  to  cut  out,  and  could  have  gone 
out  but  for  the  timidity  of  officers.  Several  thousand  infan- 
try esc:iped  one  way  or  another,  many  of  whom  are  now  at 
this  place,  and  all  others  are  ordered  here  as  a  rendezvous 
for  re-organization.  From  the  list  of  prisoners  published  in 
the  Northern  papers  which  I  have  seen,  it  required  the  pri- 
Boners  of  six  regiments  to  make  nine  hundred  men.  I  do 
not  believe  that  the  number  of  prisoners  exceeded  that  stated 
by 'the  Northern  papers,  which  is  put  at  5,170  privates. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  I  had  caused  the  arms 
lost  by  the  enemy  to  be  gathered  up  from  about  h  If  the 
field  of  battle,  and  had  hauled  and  stacked  up  over  five  thoii- 
sand  stand  of  arms  and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  all  of  which 
were  lost  in  the  surrender  of  the  place  for  want  of  trans- 
portation to  bring  them  away.  In  regard  to  the  enemy's 
force  with  which  we  were  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Dover, 
General  Grant,  in  an  official  report,  says  that  he  had  taken 
fifteen  thousand  prisoners  ;  ihat  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow 
made  their  escape  with  about  15,000  men,  and  that  the  forces 
engaged  were  about  equal.  While  his  estimate  of  the  num- 
ber of  prisoners  taken,  and  the  number  with  which  General 
Floyd  escaped,  is  wide  of  the  mark,  yet  the  aggregate  of 
these  numbers  as  given  by  himself  is  30,000,  and  his  ac- 
knowledgement that  the  forces  were  about  equal  furnishes 
conclusive  evidence  that  we  fought  30,000  men,  the  same 
number  given  by  prisoners  we  had  taken,  and  agreeing  with 
my  original  estimate  of  his  strength.  General  iialleck,  in  a 
telegraphic  despatch  of  February  IG,  from  St.  Louis,  to  Gen- 


eral  McClellan,  said  he  had  invested  Fort  Donelson  with  a 
force  of  50,000  men,  and  he  had  no  doubt  all  communica- 
tion and  supplies  were  cut  off.  This  corroborates  Grant's 
statement,  for  the  troops  which  arrived  on  the  14th  and  1 5th 
February,  being  twenty  steam-boat  loads,  had  not  reached 
the  battle-field  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  it  is  proba- 
ble that  parts  of  those  that  arrived  on  the  evening  of  the 
1 3th  had  not  reached  it. 

These  sources  of  information  make  it  clear  that  we  fought 
30,000  of  the  enemy  on  the  15th,  and  [that]  we  were  re-in- 
vested that  night  with  all  tie  enemy's  disposable  force,  in- 
cluding his  fresh  troops,  cannot  be  doubted.  Nothing  has 
occurred  to  change  my  original  estimate  of  our  loss  in  the 
several  conflicts  with  the  enemy,  at  the  trenches,  with  the 
gun-boats  and  in  battle  at  Dover.  My  original  estimate  was 
that  our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  from  fifteen  hundred 
to  two  thousand.  We  sent  up  from  Dover  1,134  wounded. 
A  Federal  surgeon's  certificate,  which  I  have  seen,  says  there 
were  about  400  wounded  Confederates  in  hospital  at  Paducah, 
making  1 ,534  wounded.  I  was  satisfied  that  the  killed  would 
increase  the  number  to  3,000. 

As,  in  the  absence  still  of  regimental  and  brigade  com- 
manders, it  is  probable  that  I  have  not  done  justice  to  all 
the  officers  or  their  commands.  To  Brigadier  General  John- 
son's report,  which  is  herewith  forwarded,  I  particularly  refer 
for  the  conduct  of  officers  and  commands  under  his  imme- 
diate observation  during  the  battle.  The  forces  under  ray 
immediate  command  in  the  conflict  with  enemy's  right  did 
not  exceed  7,000  men,  though  it  never  faltered  and  drove 
the  enemy  from  the  position  of  his  extreme  right,  slowly,  but 
steadily  advancing  over  one  and  a  half  mile,  carrying  the' 
positions  of  his  first  battery  and  two  of  his  guns,  and  of  the 
battery  on  the  Winn's  Ferry  Road,  taking  four  more  guns, 
and  afterwards  uniting  with  General  Buckner's  command, 
drove  him  (the  enemy)  back,  sustained  by  a  large  accession 
of  fresh  troops. 

Yet  it  is  manifest  that  the  fruits  of  our  victory  would  have 
been  far  greater  had  General  Buckner's  column  been  suc- 
cessful in  its  assault  upon  the  Winn's  Ferry.  Equally  clear 
is  it  that  the  enemy  eff"ecting  a  lodgement  in  General 
Buckner's  rifle  pits,  on  his  right,  brought  the  command  and 
position  into  extreme  peril,  making  it  absolutely  necessary 
to  take  immediate  action,  in  which  we  were  under  the  neces- 
sity of  cutting  our  way  out,  of  holding  out  another  day,  and 


/ 


54 

throwing  the  command  across  the  r'ver,  or  of  capituhiting; 
my  own  position  upon  these  several  propositions  having  been 
explained  more  fully  and  in  detail  in  this  my  supplemental 
report,  nothing  more  remains  in  the  performance  of  my  duty 
to  the  government,  but  to  subscribe  niyself, 
Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  J.  PILLOW, 

Brig.  Gen.  C.  S.  A. 

IsToTE. — That  there  maybe  no  doubt  about  the  facts  stated 

in  .this  report,  I  append  the  sworn  testimony   of  Colonel 

Bur^h,   Colonel  Forrest,  Majors   Henry  and  Ilaynes    and 

Nicholson,  to  which  I  ask  the  attention  of  the  government. 

(Si-ned)  GIDEON  J.  PILLOW, 

Brig.  Gen.  C.  S.  A. 


COLONEL  BURGH'S  STATEMENT. 
{Referred  to  in  the  foregoing.) 


Dkcatuh,  Ala.,  ) 
March   15th,  1862.      ] 

On  Saturday  evening,  February  15th,  all  of  the  boats 
which  wc  had  at  Donelson  were  sent  up  the  river  Avith  our 
sick,  wounded  and  prisoners.  After  supper  a  council  of 
oflScers  was  held  at  Brigadier  General  Pillow's  headquarters. 
I  was  not  present  at  this  council,  but  during  its  session,  be- 
ing in  an  adjoining  room,  I  learned  from  some  officer  that 
intelligence  had  been  received  from  scouts  on  the  cast  side 
of  the  river  that  fourteen  of  the  enemy's  transports  were 
landing  reinforcements  one  and  a  half  or  two  milea  below  us 
at  their  usual  place  of  landing.  After  I  had  learned  this, 
and  during  the  session  of  the  same  council,  two  couriers 
came  to  Brigadier  General  Buckner — one,  and  perhaps  both, 
sentby  Captain  Graves,  of  the  Artillery  ;  ono  stating  that  a 
large  force  was  forming  in  front  of  our  right  (General  Buck- 
ner s)  wing  ;  the  second  stating  that  large  bodies  of  the  ene- 
my were  seen  moving  in  front  of  our  right,  around  towards 
our  left.  After  the  adjournment  of  this  council,  about  11 
or  12  o'clock,  I  learned  that  it  had  been  determined  to  eva- 
cuate the  post,  cut  our  way  through  the  right  wing  of  the 
enemy's  investing  force,  and  make  our  way  towards  Char- 
lotte, in  Dixon  county. 

Orders  were  given  for  the  command  to  bo  in  readiness  to 
march  at  4  o'clock,  A.  M.  After  this,  being  in  General 
Billow's  private  room,  where  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and 
Buckner  all  were,  two  scouts  came  in,  stating  that  the  ene- 
my's c"mp  fires  could  be  seen  at  the  same  places  in  front 
of  our  left  that  tUey  had  occupied  Friday.  From  the  re- 
marks of  the  Generals  this  information  seemed  to  lie  con- 
firmatory of  information  which  they  had  previously  received. 
Major  Rice,  an  intelligent  citizen  of  Dover,  was  called  in 
and  interrogated  as  to  the  character  of  the  road  to  Char- 
lotte. His  account  of  it  was  decidedly  unfavorable.  In 
the  course  of  the  conversation  which  then  followed  among 


•      56 

tlie  Generala — General  Pillow  insisting  upon  carrying  out 
the  previous   determination   of  the  council  to  cut  our  way 
out — Brigadier  General  Buckner  said  that  such  was  the  ex- 
hausted condition  of  the  men,  that,  if  they  should  succeed 
in  cutting  their  way  out,  it   would   be  at  a  heavy  sacrifice, 
and,    if  pursued  b}"^   the   large   cavalry  force  of  the  enemy, 
they  would  be  almost  entirely  cut  to  pieces.     General  Floyd 
concurred  with   General  Buckner.      General   Pillow   said : 
Then  we  can  fight  them  another  day  in  our  trenches,  and  by 
to  morrow  we  can  have  boats  enough  here  to  transport  our 
troops  across  the   river,   and  let  them  make  their  escape  to 
Clarksville.      General  Buckner  said  :   that  such  was  the  po- 
sition of  the  enemy  on  his  right,  and  the  demoralization  of 
his  forces,  from  exposure  and  exhaustion,  that  he  could  not 
hold  his  trenches  a  half  an  hour.     As  an  illustration  of  the 
correctness  of  his  remark,  he  said  :   "  You,  gentlemen,  know 
that  yesterday  morning  I  considered  the  Second  Kentucky, 
(Hanson's  regiment),  as  good  a  regiment  as  there  was  in  the 
service,  yet  sucli  was  their  condition   yesterday  afternoon 
that,  when  I  learned  the  enemy  was  in  their  trenches,  (which 
were  to  our  extreme   right,   and   detached  from   the  others) 
before   I  could  rally   and  form  them,  I  had  to  take  at  least 
twenty  men  by   the  shoulders  and  put  them  into  line  as  a 
nucleus   for  formation."      General    Floyd   concurred    with 
General  Buckner  in  his   opinion   as  to  the  impossibility  of 
holding  the  trenches  longer,  and  asked :  what  shall  we  do  ? 
General  Buckner  stated  that  no  ofiicer  had  a  right  to  sacri- 
fice Ins  men,  referred   to   our   various   successes  since  Wed- 
nesday, at  Donelson,  and  concluded  by  saying  that  an  offi- 
cer who  had  successfully  resisted  an  assault  of   a  much 
larger  force,  and  was  still  surrounded  by  an  increased  force 
could  surrender  with  honor ;   and   that  we  had  accomplished 
much  more  than  was   required   by   this  rule.      General  Pil- 
low said  that  he  never  would  surrender.    General  Floyd  said  : 
that  he  would  suffer  any  fate  before  he  would  surrender  or 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  alive.      At  the  suggestion 
of  some  one  present,  he   said :  that  personal  considerations 
influenced  him  in  coming  to  this  determination,  and  further 
stated  that  such  considerations  should  never  govern  a  gene- 
ral officer. 

Colonel  Forrest,  of  the  cavalry,  who  was  present,  said : 
he  would  die  before  he  would  surrender  ;  that  such  of  his 
men  as  would  follow  him,  he  would  take  out.  General  Floyd 
said :  he  would  take  his  chances  with  Forrest,  and  asked 


57 

General  Buckner  if  he  would  make  the  surrender  ?  Gene- 
ral Buckner  asked  him  if  he  (General  Floyd)  would  pass  the 
command  to  him  ?  General  Floyd  replied  in  the  affirma- 
tive. I  understood  General  Pillow  as  doing  the  same.  Then, 
said  General  Buckner  :  I  shall  propose  terms  of  capitula- 
tion, and  asked  for  ink  and  paper,  and  directed  one  of  his 
staff  to  send  for  a  bugler  and  prepare  white  flags  to  plant  at 
various  points  on  our  works.  Preparations  were  imme- 
diately begun  to  be  made  by  General  Floyd  and  staff,  Gene- 
ral Pillow  and  staff,  and  Colonel  Forrest,  to  leave.  This 
was  about  3  o'clock,  A.  M.  It  was  suggested  by  some  one 
that  two  boats  that  were  known  to  be  coming  down  the  river 
might  arrive  before  day,  and  General  Floyd  asked,  if  they 
came,  that  he  might  be  permitted  to  take  off  on  them  his 
troops.  General  Buckner  replied  that  all  might  leave  who 
could  before  his  note  was  sent  to  General  Grant,  the  Fede- 
ral commander.     Thus  ended  the  conference. 

After  this  I  met  or  called  on  General  Pillow  in  the  pas- 
sage, and  asked  him  if  there  was  any  possibility  of  a  mis- 
understanding as  to  his  position  ?  He  thought  not ;  but  I 
suggested  to  him  the  propriety  ot  again  seeing  Generals 
Floyd  and  Buckner,  and  see  that  there  was  no  possibility  of 
his  position  being  misunderstood  by  them.  He  said  he 
would,  and  returned  to  the  room  in  which  the  conference  was 
held. 

In  my  statement  of  what  transpired,  and  of  the  conversa- 
tions that  were  had,  I  do  not  pretend  to  have  given  the  exact 
language  used,  and  I  may  be  mistaken  as  to  the  order  of  the 
remarks  that  I  have  endeavored  to  narrate. 

(Signed)  JNO.  C.  BURGH, 

Aid  to  General  Pilloto. 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me  this  15th  day  of  March, 
1862.  LEVI  SUGANS, 

Intendant  of  the  toivn  of  Decatur,  Ala., 

and  ex  offi.  J.  P. 


COL.  FORREST'S  STATEMENT. 
[Referred  to  in  General  Pillow's  Supplemental  Report.) 


March  15,  1862. 
Between  one  and  two  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning;.  Feb- 
ruar}^  16th,  being  sent  for,  I  arrived  at  General  Pillow's 
headquarters,  and  found  him,  General  Floyd  and  General 
Buckner  in  conversation.  General  Pillow  told  me  that  they 
had  received  information  that  the  enemy  were  again  occu- 
pying the  same  ground  they  had  occupied  the  morning  be- 
fore. I  told  him  I  did  not  believe  it,  as  I  had  left  that  part 
of  the  field,  on  our  left,  late  the  evening  before,  lie  told 
me  he  had  sent  out  scouts  who  reported  large  forces  of  the 
enemy  moving  around  to  our  left.  He  instructed  me  to  go 
immediately,  and  send  two  reliable  men  to  ascertain  the  con- 
dition of  a  road  running  near  the  river  bank,  and  between 
the  enemy's  right  and  the  river,  and  also  to  ascertain  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  I  obeyed  his  instructions  and 
awaited  the  return  of  the  scouts.  They  stated  that  they 
saw  no  enemy,  but  could  see  their  fires  in  the  same  place 
where  they  were  Friday  night ;  that  from  their  examination 
and  from  information  obtained  from  a  citizen  living  on  the 
road,  the  water  was  about  to  the  saddle  skirts,  and  the  mud 
about  half  leg  deep  in  the  bottom  where  it  had  been  over- 
flowed. The  bottom  was  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  and 
the  water  then  about  one  hundred  yards  wide.  During  the 
conversation  that  then  ensued  among  the  general  officers, 
General  Pillow  was  in  favor  of  trying  to  cut  our  Avay  out. 
General  Buckner  said  that  he  could  not  hold  his  position 
over  half  an  hour  in  the  morning,  and  that  if  he  attempted 
to  take  his  force  out,  it  Avould  be  seen  by  the  enemy  who 
held  part  of  his  entrenchments,  nnd  be  followed  and  cut' to 
pieces.  I  told  him  that  I  would  take  my  cavalry  around  them 
and  he  could  draw  out  under  cover  of  them.  He  said  that 
an  attempt  to  cut  our  way  out  would  involve  a  loss  of  three- 
fourths  of  the  men.  General  Floyd  said  our  force  was  so 
demoralized  as  to  cause  him  to  agree  with  General  Buckner 
as  to  our  probable  loss  in  attempting  to  cut  our  way  out.     I 


59 

said  that  I  would  agree  to  cut  my  way  through  the  enemy's 
lines  at  any  point  the  General  might  designate,  and  stated 
I  could  keep  back  their  cavalry,  which  General  Buckner 
thought  would  greatly  harrass  our  infantry  in  retreat.  Gene- 
ral Buckner  or  General  Floyd  said  that  they  (the  enemy) 
would  bring  their  artillery  to  bear  on  us.  I  went  out  of 
the  room,  and  when  I  returned  General  Floyd  said  he 
could  not  and  would  not  surrender  himself.  I  then  asked 
if  they  were  going  to  surrender  the  command  ?  General 
Buckner  remarked  that  they  were.  I  then  stated  that  I 
had  not  come  out  for  the  purpose  of  surrendering  my  com- 
mand, and  would  not  do  it  if  they  would  follow  me  out;  that 
I  intended  to  go  out  if  I  saved  but  one  man,  aud  then  turn- 
ing to  General  Pillow,  I  asked  him  what  I  should  do  ?  He 
replied  cut  your  way  out.  I  immediately  left  the  house  and 
sent  for  all  the  officers  under  my  command  and  stated  to 
them  the  facts  that  had  occurred,  and  stated  may  determina- 
tion leave,  and  remarked  that  all  who  wanted  to  go  could 
follow  me,  and  those  who  wished  to  stay  and  take  the  con- 
sequences might  remain  in  camp.  All  of  my  own  regi- 
ment, and  Captain  Williams,  of  Helm's  Kentucky  regiment, 
said  they  would  go  with  me  if  the  last  man  fell.  Col. 
Gaute  was  sent  for  and  urged  to  get  out  his  battalion  as 
often  as  three  times,  but  he  and  two  Kentucky  companies 
(Captain  Wilcox  and  Captain  Henry,)  refused  to  come.  I 
marched  out  the  remainder  of  my  command,  with  Captain 
Porter's  artillery  horses,  and  about  two  hundred  men,  of  dif- 
ferent commands,  up  the  river  road  and  across  the  overflow, 
which  I  found  to  be  about  saddle-skirt  deep.  The  weather 
was  intensely  cold,  a  great  many  of  the  men  were  already 
frost-bitten,  and  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  Generals  that  the 
infantry  could  not  have  passed  through  the  water  and  have 
survived  it. 

(Signed)  A.  B.  FORREST, 

Forrest's  Regiment  Cavalry. 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me  on  the  15th  day  of 
March,  1862.  LEVI  SUGANS, 

Intendant  of  town  of  Decatur,  Ala., 

and  ex  qffi.  J.  P. 


MAJOR  HENRY'S  STATEMENT. 
{Referred  to  in  General  Fillow's  Supplemental  Report.) 


Decatur,  Ala,,  ) 
March  13,  1862.  \ 
On  the  morning  of  tho  16th  February,  1862,  I  was  pre- 
sent during  the  council  of  war  held  in  Brigadier  General 
Pillow's  headquarters  at  Dover,  Tennessee,  Generals  Flojd, 
Pillow,  Buckner  and  General  Pillow's  staff  being  present.  On 
account  of  being  very  much  exhausted  from  the  fight  of  the 
loth  inst.,  I  slept  the  forepart  of  the  night  and  came  down 
stairs  from  my  room  into  General  Pillow's  about  one  or  two 
o'clock.  At  the  time  I  entered  General  Pillows  room  it  had 
been  decided  that  we  should  fight  our  way  out,  and  G  moral 
Pillow  gave  me  orders  to  gather  up  all  the  papers  and  books 
belonging  to  my  department.  Whereupon,  I  immediately 
executed  the  orders  given  to  me  and  then  returned  to  Gene- 
ral Pillow's  room,  when  a  change  of  operations  had  been 
decided  upon,  on  account  of  information  received  from  scouts, 
ordered  out  by  General  Pillow,  to  ascertain  whether  the 
enemy  re-occupied  the  ground  they  were  driven  from  the 
day  previous.  The  scouts  returned  and  reported  that  the 
enemy  had  swung  entirely  around  and  were  in  possession  of 
the  very  same  ground.  General  Pillow  being  still  in  doubt, 
sent  a  second  party  of  scouts  who  made  a  thorough  recon- 
noisance,  and  reported  that  the  woods  were  perfectly  alive 
with^troops,  and  that  their  camp  fires  were  burning  in  eveiy 
direction.  General  Pillow  then  sent  a  party  of  cavalry  to 
inspect  a  slough,  that  was  filled  with  back  water  from  the 
river,  to  see  if  infantry  could  pass;  they  returned  after  hav- 
ing made  a  thorough  examination  on  horseback  and  on  foot, 
and  reported  that  infantry  could  not  pass,  but  they  thought 
cavalry  could.  Communication  being  tlius  cut  off,  General 
Pillow  urged  the  propriety  of  making  a  desperate  attempt 
to  cut  our  way  out,  whatever  might  be  the  consequences,  or 
make  a  fight  in  the  work  and  hold  our  position  one  more 
day,  by  which  time  we  could  get  steamboats  sufficient  to  put 
the  Avhole  command  over  the  river,  and  make  our  escape  by 
the  way  of  Clarksville.     General  Buckner  then  said :   that 


61 

in  consequence  of  tlie  worn-out  condition  and  demoralization 
of  the  troops  under  his  command,  and  the  occupation  of  his 
rifle  pits  on  the  extreme  right  by  the  enemy,  that  he  could 
not  hold  his  position  a  half  hour  after  being  attacked,  which 
he  thought  would  begin  about  da3'light.  General  Pillow  then 
said:  that  by  the  enemy's  occupation  of  the  rifle  pits  on 
Gencr;il  Buckner's  right,  that  it  was  an  open  gateway  to 
our  river  battery,  and  that  he  thought  we  ought  to  cut  our 
way  through,  carrying  with  us  as  many  as  possible,  leaving 
the  killed  and  wounded  on  the  field.  General  Buckner  then 
said:  that  it  would  cost  three-fourths  of  the  command  to 
got  the  other  fourth  out,  and  that  he  did  not  think  any  General 
had  the  right  to  make  such  a  sacrifice  of  human  life. 
General  Floyd  agreed  with  General  Buckner  on  this  point. 
General  Tiilow  then  rose  up  and  said:  '*  Gentlemen,  as  you 
refuse  to  make  an  attempt  to  cut  our  way  out,  and  General 
Buckner  says  he  will  not  be  able  to  hold  his  position  a  half 
hour  after  being  attacked,  there  is  only  one  alternative  left : 
that  is  capitulation,"  and  then  and  there  remarked  that  he 
would  not  surrender  the  command  or  himself;  that  he  would 
die  fir  t.  General  Floyd  then  spoke  out  and  said  that  he 
would  not  surrender  the  command  or  himself.  General 
Buckner  remaked  that,  if  placed  in  command  he  would  sur- 
render the  command  and  share  its  fate.  General  Floyd  then 
said:  "General  Buckner,  if  I  place  you  in  command,  will 
you  allow  me  to  get  out  as  much  of  my  brigade  as  I  can  ?" 
General  Buckner  replied,  "I  will,  providedyou  do  so  before 
the  enemy  receives  my  proposition  for  capitulation."  Gene- 
ral Floyd  then  turned  to  General  Pillow  and  said  :  "  I  turn 
the  command  over,  sir."  General  Pillow  replied  promptly, 
"I  pass  it."  General  Buckner  said:  "I  assume  it;  give  me 
pen,  ink  and  paper,  and  send  for  a  bugler."  General  Pil- 
low then  Started  out  of  the  room  to  make  arrangements  for 
his  escape,  when  Col.  Forrest  said  to  him  :  "  General  Pil- 
low, what. shall  I  do  ?"  General  l*iIlow  replied,  "  cut  your 
way  out,  sir;"  Forrest  said,  "  I  will  do  it,"  and  left  the 
room. 

(Signed)  GUS.  A.  HENRY,  Jr., 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
To  Brigadier  General  Pillow. 

The  SrATK,  of  Alabama,      ) 
Morgan  County.  > 
This  day  personally  came  before  me,  Levi  Sugans,  Inten- 


62 

dant  of  the   town  of  Decatur,  County  and  State  aforesaid, 
Major  Gus.  A.  Henry,  Jr.,  -who  makes  oath  in  due  form  of 
law,  that  the  above  statements  are  true.     Sworn  to  and  sub- 
scribed before  me  on  the  14th  day  of  Mai  eh,  1862. 
(Signed)  GUS.  A.  HENRY,  Jr., 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
(Signed)  LEVI  SUGANS, 

Jntendant. 


MAJOR  HAYNES'  STATEMENT. 

[Referred  to  in  General  Pillow's  Supplemental  Report. 


Office  Kivision  Ccmmtssary,  ) 
Decatur,- Ala.,  March  13,  1862.      J 

I  was  present  at  the  council  of  officers,  held  at  Briiradier 
General  Gideon  J.  Pillow's  headquarters,  in  the  town  of 
Dover,  Tenn.,  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  February,  1S62. 
Was  awoke  in  my  quarters  at  one  o'clock,  A.  M.,  by  Colo- 
nel John  C.  Burch,  aid-de-camp,  and  ordered  to  report  to 
General  Pillow  forthwith.  I  instantly  proceeded  to  head- 
quarters, where  I  saw  Brigadier  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and 
Buckner,  Colonel  Forrest,  Majors  Henry,  Assistant  Adju- 
tant General,  Gilmer  and  Jones,  and  Lieutenants  Nicholson 
and  Martin,  the  two  latter  volunteer  aids  to  General  Pillow.  . 
On  my  entrance  in  the  room,  was  accosted  by  General  Pillow, 
and  being  taken  to  one  side,  was  informed  by  him  that  they 
had  determined  to  cut  their  way  through  the  enemy's  lines, 
and  retreat  from  Dover  to  Nashville,  and  he  desired  me  to 
destroy  all  the  commissary  stores,  and  then  make  ray  escape 
across  the  river.  I  desired  to  know  at  what  hour  General 
Pillow  wished  his  order  to  be  executed,  when,  looking  at  his 
watch,  he  replied  at  half  past  five  o'clock.  I  then  retired 
from  the  room  to  inform  my  assistants  of  the  order,  but  in 
one  hour,  returned  to  headquarters. 

On  re  entering  the  room,  heard  General  Buckner  say,  "I 
cannot  hold  my  position  half  an  hour  after  the  attack,"  and 
General  I  illow,  who  was  sitting  next  to  General  Buckner, 
and  immediately  fronting  the  fire  place,  promptly  asked, 
**  why  can't  you  ?"  at  the  same  time  adding,  *'  I  think  you 
can  hold  your  position ;  I  think  you  can,  sir."  General 
Buckner  retorted,  "  I  know  my  position  ;  I  can  only  bring 
to  bear  against  the  enemy  about  four  thousand  men,  while 
he  can  oppose  me  with  any  given  number."  General 
Pillow  then  said:  "well,  gentlemen,  what  do  you  intend  to 
do  ?  I  am  in  favor  of  fighting  out."  General  Floyd  then 
spoke,  and  asked  General  Buckner  what  he  had  to  say,  and 


64 

General  Buckner  answered  quickly,  "  that  the  attempt  to 
cut  a  way  through  the  enemy's  lines  and  retreat  would  cost 
a  sacrifice  of  three-fourths  of  the  command,  and  no  com- 
mander had  a  right  to  make  such  a  sacrifice."  General 
Floyd  concurring,  remarked,  "  we  will  have  to  capitulate  ; 
but,  gentlemen,  I  can  not  surrender  ;  you  know  my  position 
■with  the  Federals  ;  it  >•  ould'nt  do,  it  wouhrnt  do ;"  where- 
upon General  Pillow,  addressing  General  Floyd,  said,  *'  I 
will  not  surrender  myself  nor  the  command  ;  will  die  Jirst.'^ 
**  Then,  I  suppose,  gentlemen,"  said  General  Buckner  "  the 
surrender  will  devolve  upon  me  ?"  General  Floyd  replied, 
speaking  to  General  Buckner,  •"  General,  if  you  are  put  in 
command,  will  you  allow  me  to  take  out  by  the  river  my 
brigade  ?"  "  Yes,  sir,  "  responded  General  Buckner,  **  if 
you  move  your  command  before  the  enemy  act  upon  my  com- 
munication, ofi"ering  to  capitulate."  "  Then,  sir,"  said 
General  Floyd,  '*  I  surrender  the  command,"  and  General 
Pillow,  who  was  next  in  command,  very  quickly  exclaimed, 
'*  I  will  not  accept  it ;  I  will  never  surrender,"  and  while 
speaking,  turned  co  General  Buckner,  who  remarked,  "  I  will 
accept  and  share  the  fiite  of  my  command,"  and  called  for 
pen,  ink,  paper  and  a  bugler. 

After  the  capitulation  was  determined  upon,  General  Pil- 
low wished  to  know  if  it  would  be  proper  for  him  to  make 
his  escape,  when  General  l^loyd  replied  that  the  question 
was  one  for  every  man  to  decide  for  himself,  but  he  would 
be  glad  for  every  one  to  escape  that  could.  "  Then,  sir,  I 
shall  leave  here,"  replied  General  Pillow.  Colonel  Forrest, 
who  was  in  the  room,  and  heard  what  passed  then,  spoke : 
*'  I  think  there  is  more  fight  in  these  men  than  you  all  sup- 
pose, and  if  you  will  let  me,  I  will  take  my  command.  Gen- 
eral Pillow  responding  to  him,  "  yes,  sir,  take  out  your 
command,  cut  your  way  out."  Generals  Floyd  and  Buckner 
assented.  General  Floyd,  by  saying,  "  yes,  take  out  your 
command,"  and  General  Buckner,  by  expressing :  "  I  have 
no  objection."  The  means  of  getting  away  was  then  dis- 
cussed, and  soon  after  we  began  to  disperse. 

"While  the  gentlemen  were  leaving  the  room,  I  approached 
General  Buckner  and  wished  to  know  if  General  Pillow's 
order  to  destroy  the  commissary  stores  should  be  carried  out, 
and  he  answered:  ''Major  Ilayncs,  I  countermand  the 
order."  It  may  be  proper  for  me  to  say  that  I  never  met 
General  Pillow  before  the  morning  of  the  9th  February, 
1862,  having  been  upon  Brigadier  General  Charles  Clark's 


65 

staff  since  my  entrance  into  the  service,  and  only  went  to 
Donelson  with  General  Pillow  to  take  temporary  charge  of 
the  commissariat.  General  Pillow  assigned  mc  to  duty  on 
his  staff  after  arriving  at  Donelson,  on  the  10th  February, 
1862. 

(Signed)  W.  H.  HAYNES, 

Major  and  Brigade  Commissary. 

State  of  Alabama,         > 
Morgan  County.    5 
Personally  appeared  before  me  Levi  Sugans,  Intendant  of 
the  town  of  Decatur,  and  ex  officio  Justice  of  the  Peace, 
Major  W.  H.   Haynes,  who  makes  oath  that  the  statements 
herein  made  relating  to  what  was  said  in  the  council  of  offi- 
cers, on  the  morning  of  the  16th  February,  1862,  are  true. 
Sworn  to,   and  subscribed  before  me   this    14th  March, 
1862. 

(Signed)  W.  II.  HAYNES, 

Major  and  Brigade  Commissary. 
(Signed)  LEVI  SUGANS, 

Intendant^ 
5 


HUNTER  NICHOLSON'S  STATEMENT. 
(^Referred  to  in  General  Pillow'' s  Supplemental  Report.) 


I  was  present  at  the  council  of  war,  held  at  Brigadier 
General  Pillow's  headquarters  in  Dover,  on  Saturday  night, 
Feliruary  15th,  1862.  I  came  into  the  room  about  two 
o'clock.  There  were  present  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and 
Buckner,  Major  Gilmer,  Colonel  Forrest,  and  several  staff 
officers,  among  whom  1  distinctly  remember  Major  Henry 
and  Colonel  Burch,  of  General  Pillow's  staff. 

The  Generals  were  discussing  the  necessity  and  practica- 
bility of  marching  the  forces  out  of  the  entrenchments  and 
evacuating  the  place.  Major  Rice,  a  resident  of  Dover, 
and  an  aid-de-camp  of  General  Pillow,  was  describing  the 
nature  of  the  country  and  character  of  the  roads  over  which 
the  army  would  have  to  pass.  He  referred  to  some  citizen, 
I  think,  a  doctor,  but  do  not  remember  his  name,  whom  he 
represented  as  more  familiar  with  the  roads.  In  a  little 
while,  or  perhaps,  during  the  conversation  of  Major  Rice, 
the  gentleman  referred  to  was  announced.  He  gave  a  de- 
scription of  the  roads,  which,  from  my  ignorance  of  the 
locality,  I  am  unable  to  repeat.  The  substance  was,  however, 
that  though  exceedingly  difficult,  it  was  possible  to  pass  the 
road  with  light  baggage  trains.  General  Pillow  asked  most 
of  the  questions  propounded  to  this  gentleman,  as  also  of 
those  to  Major  Rice.  At  this  point  I  was  called  into  an 
adjoining  room,  where  I  remained  but  a  few  minutes.  When 
I  returned  Major  Jones,  Brigade  Quartermaster,  was  just 
entering  the  room.  General  Pillow  at  once  approached  him, 
and  taking  him  a  little  one  side,  explained  to  him  that  it 
had  been  determined  to  evacuate  the  place,  and  that  he  must 
prepare  to  burn  the  quartermaster's  stores  in  his  hands. 
Major  Jones  enquired  at  what  time  ;  General  Pillow  replied 
about  daybreak,  about  half-past  five  o'clock.  Major  Jones 
left  very  soon,  and  I  did  notsee  him  in  the  room  afterwards, 
that  I  recollect.  In  a  few  minutes  Major  Haynes,  Brigade 
Commissary,  entered  the  room,  and  received  similar  instruc- 
tions as  to  the  commissary  stores  under  his  charge.     About 


67 

this  time  a  scout  was  ushered  in  who  announced  that  the 
enemy  had  re-occupied  the  lines  from  which  they  had  been 
driven  during  the  fight  on  Saturday.  General  Pillow  doubt- 
ed if  the  scout  was  not  mistaken  ;  so  another  was  sent  out. 
About  half  an  hour  had  elapsed  when  Major  Haynos  return- 
ed and  remained  near  me  in  the  room  during  the  remainder 
of  the  discussion.  Just  as  he  entered  General  Buckncr  re- 
marked :  "  I  am  confident  that  the  enemy  will  attack  my 
lines  by  light,  and  I  cannot  hold  them  for  half  an  hour." 
General  Pillow  replied  quickly  :  '*  Why  so,  why  so,  Gene- 
ral ? "  General  Buckner  replied:  "Because  I  can  bring 
into  action  not  over  four  thousand  men,  and  they  demoral- 
ized by  long  and  uninterrupted  exposure  and  fighting,  while 
he  can  bring  any  number  of  fresh  troops  to  the  attack." 
General  Pillow  replied  :  "  I  differ  with  you  ;  I  think  you 
can  hold  your  lines  ;  I  think  you  can,  sir."  General  Buck- 
ner replied  :  '*  I  know  my  position,  and  I  know  that  the 
lines  cannot  be  held  with  my  troops  in  their  present  co.idi- 
tion."  General  Floyd,  it  was,  I  think,  who  then  remarked : 
'*  Then,  gentlemen,  a  capitulation  is  all  that  is  left  us."  To 
which  General  Pillow  replied:  "  I  do  not  think  so;  at  any 
rate  we  can  cut  our  way  out."  General  Buckner  replied  : 
**  to  cut  our  way  out  would  cost  three-fourths  of  our  men, 
and  I  do  not  think  any  commander  has  a  right  to  sacrifice 
three-fourths  of  his  command  to  save  one-fourth."  To 
which  General  Floyd  replied  :  *'  certainly  not." 

About  this  time  the  second  scout  sent  out  returned  and 
reported  the  enemy  in  force  occupying  the  position  from 
which  they  had  been  driven.  Thereupon  two  of  Colonel 
Forrest's  cavalry  were  sent  to  examine  the  back  water,  and 
report  if  it  could  be  crossed  by  the  army.  These  scouts  re- 
turned in  a  short  time  and  reported  that  cavalry  could  pass, 
but  infantry  could  not. 

General  Buckner  then  asked  :  "  well,  gentlemen,  what 
are  we  to  do  ?"  General  Pillow  replied  :  '*  you  understand 
me,  gentleman,  I  am  for  holding  out,  at  least  to-day,  getting 
boats  and  crossing  the  command  over.  As  for  myself,  I  will 
never  surrender;  I  will  die  first."  General  Floyd  replied: 
"  nor  will  I,  I  cannot  and  will  not  surrender  ;  but  I  must 
confess  personal  reasons  control  me."  Gen.  Buckner  replied: 
"  but  such  considerations  shouW  not  control  a  General's  ac- 
tions." General  Floyd  replied  :  "  certainly  not ;  nor  would 
I  permit  it  to  cause  me  to  sacrifice  the  command."  General 
Buckner  replied  :    "  then,  I  suppose  the  duty  of  surrender- 


68 

ing  the  command  will  devolve  on  me  ?"  General  Floyd 
asked  :  "  how  will  you  proceed  ?"  General  Buckner  replied  : 
*'  I  Avill  send  a  flag  asking  for  General  Grant's  quarters,  that 
I  may  send  a  message  to  him,  I  will  propose  an  armistice 
of  six  hours  to  arrange  terms."  A  pause  here  ensued. 
Then  General  Buckner  asked :  "  am  I  to  consider  the  com- 
mand as  turned  over  to  me  ?"  General  Floyd  replied : 
"certainly;  I  turn  over  the  command."  General  Pillow 
replied,  quickly  :  *'  I  pass  it ;  I  will  not  surrender."  Gen- 
eral Buckner  then  called  for  pen,  ink  and  paper  and  a  bugler. 
General  Floyd  then  said  :  "  well,  General,  will  I  be  permit- 
ted to  take  my  little  Brigade  out  if  I  can  ?"  General  Buck- 
ner replied  ;  "  certainly,  if  you  can  get  them  out  before  the 
terms  of  capitulation  are  agreed  on."  Colonel  Forrest  then 
asked:  *' gentlemen,  have  I  leave  to  cut  my  way  out  with 
my  command  ?"  General  Pillow  replied  :  "  yes,  sir  ;  cut 
your  way  out ;"  and  continuing,  *'  gentlemen,  is  there  any- 
thing wrong  in  my  leaving  ? "  General  Floyd  replied  : 
**  every  man  must  judge  for  himself  of  that,"  General  Pil- 
low replied :  "  then,  I  shall  leave  this  plaee."  Here  Gene- 
ral Pillow  left  the  room  ;  but  returning  in  a  short  time  and 
taking  a  seat  between  Generals  Floyd  and  Buckner,  said  : 
"gentlemen,  in  order  that  we  may  understand  each  other, 
let  me  state  what  is  my  position.  I  differ  with  you  as  to  the 
cost  of  cutting  our  way  out ;  but  if  it  was  ascertained  that 
it  would  cost  three-fourths  of  the  command,  I  agree  that  it 
would  be  wrong  to  sacrifice  them  for  the  remaining  fourth." 
Generals  Floyd  and  Buckner  replied  :  "  we  understand  you, 
General,  and  you  understand  us." 

After  this  I  left  the  room,  and  soon  after,  the  place. 
(Signed)  HUNTER  NICHOLSON. 

Sworn  to  and  subscribed  before  me  on  this  18th  day  of 
March,  1862. 

(Signed)  LEVI  SUGANS, 

Intendant  of  the  town  of  Decatur,  Ala., 

and  ex  offi.  J.  P. 


REPORT  OF  MAJOR  U.  N.  BROWN,  TWENTIETH 
REGIMENT  OF  MISSISSIPPI  VOLUNTEERS,  ON 
THE  BATTLES  AT  FORT  DONELSON. 


To  General  George  W.  Randolph, 

Secretary  of  War,  C.  S.  A.  : 

I  am  directed  by  his  Excellency,  President  Davis,  to  make 
to  your  department  a  report  of  the  part  taken  by  tlie  twen- 
tieth Mississippi  Regiment,  in  the  engagements  with  the 
enemy  at  Fort  Donelson,  Tenn.,  February  13th,  14th  and 
15th,  1862,  also  all  other  facts  concerning  the  investment 
and  subsequent  surrender  of  that  post. 

The  regiment  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  Brigadier 
General  John  B.  Floyd  in  Western  Virginia,  during  the 
past  summer,  and  went  to  Kentucky,  and  from  thence  to 
Fort  Donelson,  as  part  of  his  ''immediate  command,"  arri- 
ving at  that  place  at  daylight  on  the  13th  February. 

By  sunrise  we  were  ordered  into  position  as  a  reserve,  im- 
mediately in  rear  of  a  point  which  was  said  to  be  our  centre. 
During  the  day  heavy  cannonading  was  kept  up  by  both 
sides,  mostly  of  shells  and  shrapnel,  which  resulted  in  killing 
one  man,  and  wounding  slightly  three  or  four  others.  At 
night  we  bivouacked  in  position  until  12  o'clock,  when  an 
order  came  from  General  Pillow  to  relieve  the  7th  Texas 
Regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel  John  Gregg,  then  in  the 
trenches.  At  that  time  a  brisk  firing  was  going  on,  sup- 
posed to  be  induced  by  the  enemy's  scouts  and  sharpshooters. 
The  breast-works  were  thought  insufficient  from  the  test 
of  the  preceding  day,  so  the  remainder  of  the  night  was 
occupied  in  strengthening  them,  and  clearing  out  the  trenches 
now  partially  filled  with  water  and  snow.  The  next  day 
(Friday)  was  spent  in  occasional  engagements  with  the  ene- 
my's sharpshooters.  The  fort  was  actively  engaged  in  re- 
pelling an  attack  of  the  gun-boats  of  the  eneiny.  My 
position  did  not  afford  me  a  view  of  the  proceedings,  Avhich 
have  been  fully  reported  by  others. 

About  one  o'clock  I  received  an  order  to  form  my  regiment 


70 

on  the  extreme  left,  in  an  open  field,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  sortie  on  the  enemy,  whose  formation  was  executed 
in  a  very  short  time.  By  order  of  General  Pillow,  the  20th 
Mississippi  was  attached  to  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Wm.  E. 
Baldwin,  1 4th  Mississippi  Regiment,  for  the  occasion.  Before 
the  order  to  advance  had  been  given,  a  few  guns  of  the 
enemy  were  heard,  and  by  the  time  we  had  advanced  one 
hundred  yards,  a  private  in  company  "  D"  Avas  shot  down, 
showing  that  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand.  We  continued 
the  march  one  hundred  yards  more,  when  the  order  to  halt 
was  given,  said  to  come  from  General  Floyd,  with  the  ex:- 
planation  that  wc  did  not  have  time  to  accomplish  what  he 
wanted,  and  the  order  to  countermarch  being  given,  we  did 
so  in  proper  order  and  returned  to  the  trenches. 

About  one  o'clock  on  that  night  (Friday,)  I  received  an 
order  to  form  again,  as  the  preceding  evening,  which  was 
executed  promptly,  and,  by  direction  of  General  Pillow  was 
«gain  placed  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Wm.  E.  Baldwin, 
14th  Mississippi  Regiment,  acting  Brigadier. 

I  made  a  report  to  him  of  the  casualties  of  that  day  while 
in  captivity,  but  as  he  has  been  prohibited  from  making  a 
statement  to  the  War  Department  of  this  government,  as 
likewise  General  Buckner,  I  hereby  append  substantially  the 
same  of  that  day's  proceedings,  which  were  confined  parti- 
cularly to  the  2()th  Mississippi  Regiment, 

"  Being  the  only  field  officer  present,  I  was  in  command 
and  greatly  assisted  by  Captain  H.  Cautey,  company  "  A," 
and  Captain  C.  K.  Massey,  company  "  D,"  who  were  se- 
lected by  the  officers  of  the  regiment  to  assist  in  field  duty, 
(there  being  some  difficulty  as  to  seniority  of  Captains). 
Adjutant  J.  M.  Couper  was  also  very  efficient,  and  rendered 
valuable  assistance. 

Assistant  Surgeon  J.  B.  Elkin  was  present,  and  rendered 
every  assistance  in  his  power  to  the  wounded. 

[The  casualties  are  omitted,  but  to  keep  up  the  connectioQ 
the  recapitulation  is  given  as  follows,  viz.:] 

5U()  aggregate  engaged; 

20  killed; 

68  wounded ; 

454  surrendered ; 
that  being  the  number  returned  by  the  commanding  officers 
of  companies  on   Sunday,  February  16,    1862,  the   day  we 
were  surrendered  ;  afterwards  many  reported  that  they  had 
several  to  escape. 


71 

On  the  morning  of  Saturd<ay,  the  loth  February,  when 
marched  out  to  attack  the  enemy,  we  were  third  in  the  order 
of  advance.  The  enemy's  pickets  and  sharpshooters  com- 
menced firing  upon  us  soon  after  the  order  to  advance,  and  by 
the  time  we  had  gained  three  hundred  yards,  we  were  under 
a  brisk  fire,  which  came  from  a  hill  in  front,  covered  with 
timber. 

By  order  from  General  Pillow,  the  regiment  was  formed 
on  the  left  of  the  road,  perpendicular  to  the  road  in  the 
woods,  immediately  behind  the  fence,  with  an  open  field  in 
front. 

Subsequently,  I  received  an  order  from  the  same  source  to 
wheel  the  regiment  to  the  right,  through  the  field,  behind  the 
line  of  fence,  parallel  to  the  road.  Tnis  movemtnt  subjected 
us  to  a  cross  fire,  and  very  much  exposed  us  to  the  enemy  on 
both  sides  under  cover  of  the  woods.  I  had  this  fact  repre- 
sented lO  General  Pillow,  who  ordered  me  back  to  our  first 
position.  At  this  time,  the  five  left  companies  were  actively 
engaged  on  the  hill,  and,  not  hearing  the  command,  did  not 
obey  with  promptness.  The  destruction  in  their  ranks  at 
that  time,  demonstrates  the  fierceness  of  the  conflict  and 
their  unflinching  bravery.  I  would  mention  especially,  Lt. 
R.  W.  Paine,  of  Company  H,  who  fell  at  this  time,  a  martyr 
to  his  country's  cause.  Here,  also,  was  wounded  Capt.  D. 
T.  Patterson,  Company  K.  Lt.  0.  R.  Castland,  of  Company 
F,  was  badly,  perhaps  mortally,  wounded.  He  refused  to  be 
carried  from  the  field,  and  exclaimed :  "  Never  mind  me, 
boys,  fight  on,  fight  on."  Lt.  J.  H.  Barbee,  Company  H, 
was  wounded  and  forced  to  retire.  Capt.  W.  A.  Roner, 
commanding  Company  B ;  Lt.  W.  R.  Nelson,  commanding 
Company  G ;  Lts.  J.  B.  Sykes,  Conway,  Murf,  Roberts,  W. 
S.  Champlin,  commanding  Company  E,  and  Lt.  Harrison, 
are  all  deserving  of  honorable  mention  for  their  conduct  at 
this  place. 

To  enumerate  all  the  officers  and  privates  who  were  deserv- 
ing of  notice  for  their  gallantry  throughout  the  day,  would 
be  to  return  a  list  of  all  who  were  on  the  field,  and  I  would, 
therefore,  refer  you  to  the  foregoing  list ;  but  as  fortune  had 
thrown  the  left  of  the  regiment  in  a  more  fiercely  contested 
place,  Avhich  the  suff'ering  truthfully  indicated,  it  is  but 
justice  to  give  those  companies  some  special  notice. 

On  several  other  occasions  during  the  day  we  were  ordered 
to  advance  and  charge  through  the  woods,  part  of  the  time 
under  -the  eye   and  immediate  direction   of  General  B.  R, 


72 

Johnson,  on  the  extreme  left,  until  the  enemy  were  entirely 
driven  off.  Our  movements  under  that  officer  seemed  to  take 
the  enemy  by  their  flank  and  rear.  We  opposed  several  of 
their  lines  of  reserves,  which  retired  with  but  little  resist- 
ance. At  12  o'clock,  I  was  instructed  by  General  Johnson 
to  remain  with  the  brigade  of  Col.  Jos.  Drake,  of  the  Fourth 
Mississippi,  then  on  my  left.  The  regiments  on  my  right 
soon  commenced  retiring  to  the  entrenchments.  I  did  not 
learn  by  whose  order  or  for  what  purpose. 

In  two  or  three  hours,  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy  at- 
tacked us  in  front,  which  was  repulsed  with  little  or  no  loss 
to  us.  They  then  endeavored  to  flank  our  right  and  thereby 
cut  us  ofl"  from  the  breast-works,  now  about  three-fourths  of 
a  mile  distant.  Col.  Drake  being  so  informed  gave  the  order 
to  move  by  the  right  flank,  and  continue  the  firing,  which 
was  executed.  By  this  time,  many  companies  were  without 
ammunition — such  was  the  case  with  many  of  Col.  Drake's 
command.  On  this  account,  we  retired  to  the  trenches  in 
perfect  good  order. 

When  called  upon  the  field,  the  regiment  had  been  without 
sleep  for  four  nights,  during  which  time  they  were  marching, 
working,  and  watching  in  the  trenches,  encountering  a  severe 
snow  storm  without  tents  or  cooking  utensils.  Notwith- 
standing all  these  privations  and  sufi'crings  every  order  was 
obeyed  with  the  greatest  alacrity,  every  man  seeming  to  feel 
that  much  depended  upon  himself. 

At  one  o'clock,  on  Saturday  night,  I  was  sent  for  to  re- 
port to  (jcneral  J.  B.  Floyd,  Avhich  I  did  promptly,  and  re- 
ceived notice  from  him  that  the  place  was  to  be  surrendered, 
but  that  he  would  not  surrender  himself  and  would  cut  his 
way  out  with  his  immediate  command.  To  carry  out  this 
determination,  he  ordered  me  to  form  my  regiment  on  the 
left  of  our  line,  as  on  the  previous  morning,  with  the  Vir- 
ginia regiments.  While  executing  this  order,  an  aid-de- 
camp of  General  Buckner  brought  an  order  countermanding 
this  arrangement  and  directing  me  to  the  steamboat  landing 
to  embark  on  one  of  two  boats  then  momentarily  expected. 

I  Avcnt  immediately  to  General  Floyd,  so  as  better  to  un- 
derstand the  movement,  and  from  him  learned  the  authen- 
ticity of  the  instructions,  and  also  that  we  would  embark 
according  to  the  rank  of  commanding  officers,  (Col,  Whar- 
ton's brigade,  and  Col.  McCauslin's  brigade,  would  precede  me 
in  order).  I  was  further  directed  to  place  a  strong  guard 
around  the  steamboat  lauding  to  prohibit  stragglers  from 


73 

going  aboard.  The  boats  being  detained  until  nearly  day- 
light, and  the  news  of  surrender  spreading  through  the 
camp,  caused  many  to  flock  to  the  river  almost  panic-stricken 
and  frantic  to  make  good  their  escape  by  getting  aboard. 
In  all  this  confusion,  I  am  proud  to  say,  that  the  2{Hh  Mis- 
sissippi regiment  stood  like  a  stonewall,  which,  as  the  necessity 
had  required,  I  had  thrown  in  a  semi-circle  around  the  land- 
ing to  protect  General  Floyd  and  his  Virginia  regiments, 
while  embarking ;  and  when  the  last  hope  had  vanished  of 
getting  aboard,  according  to  the  orders  and  promises  of 
General  Floyd,  and  we  realized  the  sad  fate,  that  we  had 
been  surrendered,  the  regiment  stacked  arms  in  perfect  good 
order,  wnthout  the  least  intimidation,  but  full  of  regret. 

I  am  not  able  to  state  why  we  ay  ere  not  taken  aboard  the 
boat, — there  w^as  about  200  men  and  officers  between  my 
regiment  and  the  boat,  and  General  Floyd  was  aboard.  I 
sent  my  Adjutant  to  inform  him  we  were  ready  to  go  aboard; 
I  did  not  get  a  satisfactory  ans-frer,  but  I  learned  that  the 
General  was  fighting  off  the  men  in  my  front,  who  I  thought 
belonged  to  one  of  the  Virginia  regiments,  commanded  by 
Major  Thomas  Smith,  who  has  since  informed  me  that  some 
did  not. 

There  seemed  to  me  to  be  room  enough  on  board  for  us 
all,  and  if  he  had  wanted  them  out  of  the  way,  I  could  have 
cleared  the  bank  in  a  moment's  time.  When  the  boat  left, 
there  did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  fifty  men  on  deck.  It  is, 
perhaps,  unbecoming  in  me  to  say  whose  fault  it  was  that 
my  regiment  Avas  not  embarked,  but  I  certainly  owe  it  to 
myself  to  show  that  it  was  not  mine.  While  this  excitement 
was  going  on,  General  Buckner  sent  for  me  and  informed 
me,  that  unless  the  steamboat  left  the  landing  immediately, 
he  would  have  a  bomb-shell  thrown  into  it, — that  he  had 
sent  word  to  the  boat  to  that  effect.  lie  made  some  further 
remarks  of  an  explanatory  character,  among  others,  that  we 
were  in  danger  of  being  shelled  by  the  gunboats  of  the 
enemy,  as  he  had  surrendered  the  place,  and  the  gunboats 
were  or  may  be  at  the  fort ;  that  his  honor  as  an  officer,  and 
the  honor  and  good  faith  of  the  Ccnfcderacy,  required  that 
at  daylight,  he  should  turn  over  everything  under  his  com- 
mand, agreeably  to  the  terms  of  capitulation  with  General 
Grant,  of  the  Federal  army. 

I  returned  to  the  boat  to  make  every  effort  to  get  aboard, 
but  it  had  shoved  off,  and  was  making  up  the  river,  with 
very  few  persons  aboard. 


74 

If  I  have  been  at  fault,  and  caused  the  unnecessary  im- 
prisonment of  my  regiment,  I  am  deserving  the  eternal  in- 
famy of  my  fellow  soldiers  ;  but  to  the  contrary,  not  an  of- 
ficer or  private  of  the  regiment  who  witnessed  the  proceed- 
ings, but  who  freely  and  cheerfully  exonerates  me  from 
every  blame  whatever. 

During  the  summer  and  fall  campaign  in  Western  Vir- 
ginia, in  Kentucky,  and  in  Tennessee,  this  regiment  has 
done  credit  to  themselves  and  their  State  by  the  arduous  ser- 
vice they  have  performed.  At  Sewell  IMountain,  Cotton 
Hill  and  Fort  Donelson,  their  manly  endurance  of  priva- 
tions, prompt  obedience  to  orders  and  their  eagerness  for 
the  fray,  Avas  never  excoWed  by  veteran  soldiers  of  any  army, 
and  has  entitled  the  20th  Mississippi  to  a  prominent  place 
in  the  history  of  this  revolution. 

In  obedience  to  my  instructions  to  furnish  the  department 
whatever  information  I  may  have  of  the  battle  of  Donelson, 
I  hereby  append  an  unofficial  statement  which  I  have  in  my 
possession,  made  by  "  Wm.  E.  Baldwin,  Captain  infantry,  C. 
S.  A.,  Colonel  14th  Mississippi  A^olunteers,  commanding  2d 
brigade,  2d  division  (General  Buckner's)  Central  Army, 
Ky.,"  from  October  30,  1860. 

**  To  supply  an  anticipated  omission  in  the  future  history 
of  our  country,  it  may  not  be  improper  here  to  state,  that 
this  brigade  composed  of  the  following  regiments : 

14th  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Major  Wm.  T.  Voss, 
26th  Tennessee,  «'  "    Col.  J.  M.  Lillard, 

26th  Mississippi,  "  ''    Col.  A.  E.  Reynolds, 

41st  Tennessee,  "  ''    Col.  R.  Farquharson, 

was  temporarily  divided  in  the  line  around  Fort  Donelson  : 
the  14th  Mississippi  and  the  41st  Tennessee  being  posted 
in  the  right  wing,  under  General  Buckner's  immediate 
supervision,  the  26th  Tennessee  and  26th  Mississippi  were 
posted  under  my  own  command,  on  our  extreme  left.  These 
regiments,  with  the  20th  Mississippi,  Major  W.  N.  Brown, 
which  was  added  to  the  command,  constituted  the  advance 
in  our  attack  on  the  right  of  the  enemy,  at  six  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  15th  of  February,  1862.  They  all  behaved 
with  great  gallantry  in  a  six  hour's  contest,  which  resulted 
in  the  total  defeat  of  the  enemy's  right,  whereby  a  way  was 
opened  for  the  retreat  of  the  army.  The  opportunity  not 
having  been  seized,  and  the  enemy,  60,000  strong,  having 
completely  enveloped  our  little  force,  numbering,  before  the 
loss   occasioned  by  four  days'   constant   engagements,  but 


75 

12,000,  officers  and  men,  tte  senior  Generals,  Floyd  and 
Pillow,  relinquished  the  command  to  General  Buckner,  and 
made  their  escape, — the  former  taking  with  him  some  1500 
of  his  immediate  command ;  only  leaving  Major  Brown 
with  the  20th  Mississippi,  who,  like  veterans,  were  silently 
and  steadily,  though  sullenly,  guarding  the  embarkation  of 
troops,  while  their  chief  was  seeking  safety.  The  command 
was  unconditionally  surrendered  on  the  morning  of  the  16th 
of  February,  by  General  Buckner,  who  shared  the  fate  of 
his  command. 

It  is  unbecoming  in  soldiers  to  criticise  the  conduct  of 
superiors  ;  but  when,  after  rejecting  the  counsels  of  juniors, 
the  condition  of  affairs  is  placed  beyond  the  power  of  human 
means  to  retrieve,  the  seniors  endeavor  to  escape  responsi- 
bility by  throwing  the  same  upon  the  former,  coinment  is 
umiecsssary  .^^ 

"After  surrendering,  the  force  was  taken  on  transports, 
the  rank  and  file  separated  from  officers.  jNlost  of  the  of- 
ficers were  confined  in  Camp  Chase,  near  Columbus,  Ohio. 
On  the  4th  March,  the  field  officers,  fifty  in  number  were 
brought  from  that  place  to  this  (Fort  Warren,)  where  we 
have  since  been  waiting  with  patience  for  the  time  Avhen  we 
can  again  strike  for  our  homes,  and  our  country's  indepen- 
dence. 

Fort  Warren,  March  1 9th,  1862." 

It  may  not  be  improper  for  me  here  to  state,  that  should 
an  arrangement  be  established  with  the  Federal  Government 
for  the  exchange  of  prisoners  of  war,  that  in  consideration 
of  the  services  rendered  by  this  regiment,  and  the  further 
fact  that  it  is  mustered  for  the  war,  1  would  request  that  it 
be  placed  first  in  the  list  to  be  exchanged. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

WM.  N.  BROWN,  Major, 
2[Uh  Mississippi  Regiment. 

Richmond,  Va.,  April  12th,  1862. 


STATEMENT  OF  CAPTAIN  JACK  DAVIS,  OF 
TEXAS. 


I  was  in  the  diiferent  battles  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  be- 
longed to  t  e  outside  forces  ;  was  Captain  of  Company 
E,  Colonel  Gregg's  Regiment,  Texas  Volunteers.  I  was 
in  the  batt  es  of  Thursday,  Friday  and  Saturday,  Was  one 
of  those  taken  prisoners,  but  made  my  escape  on  Sunday 
morning  on  a  flat-boat  across  the  river  from  Dover.  To  the 
best  of  my  knowledge,  we  were  surrendered  on  Sunday 
morning  between  daylght  and  sun  up. 

Some  hours  before  daylight,  we  were  aroused  from  our 
slumber  (which  by  an  arrangement  of  alternation,  we  were  al- 
lowed to  take)  by  an  announcement  that  we  were  to  retreat 
immediately.  In  pursuance  of  this  announcement,  we  im- 
mediately took  up  our  line  of  march,  and  had  advanced  some 
distance  to  an  open  field,  when  a  halt  was  ordered.  At  this 
order,  the  men  became  much  dissatisfied.  It  was  exceeding- 
ly cold  and  uncomfortable.  We  remained  in  this  position 
until  it  was  understood  that  we  were  surrendered,  and  we 
were  ordered  to  march  back  to  our  quarters. 

Our  regiment  belonged  to  Brigadier  General  Clarke's  Bri- 
gade, stationed  at  Hopkinsville,  Kentucky,  We  reached 
Fort  Donelson,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection,  on  the  Mon- 
day evening,  preceding  the  battle.  Was  in  all  the  conflicts 
that  occurred  outside  the  fort.  Tho  great  body  of  the  sol- 
diers behaved  with  gallantry  and  valor,  and  had  the  most 
implicit  confidence  in  the  Generals,  which,  I  believed  the 
Generals  merited. 

The  enemy  commenced  the  regular  attack  on  Thursday 
morning,  their  infantry  assailing  us  on  the  right,  while  their 
batteries  opened  on  our  left.  We  had,  so  far  as  I  was  able 
to  form  an  opinion,  about  12,000  altogether,  in  the  fort  and 
outside.  The  whole  body  of  our  troops  were  not  engaged 
in  the  battle  of  Thursday,  reserves  having  been  kept  on  the 
left,  and,  I  suppose,  also  in  the  fort  and  between  the  fort  and 
our  entrenchments.     I  will  here  explain  what  I  mean  by  en- 


77 

trenchments.  They  consisted  of  small  saplings,  with  which 
that  country  abounds,  thrown  lengthwise  along  the  outside 
margin  of  ditches  dug  some  five  feet  wide  and  two  feet  deep, 
the  dirt  having  been  thrown  upon  the  saplings,  and  giving 
us  a  protection  of  about  five  feet.  These  ditches  extended 
about  three  miles  in  length,  the  whole,  or  the  greater  part  of 
the  work  having  been  thrown  up  during  the  night  of  Wednes- 
day, some  slight  additions  and  improvements  having  been 
completed  on  Thursday  night. 

The  locality  was  most  judiciously  selected.  This  line  of 
ditches  was  so  constructed  that  it  afforded  a  complete  protec- 
tion to  the  fort,  which  was  situated  in  its  rear,  except  on  the 
water  side,  the  fort  being  on  the  bank  of  the  Cumberland 
river.  The  infantry  of  both  armies  mainly  conducted  the 
battle  on  Thursday,  the  heaviest  fighting  having  occurred  on 
our  right  wing,  the  left  being  assailed  with  shot,  shell  and 
grape  from  their  batteries.  Our  loss  on  the  right  wing, 
from  the  best  information  I  could  obtain,  amounted  to  from 
50  to  100  killed,  while  that  of  the  enemy,  as  I  was  inform- 
ed, was  not  less  than  from  400  to  500  killed  and  wounded. 
On  the  left  wing,  our  loss  amounted  to  from  4  to  6  killed. 

On  Thursday  night,  I  suppose,  that  the  various  regiments 
were  able,  by  alternately  relieving  each  other,  to  obtain  some 
partial  repose,  which  was  facilitated  by  having  the  reserves 
already  referred  to. 

^  On  Friday  morning,  the  fight  was  renewed  about  8  or  9 
o'clock,  the  battle,  as  on  Thursday,  having  been  chiefly  con- 
fined to  our  right  wing,  the  left  being  assailed  by  the  ene- 
my's sharpshooters.  The  battle  continued  on  Friday  be- 
tween the  infantry  on  both  sides  until  about  noon,  resulting 
in  about  equal  loss  on  both  sides  with  that  of  the  preceding 
day.  The  fighting  on  land  ceased  about  noon,  and  the  gun- 
boats, four  in  number,  opened  upon  the  fort,  which  returned 
the  fire,  resulting  after  a  conflict  of  about  one  hour-and-a- 
quarter,  in  but  little  if  any  damage  to  the  fort,  while  all  but 
one  of  the  gun-boats  were  disabled.  I  will  be  more  particu- 
lar. ^ 

The  guns  commenced  the  assault  when  about  one-and-a- 
quartcr  miles  from  the  fort,  coming  up  the  four  abreast,  and 
continuing  their  fire  until  they  were  opposite  the  fort.  The 
fort  kept  up  a  regular  fire  with  guns  of  a  smaller  calibre, 
evidently  reserving  the  heavy  guns  until  the  gun-boats  were 
within  a  distance  of  about  150  yards.  The  effect,  as  wit- 
nessed by  our  troops  and  by  the  citizens  who  had  gathered 


78 

on  the  hills  around  Dover,  vras  beyond  the  power  of  descrip- 
tion. After  having  received  a  shot  from  a  128-pounder, 
one  of  the  gun-boats  rolled  towards  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
river,  silenced,  crippled,  and  apparently  unmanageable  ;  a 
second  soon  shared  the  same  fate ;  a  third  was  totally  disa- 
bled, and  the  fourth,  turning  her  head,  took  to  a  precipitate 
flight  down  the  river.  The  excitement  at  this  time,  among 
the  military  and  the  citizen  spectators,  was  intense  and  al- 
most wild — the  latter  testifying  their  joy  by  tossing  their 
hats  in  the  air,  and  the  former  by  a  general  huzza,  com- 
mencing on  the  right  wing  and  soon  caught  up  and  became 
universal  along  the  entire  line. 

With  the  exception  of  some  random  shots  from  both  sides, 
there  was  no  further  fighting  on  that  evening.  On  that 
night,  we  received  orders  to  cook  three  days'  provisions,  and 
be  ready  for  marching  the  next  morning.  We  did  not  know 
whither  we  were  to  proceed,  but  we  supposed  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Fort  Henry,  to  which  it  was  believed  the  enemy  were 
retreating. 

On  Saturday  morning  the  battle  was  renewed  about  sun- 
rise, commencing  to-day  on  our  left.  At  an  early  hour  in 
the  morning,  we  were  informed  that  we  were  to  attack  the 
enemy.  This  I  regarded  as  an  indiscreet,  though  a  bold 
movement,  as  w^e  did  not  know  the  force  of  the  enemy  or  the 
number  and  locality  of  his  batteries. 

Three  of  our  regiments  commenced  the  attack  on  the 
enemy's  right,  and  the  fight  was  kept  up  until  they  com- 
menced retreating,  when  our  batteries  were  brought  to  bear 
upon  them.  We  pursued  them  over  a  mile,  the  regiment  to 
which  I  belonged  having  been  relieved,  and  a  fresh  regiment 
having  taken  our  place  in  the  pursuit.  From  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  this  morning,  I  became  convinced  that 
when  we  can  get  within  a  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  they 
will  not  stand  either  a  close  fight  or  a  charge.  The  result 
of  to-day's  fighting  was  much  more  disastrous  to  the  enemy 
than  on  any  of  the  preceding  days,  their  loss  being  at  least 
three  to  one.  On  each  day  our  army  took  prisoners,  vary- 
ing in  number.  Another  result  of  to-day's  battle  was  the 
capture,  by  our  troops,  of  eleven  or  more  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, five  of  which  1  know  of  myself — the  capture  of  the 
others  I  learned  from  good  authority  and  general  belief. 
This  battle  continued  until  between  11  and  12  o'clock — the 
enemy  at  this  time  having  been  driven  over  a  mile,  perhaps 
a-mile-and-a-half,  along  their  camp. 


79 

Our  army  returned,  all  believing  that  we  had  gained  a 
signal  victory  ;  but  later  in  the  day  the  fight  was  renewed, 
by  an  attack  of  the  enemy  on  our  right  wing,  with  results, 
on  both  sides,  more  disastrous  than  at  any  previous  period 
of  the  conflict.  The  disasters  on  our  side  were  attributed 
to  the  fjict  that,  from  some  cause  unknown  to  me,  a  portion 
of  our  forces  left  their  entrenchments,  which  were  imme- 
diately occupied  by  the  enemy. _  Our  greatest  loss  occurred 
in  connection  with  a  successful  and  gallant  charge,  con- 
ducted by  General  Buckner,  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the 
entrenchments. 

As  to  the  subsequent  surrender,  and  the  circumstances 
connected  with  it,  I  have  no  personal  knowledge.  We  went 
to  rest,  supposing  ourselves  completely  victorious  ;  but  I 
was  informed  by  several  persons,  especially  by  some  pri- 
soners, that  on  that  night,  as  well  as  on  the  night  previous, 
the  enemy  were  reinforced  to  an  extent  that  increased  their 
army  to  80,001)  men.  Meanwhile,  we  received  no  reinforce- 
ments, although  we  had  been  led  to  believe  that  they  were 
on  their  way  to  our  relief  from  Bowling  Green. 

I  have  already  referred  to  our  movements  on  Saturday 
morning.  When  the  intelligence  of  our  surrender  was  com- 
municated to  the  troops,  there  was  a  general  feeling  of  in- 
dignation, mingled  with  surprise,  among  all.  The  men  were 
frantic  to  be  permitted  to  fight  their  way  out.  It  is  my  firm 
belief,  and  the  general  impression,  that  had  a  reinforcement 
of  10,000  men  reached  us  on  Sunday  morning,  we  could 
have  held  out  and  secured  a  decisive  victory. 

Inter ro;:,atory  hy  H.  S.  Foote. — Had  the  steamer,  or  steam- 
ers, that  were  employed  in  taking  off  General  Floyd  and  his 
command,  been  employed  in  removing  our  men  and  muni- 
tions of  war  on  Saturday  night,  could  they  have  done  so  ? 

Answer. — Yes,  two  boats  could  have  taken  the  men  and 
munitions  of  war  in  two  hours.  The  enemy  did  not  come 
within  gun-shot  distance  of  the  fort  until  after  the  surrender. 
Had  some  5,000  men  been  kept  in  the  entrenchments,  even 
on  Sunday  morning,  we  could  have  transferred  across  the 
river  10,000  men.  JACK  DAVIS, 

Captain  Company  E^ 
Col.  John  Gregg's  regiment  Texas  Vols. 


COLONEL  LEON  TROUSDALE'S  RESPONSES  TO 
INTERROGATORIES  OF  COMMITTEE  TOUCHING 
SURRENDER  OF  NASHVILLE. 


Richmond,  March  11th,  1862. 

To  the  Clerk  of  tlie  Special  Committee  on  tJie  recent  Military 
Disasters  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson. 

Sir  :  Herewith  I  hand  you  my  answers  to  the  interroga- 
tories propounded  to  me  by  the  committee  and  transmitted 
to  me  by  you. 

Very  respectfully,  • 

LEON  TROUSDALE. 

Answer  to  Interrogatory  1.  I  am  a  resident  of  Nashville, 
and  my  occupation  is  that  of  editor  and  publisher  of  a  pub- 
lic journal. 

2.  I  left  the  city  of  Nashville  about  9  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  February  23d,  just  one  week  after  the  surrender 
of  Fort  Donelson. 

3.  General  A.  Sidney  Johnson  arrived  at  Nashville  and 
took  quarters  in  the  village  of  Edgefield,  on  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  Cumberland  river,  a  few  days  before  the  fall  of 
Donelson — the  precise  date  I  do  not  recollect.  His  forces 
were  left  in  the  rear,  and  did  not  reach  Nashville  until  Sun- 
day, the  16th  of  February,  when  they  passed  through  the 
city  and  marched  in  the  direction  of  Murfreesboro'.  I  un- 
derstand that  the  last  brigade  passed  through  the  city  on 
Monday.  General  Floyd's  Brigade  afterwards  arrived  from 
Donelson. 

4.  The  advance  of  General  BuelFs  forces  arrived  at 
Edgefield,  opposite  Nashville,  on  Sunday  morning,  Febru- 
ary 23d. 


81 

5.  The  first  report  of  General  Buell's  expected  advance 
was  promulgated  in  the  city  on  Sunday  morning,  1 6th  of 
February,  accompanied  by  intelligence  of  the  surrender  of 
our  forces  at  Donelson,  and  the  announcement  that  General 
Johnston  had  determined  not  to  make  a  stand  for  the  defence 
of  Nashville,  which  was  verified  during  the  day  by  the  move- 
ment of  masses  of  Confederate  troops  through  the  city  m  a 
Southeastern  direction,  on  the  Murfreesboro'  Turnpike. 
The  proximity  of  Buell's  forces  as  reported,  however,  was 
discredited  during  the  day.  As  before  stated,  the  enemy's 
advance  did  not  reach  the  Cumberland,  at  Nashville,  until 
the  23d. 

6.  The  citizens  of  Nashville  were  startled  and  confounded 
by  the  intelligence,  and  by  the  announcement,  said  to  have 
been  made  as  the  opinion  of  General  Johnston,  that  the 
gun-boats  would  probably  arrive  in  six  hours,  accompanied, 
as  it  was,  by  his  expressed  determination  not  to  make  a  stand 
for  the  defence  of  the  city.  Large  numbers  of  citizens  had 
been  drilling  in  companies  and  squads  for  several  days,  with 
the  design  of  aiding  the  Confederate  forces  in  making  such 
defence  as  might  be  resolved  on  by  the  General  command- 
ing. They  could  now  do  nothing  but  fly  from  their  homes 
or  submit  to  the  Federal  despotism,  virtual  prisoners  within 
the  lines  of  the  enemy,  unable  to  write,  speak  or  act  in  any 
manner  not  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  their  despotic 
enemies.  Thousands  chose  the  former  alternative,  however 
hard,  and  left  their  beautiful  city  "  fugitives  without  a 
crime." 

7.  I  know  nothing  of  the  strength  of  General  Buell's 
army,  now  at  Nashville,  but  I  have  heard  it  estimated,  by 
persons  from  that  vicinity,  at  fifteen  thousand  (15,000)  men. 

8.  I  do  not  think  that  Nashville  could  have  been  success- 
fully defended  after  the  surrender  of  Forts  Henry  and  Don- 
elson, in  the  incomplete  state  of  the  fortifications  near  the 
city,  and  with  the  rear  and  flank  of  Gen.  Johnston's  forces 
exposed  in  consequence  of  the  enemy  having  command 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers.  But  I  believe 
that  those  great  disasters  might  have  been  prevented  by 
energy  and  promptness  ;  and,  having  occurred,  that  the 
enemy  might  have  been  checked  in  his  advance,  by  a  proper 
demonstration. 

No  troops  ever  fought  with  more  gallantry  and  endurance 
than  the  Copfcderate  forces  at  Donelson,  and  I  have  been 
led  to  believe  that  moderate  reinforcements,  in  season,  would 
6 


82 

have  secured  for  them  the  fruits  of  their  valor  and  patient 
pacrificcs.  An  early  attention  to  the  fortifications  on  the 
Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  and  greater  enterprise  in  plan- 
ning and  perfecting  them,  I  am  satisfied,  would  have  insured 
a  different  result. 

9.  I  learned  from  officers,  who  were  with  the  rear  guard 
of  our  army  at  Bowling  Green,  that  large  amounts  of  pork 
and  some  unopened  boxes  of  Enfield  rifles  and  Colt's  navy 
pistols  were  left  at  that  point,  in  consequence  of  the  enemy 
shelling  the  town,  before  they  could  be  removed,  but  they 
were  burned  or  otherwise  destroyed,  as  best  they  could  be, 
by  General  Hardee.  Less  than  one  million  of  dollars,  I  was 
informed,  would  be  the  loss  in  stores  at  Nashville.  General 
Floyd  and  Colonel  Forest  exhibited  extraordinary  energy 
and  efficiency  in  getting  off  Government  stores  at  that  point. 
Colonel  Forrest  remained  in  the  city  about  twenty-four  hours 
with  only  forty  (40)  men  after  the  arrival  of  the  enemy  at 
Edgefield.  These  officers  wore  assisted  by  the  voluntary 
efforts  of  several  patriotic  citizens  of  Nashville,  who  ren- 
dered them  great  assistance.  Among  these,  I  remember 
Messrs.  John  Williams,  J.  J.  McCann,  H.  L.  Claiborne,  and 
R.  C.  McNairy. 


STATEMENT  OF  LIEUT.  COL.  HAYNES. 


Richmond,  Va., 
24tli  March,  1862. 
To  Hon.  H.  S.  Foote, 

Chairman. 

S[R :  In  answer  to  tlie  order  of  your  Committee,  requir- 
ing me  to  report  the  facts  connected  with  the  defence  and 
fiill  of  Fort  Donelson,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  yo'i,  that 
on  the  lotli  January  hist,  I  was  ordered  by  Major  General 
Polk  to  proceed  at  once  from  Columbus  Ky.,  to  the  Fort3 
Henry  and  Donelson,  to  take  charge  of  the  artillery  forces 
at  those  points.  The  next  day,  I  reported  in  person  to 
Brig.  Gen  1  Til;2;hman,  at  Fort  Henry,  and  by  his  order  was 
appointed  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  4th  Division,  and  di- 
rected to  Fort  Donelson,  and  take  charge  of  the  artillery 
there — he  saying,  that  for  the  present  he  would  attend  to 
Fort  Henry.  That  same  day,  I  proceeded  to  Donelson,  and 
at  once  entei'ed  upon  my  duty.  There  was  but  one  artillery 
company,  Capt  Maury's  Light  Battery,  there;  but  two  volun- 
teer infantry  companies,  under  Capts.  Beaumont  and  Bid- 
well,  had  been  detailed  to  man  the  heavy  guns,  but  they 
had  been  but  slightly  and  imperfectly  trained  and  Captain 
Bidweirs  company  not  at  all.  I  at  once  organized  these 
three  companies  into  a  battalion,  and  placed  them  under 
daily  instruction.  I  telegraphed  to  Gen.  Polk  for  officers 
of  artillery  to  act  as  instructors,  and  he  sent  to  me  for  duty, 
Lieuts.  Martin  and  McDaniel,  who  drilled  the  men  daily  at 
the  heavy  guns,  and  they  were,  under  my  own  eye,  taught 
to  fire  their  guns  at  targets  1,000,  1,500,  and  2,000  yards, 
and  the  elevation  for  particular  range  explained  and  taught 
to  them. 

Every  man  in  the  battalion  of  artillery,  nearly  300,  who 
was  fit  for  duty,  was  required  to  labor  in  mounting  the  guns, 
repairing  and  finishing  the  merlous,  embrazures  and  plat- 


84 

forms.  A  new  bomb-proof  magazine,  near  the  main  battery, 
approached  by  a  bomb-proof  covered  way,  of  capacity  suffi- 
cient to  hold  100  rounds  for  ten  guns,  was  rapidly  con- 
structed under  the  direction  of  Captain  Beaumont  and  Lieu- 
tenant H.  S    Bedford,  acting  adjutant  battalion. 

Captain  J,  P,  Shuster,  (who  had  reported  to  me  for  duty, 
by  order  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,)  was  appointed  chief 
of  the  battalion,  and  under  his  direction  the  ammunition 
and  stores  necessary  for  ten  guns,  were  arranged  in  the 
magazine,  with  matches,  port-lires,  lanterns,  and  so-forth. 
The  men  were  divided  into  detachments  of  15  men  to  a  gun, 
with  supernumeraries  to  each,  and  each  detachment  assigned 
under  its  chief  to  its  gun,  and  each  man  to  his  place  at  the 
gun,  and  their  duties  explained  to  them  in  case  of  an  attack 
by  day  or  night. 

By  the  10th  February,  we  had  our  batteries  finished,  and 
ten  thirty-two  pounder  guns  mounted,  and  there  were  oily 
two  other  guns  not  mounted,  the  columbiad  and  rilie  guns. 

The  10-inch  columbiad  was  mounted  about  the  25th  Jan- 
uary, but  upon  firing  it,  the  shock  threw  it  back  against  the 
hurters,  and  the  recoil  threw  the  chassis  off  the  pintle,  and 
the  counter  shock  threw  the  muzzle  of  the  gun  so  violently 
against  the  transcom  bar,  as  to  injure  the  carriage.  In 
this  condition  (like  the  one  at  Fort  Henry.)  it  was  useless. 
I,  therefore,  dismounted  it,  re-modeled  the  platform,  and 
sent  an  officer  to  the  Rolling  Mill  and  had  new  rear  traverse 
wheels  cast  four  inches  greater  in  diameter.  These  wheels 
were  cast  and  sent  to  us  only  in  time  to  enable  us  to  re- 
mount this  important  gun.  With  its  new  wheels  it  worked 
like  a  charm. 

The  rifle  gun,  throwing  a.  conical  shell  of  128  pounds, 
was  sent  to  us  about  the  1st  February  from  Nashville,  but 
neither  pintle,  nor  pintle-plate  (without  which  it  could  not 
be  mounted)  was  sent  with  it.  I  at  once  sent  Lieutenant 
G.  S.  Moorman,  of  the  artillery,  to  Nashville,  to  procure 
these  and  other  fixtures  necessary  for  this  and  other  guns, 
and  we  only  obtained  tliese  indispensable  fixtures  two  days 
before  the  fight,  and  scarcely  in  time  to  mount  this  gun.  It 
was,  however,  successfully  mounted  on  the  llth. 

Our  batteries  being  now  in  order,  were  manned  and  com- 
manded as  follows:  Captain  Beaumont's  company  at  the 
five  32-pounders  next  the  river ;  Captain  BidweU's  company, 
with  the  other  four  guns  to  the  left,  including  the  10-inch 
columbiad;  each,  with  several  lieutenants,  all  under  the  eye 


$5 

of  Captain  Shuster,  commander  of  battalion  and  Captain 
Dixon,  engineer,  and  Lieutenant  Joseph  Culbertson,  C.  S. 
A.,  on  special  duty  with  me.  Captain  Ross  (just  arrived 
from  Hopkinsville)  having  given  up  his  light  battery  with 
his  men,  took  cliarge  of  the  half-moon  battery,  composed  of 
the  rifle  gun  and  two  ship  carronades.  furnishing  a  detach- 
ment under  Lieutenant  Stankovitch  (Captain  Taylor's  com- 
pany) to  mann  the  8-inch  howitzer  and  the  two  9-pounder 
nondescripts.  Captain  Maury's  light  battery  took  post  on 
the  left  of  the  rifle  trenches,  in  General  Pillow's  Division, 
and  was  not  further  under  ray  chartre. 

The  liglit  battery  and  horses  of  Capt.   Ross's  company 
were  placed  under  Lieut.  Parker,  with  an  infantry  volunteer 
company  to  man  them,  and  stationed   at  the   ffrave-vard 
above  Dover.  *^ 

On  the  12th  (Wednesday)  the  gun-boats  made  their  ap- 
proach, but  did  not  venture  within  the  range  of  our  guns  ; 
but  early  the  next  morning  a  vigorous  attack  having  been 
made  upon  our  whole  lines  by  the  enemy,  the  gun-boats 
opened  a  spirited  fire  upon  our  batteries,  throwing  during 
the  forenoon  about  15!)  shot  and  shells,  from  large  nfle  and 
smooth-bore  guns.  Their  fire  was  returned  with  spirit  by 
our  guns,  a  shot  piercing  one  at  her  water-line,  and  com- 
pelling it  to  fall  back.  Unfortunately  a  single  rifle  shell 
from  the  enemy's  guns  dismounted  one  of  our  32-pounder 
guns,  instantly  killing  the  brave  Captain  Dixon,  disabling 
for  the  time  Captain  Shuster,  and  killing  and  wounding  sev- 
eral privates.  I  immediately  placed  Lieutenant  (acting 
Captain)  Culbertson  in  charge  of  the  ten-gun  battery,  and 
took  my  post  at  the  river  battery,  although  not  able  to  walk, 
without  crutches,  and  then  only  with  great  pain. 

In  the  afternoon,  our  army  being  hotly  eno-aged 
along  our  whole  line,  the  gun-boats  renewed  the  attack, 
keeping  up  a  continual  discharge  of  shot  and  shells,  with- 
out however,  doing  much  damage.  Our  own  fire  was  care- 
fully withheld,  in  order  to  draw  the  boats  nearer  to  us,  and, 
as  was  expected,  they  soon  ventured  within  range.  A  few 
well-directed  shots  from  our  rifled  gun  and  columbiad,  soon 
drove  them  back,  one  of  their  boats  being,  as  I  learned  that 
night,  with  difficulty,  kept  from  sinking.  At  the  close  of 
the  day,  the  contest,  by  land  and  water,  ceased,  and  our 
batteries  were  visited  by  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow,  and 
our  artillerists  complimented  by  them.  General  Floyd  order- 
ing the  dismantled  gun  to  be  that  night,  if   possible,   re- 


86 

mountctl.  Upon  an  inspection  made  by  ^lajor  Gilmer,  of 
the  Engineers,  and  myself,  I  ordered  a  detail  of  twelve  ar- 
tificers and  carpenters  for  that  purpose. 

On  the  next  day  the  increased  pain  and  inflamation  of 
my  Avound  rendered  it  impossible  for  me  to  remain  longer  at 
the  batteries,  and  the  next  day  I  was,  by  direction  of  Sur- 
geon Williams,  placed  on  board  a  steamer,  with  the  wound- 
ed, to  be  sent  up  the  river. 

During  my  services  at  Fort  Donelson,  both  before  and  in 
the  engagement  at  that  place,  I  was  under  obligations  to 
Acting  Adjutant  W.  W.  Foote,  (a  boy  only  16  years  old,) 
and  to  Lieutenant  H.  S.  Bedford,  Adjutant  of  Artillery 
Battalion,  for  the  prompt  and  faithful  discharge  of  the  ardu- 
ous and  dangerous  duties  which  they  had  to  perform. 

I  cannot  close  this  statement  of  the  brief  and  humble  part 
which  I  performed  in  preparing  and  maintaining  the  defences 
of  Fort  Donelson,  without  expressing  my  particular  obliga- 
tions to  Lieutenant  J.  Culbertson,  of  the  C.  S.  Army,  on 
special  duty,  and  Lieutenants  Bedford  and  Cobb,  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department,  for  the  zeal  and  energy  displayed  by 
them  in  superintending  the  work  at  the  batteries,  and  valu- 
able services  during  the  engagement,  in  all  of  which  they 
were  greatly  assisted  by  Captain  T.  W.  Beaumont  and  his 
subalterns  ;  nor  to  Lieutenants  Martin  and  McDaniel,  of  the 
Tennessee  Corps  of  Artillery,  for  their  untiring  energy  in 
imparting  instruction  to  the  battalion  of  artillery  under  my 
command;  nor  can  too  much  be  said  in  praise  of  the  volun- 
teer infantry,  who,  after  three  or  four  weeks'  instruction, 
in  the  midst  of  toil  and  labor,  both  by  day  and  night,  ac- 
quired such  skill  in  the  management  of  their  guns,  as  to  be 
able  to  maintain  successfully  a  four  days'  cannonade  against 
a  flotilla  of  gun-boats,  carrying  twice  as  many,  and  better 
guns,  than  theirs,  crippling  at  least  five  of  them,  and  com- 
pelling their  flag-officer,  Foote,  (himself  wounded,)  to  with- 
draw his  fleet  entirely  from  the  hopeless  effort  to  pass  their 
batteries  ;  nor,  in  this  meed  of  praise,  should  the  gallant 
Captain  Ross  and  Lieutenant  Stankovitch,  (both  old  artil- 
lery oflScers)  with  their  subalterns  and  privates,  be  forgot- 
ten. 

Without  our  success  was  greatly  due  to  the  admirable  po- 
sition of  our  guns,  rising  gradually  from  the  river,  to  an 
elevation  of  fifty  feet,  thus  affording  a  plunging  fire,  which 
from  the  narrowness  of  the  river,   (only  50U  feet  wide,)  to 


87 

throw  our  balls  into  the  holds  of  the  boats,  and  cripple  their 
machinery. 

I  may  here  add,  from  information  derived  from  some  of 
the  parties,  that  on  Saturday  night,  Captain  Bidwcll  and 
one  private  of  artillery,  Lieutenant  Burt,  and  about  41)  men, 
and  all  the  horses  of  Captain  Porter,  and  Light  Battery, 
and  Col.  Forrest's  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  many  stragglers, 
from  various  corps,  made  good  their  retreat,  without  meeting 
any  obstruction  from  the  enemy. 

In  justice  to  myself  (as  I  was  in  charge  of  the  artillery  for 
a  short  time  at  Fort  Donelson)  I  ought  to  add  that  I  had 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  exterior  defences  of  the 
place,  which  were  arranged  under  the  direction  of  the  com- 
manding General  and  Engineers. 

In  my  opinion,  the  site  its-lf  was  the  most  unfortunate, 
first,  because  the  space  enclosed  by  the  trenches  formed  a 
ml  (k  sac,  divided  in  the  mi  Mle  by  a  sheet  of  backwater,  thus 
rendering  communication  between  the  wings  of  our  army 
diflScult  and  hazardous.  Second,  because  the  area  enclosed, 
though  strong  itself,  was  surrounded  at  a  distance  of  from 
eight  hundred  to  twelve  hundred  yards  by  a  range  of  hills 
higher  than  those  occupied  by  us,  thus  affording  a  command- 
ing position  (eagerly  seized  by  the  enemy)  for  their  batteries 
of  rifled  guns,  from  which  they  could  reach  every  .point  within 
our  lines. 

Hence,  the  utmost  courage  and  endurance  could  not,  and 
did  not,  avail  to  save  us  from  disaster  ;  but  the  dcods  of  dar- 
ing performed  by  our  army  will  form  the  brightest  picture 
in  the  pages  of  our  history  and  render  the  names  of  the 
heroes  who  fell  on  Dover's  blood-stained  hills  immortal. 
Respectfully, 

MILTON  A.  HAYNES, 
Lt.  Col.  and  Chief  of  Corps  of  2\nnessee  Artillery. 


r 


^  MAJOR  MUNFORD'S  ANSWERS 

^y  To  Interrogatories  of  Special  Committee,  ^c,  fyc. 


Answer  1.  General  Johnston  did  not  take  command  in 
person  at  Bowling  Green  till  the  28th  of  October,  1861.  He 
arrived  there  on  the  14th,  and  General  Buckner  remained 
in  command  till  the  28th. 

Answer  2.  The  force  under  Buckner,  when  Gen.  John- 
ston arrived  was  a  fraction  under  six  thousand,  and  were 
being  reinforced  by  Major  General  Hardee's  division  of  about 
five  thousand,  and  Col.  Terry's  regiment  of  Texas  Rangers, 
about  one  thousand,  making  the  force,  before  Gen.  Johnston 
took  immediate  command,  within  a  fraction  of  twelve  thou- 
sand. I  have  not  the  means  of  stating  the  weekly  increase. 
Disease  fell  upon  the  army,  particularly  measles,  both  at 
Bowling  Green  and  at  the  diiferent  rendezvous  for  fresh  en- 
listments which  had  not  been  turned  over  to  the  Confed- 
eracy. It  was  a  terrible  scourge,  and  the  ranks  were  so 
thinned  that  on  the  last  of  November  our  eflfective  force  was 
estimated  at  twelve  thousand  five  hundred,  showing  no  ma- 
terial increase  for  more  than  a  month. 

Answer  3.  I  do  not  know.  General  Buckner  took  pos- 
session of  Bowling  Green  on  the  17th  of  September  with 
about  four  thousand  troops.  I  have  heard,  and  believe  it  to 
be  true,  that  as  Buckner  moved  in  on  one  side  of  Kentucky, 
Rosseau  moved  in  on  the  other.  Rosseau's  force,  or  the 
number  of  ''  Home  Guards,"  who  were  regarded  as  equally 
hostile  to  us,  I  do  not  know,  nor  have  I  heard.  This,  how- 
ever, is  true,  that  on  the  4th  of  October,  General  Buckner 
despatched  to  General  Johnston,  at  Columbus,  that  the  en- 
emy thirteen  or  fourteen  thousand  strong  were  advancing  upon 
him ;  that  his  own  (Buckner's)  force  was  "  less  than  six 
thousand,"  and  asked  for  reinforcements. 

It  was  this  despatch  which  led  to  reinforcing  Bowling 
[Green]  as  promptly  as  possible  with  Hardee's  division  and 
Texas  Cavalry.  Shumber's  regiment  from  Overton  county 
was  also  ordered  to  that  place,  but  in  consequence  of  depre- 
dations of  "  Home  Guards"  had  to  be  sent  back  to  repress 
them.      Another   regiment   was   also   ordereal   to   Bowling 


89 

Green,  but,  as  now  remembered,  was  not  carried  forward 
because  it  was  unarmed  and  there  were  no  arms  to  give  tliem. 
The  more  rapid  advance  of  the  enemy  had  been  checked  by 
burning  the  bridge  over  '^  Rolling  Fork," 

Answer  4.  I  have  heard  General  Johnston  assign  many 
reasons  for  not  ordering  General  Buckner  to  advance  in  the 
first  instance  to  Muldrough's  Hill.  He  regarded  that  posi- 
tion as  unsuited  for  a  base  of  military  operations,  and  as 
possessing  but  slight  strategic  importance.  It  was  beyond 
the  Green  river,  the  navigability  of  which  had  to  be  de- 
stroyed to  prevent  the  enemy  from  moving  by  water  from 
Paducah,  Cairo,  and  other  points  in  Buckner's  rear.  With 
that  navigable  stream  open,  they  could  transport  upon  it  not 
only  troops,  but  the  heaviest  ordnance  and  other  munitions 
of  Avar,  and  effectually  cut  Buckner's  line  of  communication 
with  Tennessee  and  the  South  whence  his  supplies  of  men 
and  munitions  must  be  drawn.  Buckner's  force  was  small, 
(about  four  thousand,)  his  troops  were  fresh,  most  of  them 
illy  armed,  and  many  illy  disciplined.  Their  general  ap- 
pointments for  a  campaign  defective,  and  being  wholly  with- 
out transportation,  they  would  have  been  tied  down  to  the 
railroad. 

The  line  of  the  Barren  river,  however,  on  which  Bowling 
Green  is,  he  regarded  as  a  good  base  of  operations;  the 
advance  column  occupying  the  country  to  the  Green  river 
and  Bowling  Green  being  in  supporting  distance  from  Ten- 
nessee, from  and  through  which  supplies  and  reinforcements 
must  come,  if  unexpectedly  the  Kentuckians  failed  to  rush 
to  Buckner's  standard  at  his  approach.  He  regarded  it  as 
necessary  to  hold  Bowling  Green,  not  only  till  the  naviga- 
bility of  the  Green  river  Avas  destroyed,  but  to  make  it  a 
depot  of  supplies.  He  also  thought  it  should  be  fortified 
that  it  might  be  garrisoned  and  held  by  as  small  a  force  as 
possible  to  increase  thereby  the  numbers  for  the  field.  If  a 
superior  force  should  advance  on  that  position  by  being  fort- 
ified, compensation  would  be  had  for  disparity  in  numbers. 

Answer  5.  As  nearly  as  I  can  ascertain,  between  three 
and  four  thousand,  the  balance  of  his  force  being  distributed 
along  the  turnpike  on  the  march  to  Nashville. 

General  Johnston  had  ordered  on  Friday  before  the  con- 
flicts at  Donelson  that  preparations  be  made  to  evacuate 
Bowling  Green  ;  the  army  began  the  march  on  Tuesday,  and 
the  troops  remaining  Avere  engaged  in  removing  Government 
stores  by  the  railroad.     They  were  under  the  command  of 


90 

Brigadier-General  Hindman,  and  detained  for  that  purpose. 

Answer  G.  For  the  troops  along  the  turnpike  none.  They 
would  have  been  compelled  to  march.  For  those  at  Rowling 
Green  who  were  still  engaged  in  removing  the  stores,  the 
engines  and  cars  on  hand,  what  number  of  either,  I  do  not 
know.  The  railroad  runs  to  Clarksville,  steamers  thence  to 
Donelson. 

Answer  7.     See  No.  5. 

Answer  8.  I  do  not  know,  nor  have  I  the  means  of  ascer- 
taining. 

Answer  9  and  10.  I  do  not  believe  reinforcements  were 
asked  of  General  Johnson  by  either  General  Floyd  or  Pil- 
low, or  Buckner,  or  any  other  commander  there  during  those 
conflicts.  I  had  access  to  the  despatches — think  I  read 
every  one.  I  never  saw  such  a  request  except  when  I  heard 
it  reported  in  Richmond  that  General  Johnston  had  been 
asked  by  the  Generals  at  Donelson.  I  thought  it  a  mistake 
then,  and  as  no  member  of  this  staff  ever  saw  such  a  des- 
patch, I  am  confirmed  in  that  impression.  The  Generals  at 
Donelson  can  settle  it,  and  I  entertain  no  doubt  that  they 
will  all  assert  that  no  reinforcements  were  asked  for :  as 
they  knew  how  much  the  command  had  been  weakened  by 
sending  Floyd's  and  Buckner's  forces  to  that  place,  and  how 
greatly  larger  was  the  enemy's  forces  pressing  on  his  rear, 
as  well  as  the  fact  that  General  Johnston's  troops  were  on 
their  march  between  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville,  and 
could  not  get  there  in  time  to  do  any  good.  And  further  I 
say  not. 

(Signed.)  ED.  W.  MUNFORD. 


Extract  of  Letter  from  Major  Munford  to  Committee  covering 
the  foregoing. 

Hon.  Henry  S.  Foote,  &c.  : 

Sir  :  With  this  note  be  pleased  to  receive  answers  to  the 
interrogatories  propounded  to  mo  by  yourself,  as  chairman 
of  the  Special  Committee  of  the  Ilouse.  They  have  been 
prepared  from  the  records,  from  my  own  memory  of  facts, 
and  from  such  other  sources  of  information  as  I  knew  to  be 
reliable,  and  are  sent  with  the  hope  that  both  you  and  the 
committee  may  be  somewhat  assisted  by  them  in  arriving  at 
the  truth.  ****** 

(Signed.)  ED.  W.  MUNFORD. 


TESTIMONY    OF    COL.    JOHN  McCAUSLAND  AND 
CAPT.  F.  P.  TURNER. 


Questio?}s  propounded  to  Colonel  John  McCausland  of  the  S6th 
Reghmnt  Virc:inia  Volunteers,  and  Captain  F.  P.  Turner, 
Company  G,  S^th  Regiment  Virginia  Vo  unteers. 

1st.  How  long  had  you  been  serving  in  the  command  of 
Brigadier  General  John  B.  Floyd  prior  to  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Donelson  ? 

Ans.  By  Col.  McCausland.  I  had  been  serving  in  that 
Brigade  from  August  last  until  after  the  surrender  of  the 
Fort  in  question. 

2d.  Were  you  with  your  regiment  in  the  contest  at  Fort 
Donelson,  which  resulted  in  its  surrender  by  the  Confede- 
rate troops  ? 

Ana.  By  the  same.     I  was. 

3d.  Was  the  Army,  in  your  opinion,  in  such  a  condition 
on  Saturday  morning  preceding  the  surrender  of  Don- 
elson, on  Sunday  morning,  as  to  have  rendered  it  possible  to 
enable  it  to  cut  its  way  through  the  enemy's  lines,  and  made 
its  escape  without  a  surrender,  and  if  so,  Avhat  in  your  judg- 
ment must  have  been  the  loss  by  such  an  effort,  Avhether 
successful  or  unsuccessful  ? 

^7?^.  By  the  same.  I  do  not  think  it  would  have  been 
possible  for  our  troops  to  have  cut  their  way  through  the 
enemy's  lines.  An  attempt  would  certainly  have  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  one-half  of  our  entire  aimy,  including  the 
whole  baggage,  army  supplies  and  artillery, 

4th  Wlien  did  the  steamboats,  upon  which  General  Floyd 
and  a  portion  of  his  command  escaped  from  Donelson,  arrive 
at  that  point  ? 

Ans.  By  the  same.  They  did  not  arrive  until  Sunday 
morning,  about  daylight,  and  when  they  did  arrive,  they 
were  loaded — one  with  corn,  and  the  other  with  ammunition 
and  provisions,  brought  for  immediate  use. 

(Signed,)  JOHN  McCAUSLAND, 

Colonel  Thirty-sixth  Virginia  Regiment. 


92 

The  same  questions  being  propounded  to  Captain  Turner, 
he  says  he  concurs  in  the  responses  made  by  Colonel  Mc- 
Causland,  and  adopts  his  statements  above  as  his  to  the 
same  questions.  F.  P.  TURNER, 

Capt.  Co.  G,  SGih  Va.  Rcgi. 


INTERROGATORIES   PROPOUNDED   TO  COLONEL 
RUSSELL. 

1st.  How  long  was  your  regiment  a  part  of  Gen.  Floyd's 
brigade  ? 

2nd.  What  was  the  number  of  your  regiment  at  Fort 
Donelsou,  in  the  battle  Avliich  led  to  the  surrender  ? 

3rd.  How  many  were  absent  on  furlough,  and  sick  leave 
and  otherwise,  and  where  were  they  ? 

4th.  IIow  many  escaped  with  General  Floyd  from  the  sur- 
render ? 

5th.  IIow  many  escaped  after  the  surrender  who  were  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  what  means  were  open  to  them  of  ef- 
fecting their  escape  ? 

6th.  Where  was  your  regiment  when  the  other  portion  of 
General  Floyd's  brigade  escaped,  and  what  were  they  engaged 
in  doing  ? 

7th.   Why  did  they  occupy  the  position  assigned  them  ? 

8th.  IIow  wide  is  the  back-water  of  the  slough  over  which 
the  men  of  your  regiment  escaped.  Did  your  son,  with 
others,  make  their  escape  across  that  water,  and  relate  the 
circumstances  of  their  escape  ? 

9th.  Was  that  portion  of  your  regiment  on  duty,  *'  wholly 
lefV^   at  Donelson  or  not  ? 

10th.  State  any  other  facts  you  know  or  have  learned, 
bearing  upon  the  facts. 


ANSWERS  OF  COLONEL  DAN.  R.  KUSSKLL.  TO  QUESTIONS  PRO- 
POUiNDEn  nv  SPECIAL  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESEN- 
TATIVES. 

Answer  to  \st  Interrogation.  My  regiment  joined  General 
Floyd  about  25th  September,  1861,  and  was  with  him  about 
five  montlis. 

Ajis.  to  2nd.  A  memorandum  from  my  Adjutant,  sent  to  me, 
shows  aggregate  on  13th  February,  of  552. 

Ans.  to  Srd.  I  cannot  ansAver  accurately  without  my  regi- 
mental books.     The   aggregate  of  the  regiment  was  some- 


94 

thing  over  son.  Thus  the  number  absent  .  .-.ild  be  aboat 
250;  some  were  at  their  homes  sick,  antl  or,  In:  lough,  some 
at  Kashville,  Chuksville  and  elsewhere  in  hospitals,  and 
some  on  detached  service  at  Cumberland  Cii  ;hI  elscNvhere, 
teamsters,  etc. 

Ans.  to  4th.  I  have  been  able  to  hear  <  ;  l.at  one  man, 
him  I  saw,  by  name  Henry  Williford.  After  rl:.'  boat  pushed 
off,  he  says,  he  jumped  into  the  water  an'i  'inhered  over 
the  guards  of  the  boat.  It  is  possible  so:.'i  'unded  went 
up  with  General  Floyd.  The  boat  used  I  '  .ueral  Floyd 
was  the  General  Anderson. 

^715.  to  5th.    I  do  not  know^  certainly.  c  seen  five 

men,  communicated  with  others,  and  suppo  ni  all  I  can 

learn,  about  twenty-five.     Their  means  of  ■'.  were  rafts 

to  cross  the  river,  or  skiffs  or  to  wade  tlnon^i;  a  sheet  of 
back-water  in  the  rear  and  left  of  our  army. 

Ans.  to  6th.  I  do  not  know,  except  from  narration  of 
those  who  were  on  the  field,  officers  and  oiiicrs,  ^\ho  say 
they  were  drawn  up  in  military  order  on  liic  bank  of  the 
river,  near  where  the  "  Anderson"  backed,  and  that  thej 
were  guarding  the  gangways  to  the  boat,  (o  scx-urc  order  in 
embarking  the  troops.  My  regiment  in  the  march  from 
Clarksville,  was  the  left  and  rear  of  Floyd  s  brigade,  and  I 
suppose  was  still  in  that  position,  and  hence  would  be  last 
to  embark,  unless  the  order  of  march  was  reversed. 

Ans.  to  1th.  I  have  never  seen  the  slough,  but  have  been 
told  by  persons  who  waded  through  it  on  Sunday  morning, 
that  it  Avas  about  fifty  yards  wide.  My  son  made  his  escape 
with  Adjutant  Cooper  and  Lieut.  Conway,  after  they  were 
ordered  to  stack  arms.  They  waded  the  slouch,  which  my 
son  says  was  about  breast  high  to  him,  and  then  they  marched 
without  encountering  the  enemy,  to  the  railroad,  reaching 
it  at  Columbia,  Tenn. 

Ans.  to  8th.  I  have  heard  of  no  one  who  was  not  leftf 
that  was  on  duty  on  the  field.  Williford  made  his  escape,  as 
stated  above,  after  the  boat  left. 

DAN.  R.  RUSSELL, 

Colonel  2\jth  Mississippi. 


OFFICIAL  RErORT  OF  OPERATIONS  OF  GENE- 
RAL S.  B.  BUCKNER'S  DIVISION  IN  THE  DE- 
FENCE OF  FORT  DONELSON,  AND  OF  THE 
SURRENDER  OF  THAT  POST. 


Richmond,  Va., 
August  11,  1862. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of 
the  operations  of  that  portion  of  the  2d  Division  of  the  Cen- 
tral Army  of  Kentucky,  which  was  detached  from  Bowling 
Green  and  Russell ville,  Ky.,  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  Fort 
Donclson  and  the  village  of  Dover,  on  the  Cumberland 
River,  Tennessee. 

By  the  courtesy  of  Brigadier-General  Grant,  L^nited 
States  Army,  I  was  permitted  to  transmit  to  Clarksville, 
Tennessee,  a  brief  report  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donel- 
son,  but  as  I  now  learn,  it  never  reached  the  Headquarters 
of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  1  transmit  hcrevtith  a  copy. 

I  have  been  prevented  from  making  an  earlier  report  by 
the  refusal  of  the  Federal  authorities  during  my  imprison- 
ment, either  to  permit  me  to  make  a  report  or  to  receive  the 
report  of  subordinate  commanders.  Such,  indeed,  was  the 
discourtesy  of  the  Federal  War  Department,  that,  though 
kept  in  solitary  confinement  during  my  imprisonment  and 
prevented  from  holding  communications  with  any  of  my 
fellow  prisoners,  a,  request  on  my  part  to  be  informed  of  the 
cause  of  a  proceeding  so  unusual  amongst  nations  pretend- 
ing to  follow  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  failed  to  elicit  a 
response.  On  the  11th  February  ultimo,  Brigadier-General. 
Floyd  had  resolved  to  concentrate  his  division  and  my  own. 
at  Cumberland  City,  with  a  view  of  operating  from  some- 
point  of  the  railway,  west  of  that  position,  in  the  direction 
of  Fort  Donelson  or  Fort  Henry,  thus  maintaining  his  com'- 
munications  with  Nashville,  by  the  way  of  Charlotte..  I 
7 


96 

reached  Fort  Donelson  on  tlie  night  of  February  11th,  with 
orders  from  General  Floyd  to  direct  General  Pillow  to  send 
back  at  once  to  Cumberland  City  the  troops  which  had  been 
designated. 

Before  leaving  Clarksville  I  had,  by  authority  of  General 
Floyd,  ordered  Scott's  Regiment  of  Louisiana  Cavalry  to 
operate  on  the  north-side  of  the  Cumberland  llivcr,  in  the 
direction  of  Fort  Donelson,  Avith  a  view  to  prevent  the  es- 
tablishing of  any  of  the  enemy's  field  batteries  which  might 
interfere  with  our  transports.  General  Pillow  declined  to 
execute  the  order  of  which  I  was  the  bearer,  until  he  should 
have  a  personal  interview  with  General  Floyd.  Accordingly 
on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  he  left  me  temporarily  in  com- 
mand and  proceeded  himself  in  a  steamer  to  Cumberland 
City.  Before  leaving,  he  informed  me  that  he  had  directed 
a  reconnoissance  to  be  made  by  Colonel  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
with  instructions,  in  no  event  to  bring  on  an  engagement, 
should  the  enemy  approach  in  force. 

General  Pillow  left  me  under  the  impression  that  he  did 
not  expect  an  immediate  advance  of  t  e  enemy,  and  regard- 
ed their  approach  from  the  direction  of  Fort  Ilcnry  as  im- 
practicable. During  the  morning  Forrest  reported  the  ene- 
my advancing  in  force  with  the  view  of  enveloping  our  line 
of  defence ;  and  for  a  time  he  was  engaged  with  his  usual 
gallantry  in  heavy  skirmishing  with  them,  at  one  time  driving 
one  of  their  battalions  back  upon  their  artillery. 

About  noon  General  Pillow  returned  and  resumed  com- 
mand ;  it  having  been  determined  to  reinforce  the  garrison 
with  the  remaining  troops  from  Cumberland  City  and  Clarks- 
ville. 

The  defences  were  in  a  very  imperfect  condition.  The 
space  to  be  defended  by  the  army  was  quadrangular  in  shape, 
being  limited  on  the  North  by  the  Cumberland  Uivcr,  on  the 
East  and  AVest  by  small  streams  now  converted  into  deep 
sloughs  by  the  high  water,  and  on  the  South  by  our  line  of 
defence.  The  river  line  exceeded  a  mile  in  length;  the  line 
of  defence  was  about  two  miles  and-a-half  long,  and  its  dis- 
tance from  the  river  varied  from  one  fourth  to  three  fourths 
of  a  mile.  The  line  of  entrenchments  consisted  of  a  few 
logs  rolled  together  and  but  slightly  covered  with  earth, 
forming  an  insufficient  protection  even  against  field  artillery. 
Not  more  than  one  third  of  the  line  was  completed  on  the 
morning  of  the  12th.  It  had  been  located  under  the  (direc- 
tion of  that  able   engineer  officer.  Major  Gilmer,  near  the 


97 

crests  of  a  series  of  ridges  which  sloped  backwards  to  tho 
river,  and  were  again  commanded  in  several  places  by  other 
ridges  at  a  still  greater  distance  from  the  river.  This  chain 
of  heights  was  intersected  by  deep  valleys  and  ravines, 
which  materially  interfered  with  communications  between 
different  parts  of  the  line.  Between  the  village  of  Dover 
and  the  water  batteries,  a  broad  and  deep  valley  extending 
directly  back  from  the  river,  and  flooded  by  the  high  water, 
intersected  the  quadrangular  area  occupied  by  tho  army,  and 
almost  completely  isolated  the  right  wing.  That  part  of  the 
line  which  covered  the  land  approach  to  the  water  batteries, 
and  constituted  our  right  wing,  was  assigned  to  me  v.ith  a 
portion  of  my  division,  consisting  of  the  third  or  Colonel 
John  C.  Brown's  brigade,  which  was  composed  of  the  ^^rd 
Tennessee  A^clunteers,  which  was  Colonel  Brown's  rcgimt'iit, 
18th  Tennessee  regiment.  Colonel  Palmer,  32d  Tennossce 
regiment.  Colonel  Cook ;  half  of  Colonel  Baldwin's  2il  bri- 
gade, temporarily  attached  to  Colonel  Brown's  2nd  Regiment 
Kentucky  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  W.  Hanson,  14th  ^Its- 
sissippi  Volunteers,  Major  Doss;  41st  Tennessee  Volun- 
teers,- Colonel  Farquharson ;  Porter'd  battery  of  six  field 
pieces ;  Graves'  battery  of  six  field  pieces. 

The  remaining  regiments  of  Baldwin's  brigade,  the  26th 
Tennessee  Volunteers,  Colonel  Lillard,  and  the  2Gth  Mis- 
sissippi Volunteers,  Colonel  Reynolds,  together  with  the  bri- 
gade commander,  were  detached  from  my  command  by  Brig. 
General  Pillow  and  assigned  a  position  on  the  left  of  the 
line  of  entrenchments. 

The  work  on  my  lines  was  prosecuted  with  energy,  and 
Vy'as  urged  forward  as  rapidly  as  the  limited  number  of  tools 
would  permit;  so  that  by  the  morning  of  the  13th,  my  posi- 
tion was  in  a  respectable  state  of  defence. 

My  disposition  of  the  troops  was  as  follows: 

Hanson's  regiment  on  the  extreme  right ;  Palmer's  regi- 
ment, with  its  reserve  in  position  to  reinforce  Hanson  ; 
Porter's  battery  occupying  the  advanced  salient,  sweeping 
the  road  which  led  to  the  front,  and  flankinc;  the  entrench- 
ments  both  to  the  right  and  to  the  left.  The  reserve  of  the 
14th  Mississippi  was  held  as  its  support.  Brown's,  Cooks', 
and  Farcjuhaj  f^on's  regiments  were  on  the  left.  Graves' 
battery  occupied  a  position  near  the  extreme  left  of  the 
entrenchments  on  the  declivity  of  the  hill,  whence  it  swept 
the  valley  with  its  fire  and  flanked  the  position  of  Colonel 
Hciman  to  the  cast  of  the  valley. 


98 

From  three  to  five  companies  of  each  regiment  were  de- 
ployed as  skirmishers  in  the  rifle  pits.  The  other  companies 
of  each  regiment  were  massed  in  columns,  sheltered  from 
the  enemy's  fire  behind  the  irregularities  of  the  ground,  and 
held  in  convenient  positions  to  reinforce  any  portion  of  the 
line  that  might  be  seriously  threatened. 

No  serious  demonstration  was  made  on  our  lines  on  the 
12th. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  a  column  of  the  ene- 
my's infantry,  which  was  apparently  forming  to  move  down 
the  valley  between  my  left  and  Heiman's  right,  was  driven 
back  by  a  few  well  directed  shots  from  Graves'  battery. 

About  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  enemy  made  a  vigo- 
rous attack  upon  Hanson's  position,  but  was  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  The  attack  Avas  subsequently  renewed  by  three 
heavy  regiments,  but  was  again  repulsed  by  the  2d  Kentucky 
Regimicnt,  aided  by  a  part  of  the  18th  Tennessee.  In  both 
these  affairs,  and  also  in  a  third  repulse  of  the  enemy  from 
tlie  same  position,  Porter's  battery  played  a  conspicuous 
part. 

About  1 1  o'clock  a  strong  attack  was  made  on  Colonel 
Heiman's  position  beyond  my  left.  A  well  directed  fire 
from  Graves'  battery  upon  the  flank  of  the  assaulting  column 
materially  contributed  to  repulse  the  enemy  with  heavy 
loss. 

The  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  riflemen  was  inces- 
sant throughout  the  day ;  but  was  responded  to  by  a  well 
directed  fire  from  the  entrenchments,  which  inflicted  upon 
the  assailants  considerable  loss,  and  almost  silenced  his  fire 
late  in  the  afternoon.  On  the  preceding  night  General 
Floyd  had  arrived  and  assumed  command  of  all  the  troops, 
and  during  the  morning  visited  and  inspected  my  lines.  My 
loss  during  the  day  was  thirty-nine  (39)  in  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  enemy  were  comparatively  quiet  in  front  of  my  posi- 
tion during  the  14th.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  1  was 
summoned  to  a  council  of  general  oflScers,  in  which  it  was 
decided  unanimously,  in  view  of  the  arrival  of  heavy  rein- 
forcements of  the  enemy  below,  to  make  an  immediate  attack 
upon  their  right,  in  order  to  open  our  communications  with 
Charlotte  in  the  direction  of  Nashville.  It  was  urged  that 
this  attack  sho.ld  be  made  at  once,  before  the  disembarka- 
tion of  enemy's  reinforcements — supposed  to  be  about  fifteen 
thousand  men.     I  proposed  with  my  division  to  cover  the 


99 

retreat  of  the  army,  should  the  sortie  prove  successful.  I 
made  the  necessary  dispositions  preparatory  to  executing 
the  movement,  but  early  in  the  afternoon  the  order  was 
countermanded  by  General  Floyd,  at  the  instance,  as  I 
afterwards  learned,  of  General  Pillow,  who,  after  drawing 
out  his  troops  for  the  attack,  thouglit  it  too  late  for  the 
attempt. 

On  the  night  of  the  14th  it  was  unanimously  decided,  in 
a  council  of  general  officers  and  regimental  commanders,  to 
attack  the  enemy's  right  at  daylight.  The  object  of  the 
attack  was  to  force  our  way  through  his  lines  recover  our 
communications,  and  effect  our  retreat  upon  Nashville  by 
way  of  Charlotte,  Tenn.  This  movement  had  become  im- 
peratively necessary  in  consequence  of  the  vastly  superior 
and  constantly  increasing  force  of  the  enemy,  who  had 
already  completely  enveloped  our  position.  The  general 
plan  was  for  General  Pillow  to  attack  his  extreme  right,  and 
for  that  portion  of  ray  division  remaining  under  my  com- 
mand, after  being  relieved  in  the  rifle  pits  liy  Colonel  Head  s 
regiment,  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  riglit  of  the  enemy's 
centre,  and,  if  successful,  to  take  up  a  position  in  advance 
of  our  works  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Road  to  cover  the  retreat 
of  the  whole  army  ;  after  which  my  division  Avas  to  act  aa 
the  rear  guard. 

On  Saturday  morning,  the  15th,  a  considerable  portion  of 
my  division  was  delayed  by  the  non-arrival  of  Head's  regi- 
ment at  the  appointed  time,  and  by  the  slippery  condition 
of  the  icy  road  which  forbade  a  rapid  march.  My  advance 
regiment,  however,  the  3d  Tennessee,  reached  its  position 
by  daylight  in  rear  of  a  portion  of  the  entrenchments  which 
had  been  occupied  by  General  Pillow's  troops.  As  no 
guards  had  been  left  in  this  portion  of  the  line,  and  even  ;i, 
battery  was  left  in  position  without  a  cannoneer,  I  deployed 
the  3d  Tennessee  in  the  rifle  pits  to  cover  the  formation  of 
my  division  as  it  arrived.  The  regiments  were  formed, 
partly  in  line  and  partly  in  column,  and  covered  from  the 
enemy's  artillery  fire  by  a  slight  acclivity  in  fi'ont.  In  the 
meantime  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  right  was  made  in  the 
most  gallant  and  determined  manner  by  the  division  of 
General  Pillow.  For  the  progress  of  that  action,  I  refer 
to  the  reports  of  Colonel  Baldwin,  Colonel  Gregg,  and  their 
subordinate  commanders,  which  have  been  transmitted  to 
me  as  the  senior  officer  left  with  the  army. 

In  front  of  my  position  the   enemy  had  a  heavy  battery 


100 

posted  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  with  another  battery  op- 
posite my  left — both  sustained  by  a  heavy  infantry  force. 

Major  Davidson,  acting  chief  of  my  artillery,  established 
Craves'  battery  to  the  left  of  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  and 
opened  upon  the  enemy's  batteries  a  destructive  fire.  I  also 
directed  a  portion  of  the  artillery  to  open  upon  the  flank 
arid  left  rear  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  who  were  contesting 
the  advance  of  General  Pillow's  division.  In  view  of  the 
heavy  duty  which  I  expected  my  division  to  undergo  in 
covering  the  retreat  of  the  army,  I  thought  it  unadvi sable 
to  attempt  an  assault  at  this  time  in  ray  front  until  the  ene- 
my's batteries  Avere,  to  some  extent,  crippled,  and  their  sup- 
ports shaken  by  the  fire  of  my  artillery.  About  9  o'clock, 
General  Pillow  urged  an  advance  to  relieve  his  forces.  I 
accordingly  sent  forward  the  14th  Mississippi,  Major  Doss, 
deployed  as  skirmishers.  At  the  request  of  its  commander 
I  assigned  the  direction  of  its  movements  to  Major  Alex!)n- 
dor  Cassiday,  of  ray  staff.  The  line  of  skirmishers  was  sus- 
tained by  the  3d  and  ISth  Tennessee.  Their  line  of  march 
uiifortunately  masked  the  fire  of  my  artillery  upon  the 
Wynn's  Ferry  road,  but  it  continued  to  play  with  effect 
upon  the  force  which  was  opposing  General  Pillow's  ad- 
vance. The  combined  attack  compelled  the  enemy  to  retire, 
n',t,-  however,  without  inflicting  upon  ray  troops  considera- 
ble loss.  Under  a  misapprehension  of  instructions  at  a  time 
when  my  artillery  was  directed  over  the  heads  of  the  ad- 
vanced troops  upon  the  enemy's  battery,  these  regiments 
withdrew  without  panic,  but  in  some  confusion,  to  the 
trenches,  after  the  enemy's  infantry  had  been  driven  a  con- 
siderable distance  from  their  position. 

As  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  Avas  along  the  Wynn's 
Ferry  road,  I  now  organized  an  attack  further  to  my  right, 
up  a  deep  valley  which  led  from  Ileiman's  left  in  rear  of  the 
position  occupied  by  the  enemy's  batteries. 

In  order  to  cover  the  advance  of  the  infantry  column,  I 
directed  Captain  Porter  with  his  artillerists  to  serve  Green's 
battery,  which  was  already  in  position,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  sent  a  request  to  Col.  Ileiman  to  direct  Maney's  bat- 
tery to  open  its  fire,  while  he  should  deploy  a  line  of  skirm- 
iphers  in  advance  of  his  position  to  cover  the  right  of  the 
valley.  Gen,  Pillow  was  at  this  time,  as  I  afterwards  learned, 
on  the  heights  to  my  right,  occupied  by  Heiman.  Maney's, 
Porter's  and  Graves'  batteries  now  opened  a  cross  fire  upon 
the   enemy's  battery  and  position,  soon  crippling  some  of 


101 

his  guns  and  driving  their  supports,  while  the  3rd,  18th  and 
32d  Tennessee  regiments,  under  their  brigade  commander, 
Colonel  John  C.  Brown,  moved  steadily  up  the  valley,  pre- 
ceded by  their  skirmishers,  who  soon  became  engaged  with 
those  of  the  enemy.  This  movement,  combined  with  the 
brisk  fire  of  three  batteries,  induced  a  rapid  retreat  of  the 
enemy,  who  abandoned  a  section  of  his  artillery.  At  the 
same  time  my  infantry  were  thus  penetrating  the  enemy's 
line  of  retreat,  Forrest,  with  a  portion  of  his  cavalry, 
charged  upon  their  right,  while  General  Pillow's  division, 
under  the  orders  of  General  B.  R.  Johnson  and  Colonel 
Baldwin  were  pressing  their  extreme  right  about  half  a  mile 
to  the  left  of  this  position. 

In  this  latter  movement  a  section  of  Graves'  battery  par- 
ticipated, playing  with  destructive  effect  upon  the  enemy's 
left,  Avhile,  about  the  same  time,  the  2nd  Kentucky,  under 
Colonel  Hanson,  charged  in  quick  time,  as  if  upon  parade, 
through  an  open  field  and  under  a  destructive  fire,  without 
firing  a  gun,  upon  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy  who  broke 
and  fled  in  all  directions.  A  large  portion  of  the  enemy's 
right  dispersed  through  the  woods  and  made  their  way,  as 
was  afterwards  learned,  to  Fort  Henry. 

While  this  movement  was  going  on,  I  conducted  one  piece 
of  artillery,  under  Capt.  Graves,  along  the  Wynn's  Ferry 
road,  supported  by  the  14th  Mississippi,  and  sent  orders  to 
the  residue  of  Graves'  battery  and  Porter's  and  Jackson's 
batteries,  and  Farquharson's  Tennessee  regiment  to  follow 
the  movement  with  rapidity.  I  also  sent  to  direct  Hanson's 
regiment  to  rejoin  me.  The  enemy,  in  his  retreat,  had  now 
taken  up  a  strong  position  on  the  road  beyond  the  point  where 
it  crosses  the  valley.  I  directed  the  position  to  be  attacked 
by  the  3rd,  ISth  and  32d  Tennessee  regiments,  the  first  on 
the  left,  the  others  on  the  right  of  the  road,  while  Graves' 
piece  took  position  in  the  road  within  two  hundred  a'.id  fifty 
or  three  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  guns.  These  regi- 
ments, under  the  immediate  command  of  Colonel  Brown, 
advanced  gallantly  to  the  attack,  while  Graves'  piece  re- 
sponded with  effect  to  the  enemy's  artillery.  Notwithstand- 
ing their  vast  superiority  in  numbers  the  enemy  were  driven, 
with  very  heavy  loss,  from  their  position,  and  retreated  to  the 
right  of  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  leaving  it  entirely  open. 
In  this  position  I  awaited  the  arrival  of  my  artillery  and 
reserves,  either  to  continue  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  or  to 
defend  the  position  I  now  held  in  order  that  the  array  might 


102 

pass  out  on  the  Forge  road,  which  was  now  completely 
covered  by  the  position  occupied  by  uiy  division.  But  Crcneral 
J'illow  had  prevented  my  artillery  from  leaving  the  entrench- 
ments, and  had  ordered  Farquharson  not  to  join  me,  and 
also  sent  me  reiterated  orders  to  return  to  my  entrench- 
ments on  the  extreme  right.  I  was  in  the  act  of  returning 
to  the  lijies  when  I  met  General  Floyd,  who  seemed  sur- 
prised at  the  order.  At  his  request  to  know  my  opinion  of 
the  movement,  I  replied  that  nothing  had  occurred  to  change 
my  views  of  the  necessity  of  the  evacuation  of  the  post, 
that  the  road  was  open,  that  the  first  part  of  our  purpose 
was  fully  accomplished,  and  I  thought  we  should  at  once 
avail  ourselves  of  the  existing  opportunity  to  regain  our 
communications.  These  seemed  to  be  his  own  views;  for 
he  directed  me  to  halt  my  troops  and  remain  in  position  until 
he  should  have  conversed  with  General  Pillow,  who  was  now 
within  the  entrenchments. 

After  that  consultation  he  sent  me  an  order  to  retire 
within  tlie  lines  and  to  repair  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  my 
former  position  on  the  extreme  right  which  was  in  danger  of 
attack.  The  enemy  made  no  attempt  at  pursuit.  1  secured' 
the  section  of  artillery  which  had  been  captured,  ftnd  cov- 
ered my  retrogade  movement  by  Hanson's  and  Farquhar- 
son's  regiments.  My  troops  Avere  already  much  exhausted, 
but  returned  as  rapidly  as  possible  a  distance  of  two  miles  to 
their  positions.  But  a  small  portion  of  my  division  had  reach- 
ed their  positions  when  a  division  of  the  enemy,  under  com- 
mand of  Gen.  C.  F.  Smith,  assaulted  the  extreme  right  of  my 
position,  falling  upon  Hanson's  regiment  before  it  had  reach- 
ed its  rifle  pits.  This  gallant  regiment  was  necessarily  thrown 
back  in  confusion  upon  the  position  of  the  18th  Tennessee. 
At  this  period  I  reached  that  position,  and,  aided  by  a  num- 
ber of  olhcers,  I  succeeded  in  hastily  forming  a  line  behind 
the  crest  of  the  hill  which  overlooked  the  detached  works 
which  had  been  seized  by  the  enemy  before  Hanson  had  been 
able  to  throw  his  regiment  into  them.  The  enemy  advanced 
gallantly  upon  this  new  position,  but  was  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  I  reinforced  this  position  by  other  regiments 
as  they  successively  arrived,  and  by  a  section  of  Graves' 
battery,  v»'hile  a  section  of  Porter's  battery  was  placed  in  its 
former  position.  During  a  contest  of  more  than  two  hours, 
the  enemy  threatened  my  left  with  a  heavy  column,  and 
made  repeated  attempts  to  storm  my  line  on  the  right,  but 
the  well-directed  fire  of  Porter's  and  Graves'  artillery  and 


103 

the  musketry  fire  of  the  infantry  repelled  his  attempts,  and 
finally  dro^e  him  to  seek  shelter  behind  the  works  he  had 
taken,  and  amid  the  irregularities  of  the  ground.  Tliere 
was  probably  no  period  of  the  action  when  his  force  Avas  not 
from  three  to  five  times  the  strength  of  mine.  Toward  the 
close  of  the  action  I  was  reinforced  by  the  regiments  of 
Colonels  Quarles  and  Sugg  and  Bailey.  Generals  Floyd  and 
Pillow  also  visited  the  position  about  the  close  of  the  action. 

In  a  council  of  general  and  field  officers  held  after  night 
it  was  unanimously  resolved,  that  if  the  enemy  had  not  re- 
occupied,  in  strength,  the  position  in  front  of  General 
Pillow,  the  army  should  efi'ect  its  retreat ;  and  orders  to 
assemble  the  regiments  for  that  purpose  were  given  by  Gen- 
eral Floyd.  But  as  the  enemy  had,  late  in  the  afternoon, 
appeared  in  considerable  force  on  the  battle  field  of  the 
morning,  a  reconnoissancc  was  ordered,  I  think  by  General 
Pillow,  under  the  instructions  of  General  Floyd.  The 
report  of  this  reconnoisance  m;ide  by  Colonel  Forrest,  has 
been  fully  stated  by  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  ;  and  from 
what  I  have  been  able  to  learn  since,  I  am  satisfied  the  in- 
formation reported  was  correct.  Amongst  other  incidents, 
showing  that  the  enemy  had  not  only  re-occupied  their  for- 
mer ground  but  extended  their  lines  still  farther  to  our  left, 
is  the  fact  that  Overton's  cavalry,  following  after  Forrest's, 
was  cut  oif  from  retreat  by  an  infantry  force  of  the  enemy 
at  the  point  where  Forrest  had  crossed  the  stream  on  the  river 
road.  When  the  information  of  our  reinvestment  was  re- 
ported. General  Floyd,  General  Pillow  and  myself  were  the 
only  members  of  the  council  pres:nt.  Both  of  these  officers 
have  stated  the  views  of  the  council,  but  my  recollection  of 
some  of  the  incidents  narrated  differs  so  materially  from  that 
of  General  Pillow,  that  without  intending  any  reflection 
upon  either  of  those  officers,  I  feel  called  upon  to  notice 
some  of  the  differences  of  opinion  between  us.  Both  (Wlicers 
have  correctly  stated  that  I  regarded  the  position  of  the 
army  as  desperate,  and  that  an  attempt  to  extricate  it  by 
another  battle  in  the  suffering  and  exhausted  condition  ot 
the  troops  was  almost  hopeless. 

The  troops  had  been  worn  dov/n  with  watching,  with 
labor,  Avith  fighting.  Many  of  them  were  frosted  by  the 
intensity  of  the  cold  ;  all  of  them  Avere  suffering  and  ex- 
hausted by  their  incessant  labors.  There  had  been  no  regu- 
lar issue  of  rations  for  a  number  of  days,  and  scarcely  any 
means  of  cooking. 


104 

Their  ammunition  was  nearly  expended.  We  were  com- 
pletely invested  by  a  force  fully  four  times  the  strength  of 
our  own.  In  their  exhausted  condition  they  could  not  have 
made  a  march.  An  attempt  to  make  a  sortie  would  have 
been  resisted  by  a  superior  force  of  fresh  troops ;  and  that 
attempt  would  have  been  the  signal  for  the  fall  of  the  water 
batteries,  and  the  presence  of  the  enemy's  gun-boats  sweep- 
ing with  their  fire  at  close  range  the  positions  of  our  troops  ; 
who  would  thus  have  been  assailed  on  their  front,  rear  and 
right  flank  at  the  same  instant.  The  result  would  have  been 
a  virtual  massacre  of  the  troops,  more  disheartening  in  its 
cftects  than  a  surrender. 

In  this  opinion  General  Floyd  coincided;  and  I  am  cer- 
tain, that  both  he  and  I  were  convinced  that  General  Pillow 
agreed  with  us  in  opinion.  General  Pillow  then  asked  our 
opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  holding  our  position  an- 
other day.  I  replied  that  my  right  was  already  turned,  a 
portion  of  my  entrenchments  in  the  enemy's  possession  ; 
they  were  in  position  successfully  to  assail  my  position  and 
the  water  batteries ;  and  that  with  my  weakened  and  ex- 
hausted force,  I  could  not  successfully  resist  the  assault 
which  would  be  made  at  daylight  by  a  vastly  superior  force. 
I  further  remarked  that  I  understood  the  principal  object  of 
the  defence  of  Donelson  to  be  to  cover  the  movement  of 
General  A.  S.  Johnston's  army  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nash- 
ville, and  that  if  that  movement  was  not  completed,  it  was 
my  opinion  that  we  should  attempt  a  further  defence  even  at 
the  risk  of  the  destruction  of  our  entire  force,  as  the  delay 
even  of  a  few  hours  might  gain  the  safety  of  GeneralJohn- 
ston's  force.  General  Floyd  remarked  that  General  John- 
ston's army  had  already  reached  Nashville. 

I  then  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  wrong  to 
subject  the  army  to  a  virtual  massacre  when  no  good  could 
result  from  the  sacrifice ;  and  that  the  general  officers  owed 
it  to  their  men,  when  further  resistance  was  unavailing,  to 
obtain  the  best  terms  of  capitulation  possible  for  them. 
General  Floyd  expressed  himself  in  similar  terms,  and  in  his 
opinion  I  understood  General  Pillow  to  acquiesce.  For 
reasons  which  he  has  stated,  General  Floyd  then  announced 
his  purpose  to  leave  with  such  portion  of  his  division  as 
could  be  transported  in  two  small  steamers,  which  were  ex- 
pected about  daylight.  General  Pillow,  addressing  General 
Floyd,  then  remarked  that  he  thought   there   were  no  two 


105 

persons  in  the  Confederacy  whom  the  "  Yankees"  wouM 
prefer  to  captur.>  than  himself  and  General  Floyd,  and  asked 
the  lattcr's  opinion  as  to  the  propriety  of  his  accompanying 
General  Floyd,  To  this  enquiry  the  latter  replied  that  it 
was  a  question  for  every  man  to  decide  for  himself.  Gene- 
ral Pillow  then  addressed  the  same  enquiry  to  me,  to  which 
I  remarked  that  1  could  only  reply  as  General  Floyd  had 
done,  that  it  was  a  question  for  every  officer  to  decide  for 
himself,  and  that  in  ray  own  case  I  regarded  it  as  my  duty 
to  remain  with  my  men  and  share  their  fate,  whatever  it 
might  be. 

General  Pillow,  however,  announced  his  purpose  to  leave, 
when  General  Floyd  directed  me  to  consider  myself  in  com- 
mand. 1  remarked  that  a  capitulation  would  be  as  bitter  to 
me  as  it  could  be  to  any  one,  but  I  regarded  it  as  a  necessity 
of  our  position,  and  I  could  not  reconcile  it  with  my  sense 
of  duty  to  separate  my  fortunes  from  those  of  my  command. 

It  is  due  to  General  Pillow  to  state  that  some  time  after 
the  command  had  been  transferred  to  me,  and  while  prepara- 
tions were  making  for  his  departure  he  returned  to  the  room 
and  said  to  General  Floyd  and  myself  that  he  wished  it  un- 
derstood that  he  liad  thought  it  would  have  been  better  to 
have  held  the  fort  another  day  in  order  to  await  the  arrival 
of  steamers  to  transport  the  troops  across  the  river.  I 
again  recapitulated  my  reasons  for  thinking  it  impossible  to 
hold  our  position ;  and  whatever  may  have  been  General 
Pillow's  opinion,  he  certainly  impressed  me  with  the  belief 
that  he  again  acquiesced  in  the  necessity  of  a  surrender. 

It  was  now  near  daylight  of  Sunday  morning  the  IGth. 
I  ordered  the  troops  back  to  their  positions  in  entrench- 
ments, and  addressed  a  note,  a  copy  of  which  is  enclosed,  to 
the  Federal  commander,  Brigadier  General  U.  S.  Grant. 
His  reply  is  also  transmitted.  When  it  was  received,  but  a 
small  |>ortion  of  the  troops  had  returned  to  their  lines.  A 
I)ortion  of  my  field  guns  had  been  spiked  when  the  troops 
had  been  withdrawn  under  General  Floyd's  order.  The 
gunners  had  not  yet  returned  to  the  water  batteries.  A 
degree  of  confusion  amounting  almost  to  a  state  of  <;isor- 
ganization,  resulting  from  the  knowledge  of  our  position, 
pervaded  a  considerable  portion  of  the  troops.  A  corps  of 
not  less  than  fifteen  thousand  of  the  enemy,  with  fifteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  in  position  to  assault  the  extreme 
right  of   the  line,   which  was   effectually   turned,   and   the 


106 

■water  batteries  exposed  to  assault  witliout  the  power  of  re- 
sisting the  attack.  At  the  point  most  strongly  threatened  I 
could  not  have  opposed  at  the  time  a  thousand  men.  Every 
road  leading  from  the  lines  was  effectually  closed.  Even 
the  river  road,  hy  which  the  cavalry  had  left,  and  Avhich 
was  impassable  by  infantry,  was  closed  by  a  force  of  the 
enemy  within  fifteen  minutes  after  Forrest  had  passed,  and 
Overton's  Cavalry  was  forced  to  return  to  the  lines.  The 
troops  Avere  broken  down  oy  unusual  privations.  Most  of 
them  had  labored  or  fought  almost  incessantly  for  a  week. 
From  Thursday  morning  until  Saturday  night  they  had 
been  almost  constantly  under  fire.  From  Thursday  evening 
until  Sunday  morning  they  had  suffered  intensely  in  a  heavy 
snow-storm,  and  from  intense  cold,  almost  without  shelter, 
with  insufficient  food  and  almost  without  sleep.  They  had 
behaved  with  a  gallantry  unsurpassed,  until  the  power  of 
further  endurance  was  exhausted.  The  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion was  very  small.  The  aggregate  of  the  army,  never 
greater  than  about  twelve  thousand,  was  never  reduced  to 
less  than  nine  thousand  men  after  the  departure  of  General 
Floyd's  brigade.  The  investing  force  of  the  enemy  was 
about  fifty  thousand  strong,  and  considerably  exceeded  that 
force  by  the  following  morning.  Under  these  circumstances 
no  alternative  was  left  me  but  to  accept  the  terms  demanded 
by  our  ungenerous  enemy.  A  copy  of  the  order  of  General 
Grant,  fixing  the  terms  of  the  surrender,  is  herewith  en- 
closed. 

I  do  not  seek  to  avoid  any  responsibility  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  President,  may  attach  to  my  action,  which 
was  guided  in  every  instance  by  a  feeling  of  duty.  My 
chief  wish  is,  that  he  will  find  it  consistent  with  the  public 
interest  to  permit  me  still  to  unite  my  fortunes  in  the  con- 
test for  independence  with  those  of  the  brave  men  whose 
gallantry  I  have  witnessed,  whose  dangers  and  hardships  I 
have  shared,  and  in  common  with  whom  I  have  endured  the 
privations  of  imprisonment  amongst  a  vindictive  and  tyran- 
nical foe,  I  cannot  close  this  report  without  calling  special 
attention  to  the  gallant  and  able  conduct  of  my  brigade 
commanders,  Colonel  John  C.  Brown,  of  the  3d  Tennessee, 
and  Colonel  ^Villiain  E.  Baldwin,  of  the  14th  Mississippi,, 
and  of  Colonel  11.  W,  Hanson,  commanding  the  2d  Ken- 
tucky, detached  from  Breckinridge's  Kentucky  Brigade. 
For  the  operations  of  Colonel  Baldwin's  troops,  I  refer  to 


107 

his  report,  as  he  was  detached  from  my  command  during  the 
siege.  But  he,  as  well  as  the  other  two  officers,  were  con- 
spicuous on  every  occasion  for  their  gallantry  and  military 
judgment,  and  merit  the  special  approbation  of  the  Govern- 
ment, 

Amongst  the  regimental  commanders,  Colonel  J.  M.  Lil- 
lard  and  Colonel  E.  C.  Cook  merit  the  highest  commenda- 
tion for  their  gallant  bearing  and  the  excellent  manner  in 
which  they  handled  their  regiments;  and  Major  W.  L. 
Doss  behaved  with  marked  gallantry.  Mnjor  George  B. 
Cosby,  my  chief  of  stalf.  deserves  the  highest  commcmhition 
for  the  gallant  and  intelligent  discharge  of  his  duties ;  and 
the  other  members  of  my  staff  are  entitled  to  my  thanks  for 
their  gallantry  and  for  the  efficient  discharge  of  their  appro- 
priate duties:  Lieutenant  Charles  F.  Johnson,  aid-dc-camp; 
Lieutenant  T.  J.  Clay,  acting  aid ;  Major  Alexander  Cassi- 
day,  acting  inspector  general ;  Major  8.  K.  Hays,  quarter- 
master ;  Captain  R.  C.  Wintersmith,  commissary  of  subsis- 
tence ;  Major  Davidson,  chief  of  artillery ;  Mr.  J.  N.  Gal- 
laher,  acting  aid  ;  Mr.  Moore,  acting  topographical  officer  ; 
Mr.  J.  Walker  Taylor,  commanding  a  detachment  of  guides, 
and  Mr.  D.  P.  Buckner,  volunteer  aid.  Major  Barbour, 
A.  D.  C.  to  Brigadier  General  Tilghman,  though  wounded, 
remained  with  me  on  the  13th.  I  cannot  bestow  sufficient 
praise  upon  Captain  Porter  and  Captain  Rice  E.  Graves, 
and  their  officers  and  men  for  the  gallant  and  efficient 
handling  of  their  batteries.  Artillery  was  never  better 
served,  and  artillerists  never  behaved,  under  trying  circum- 
stances, with  greater  coolness.  Porter's  battery,  from  its 
more  exposed  position,  lost  more  than  half  its  gunners,  and 
its  intrepid  commander  was  severely  wounded  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  Saturday,  being  succeeded  in  command  by  the 
gallant  Lieutenant  Morton. 

Captain  Jackson's  Virginia  battery,  though  not  so  fre- 
quently engaged,  is  entitled  to  notice. 

For  an  understanding  of  the  particular  operations  of 
General  Pillow's  division,  I  refer  you  to  the  reports  of  his 
brigade  commanders,  Colonel  William  E.  Baldwin,  Colonel 
A.  Heiman,  Colonel  John  Gregg,  and  to  the  reports  of  their 
subordinate  commanders. 

Accompanying  this  report  is  a  list  of  the  strength  of  my 
division  and  of  its  killed  and  wounded.  My  aggregate  force 
at  the   beginning  of   the    contests,   w1  ich   was    constantly 


108 

tllminishing,  did  not  exceed  3,025  infantry  and  two  batteries 
artillery.     Two  of  my  regiments  in  addition,  844  men,  were 
constantly  under  the  command  of   General  Pillow.      The 
length  of  my  lines  exceeded  three-fourths  of  a  mile. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respeetfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

S.  B.  BUCKNER, 
Brigadier  General,  C.  S.  A. 
Lately  commanding  2d  Division  central  army  of  Kentucky. 

To  Gen.  S.  Ccoper, 

Adj't  and  Inspector  Gen.,  C.  S.  A., 
Richmond,  Ya. 


ORIGINAL  RErORT  OF  GENERAL  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 
ADDRESSED  TO  COLONEL  W.  W.  MACKALL, 
A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  Cumberland  Armv, 
Dover,  Tenn.,  February  l.Sth,  1862. 

Sir  :  It  becomes  my  duty  to  report  that  the  remains  of 
this  army,  after  winning  some  brilliant  successes,  both  in 
repulsing  the  assault  of  the  enemy  and  in  sallying  success- 
fully through  their  lines,  has  been  reduced  to  the  necessity 
of  a  surrender. 

At  the  earliest  practicable  day  I  ■will  send  a  detailed 
report  of  its  operations.  I  can  only  say  now  that  after  the 
battle  of  the  loth  instant  had  been  won,  and  my  division  of 
the  army  was  being  established  in  position  to  cover  the 
retreat  of  the  army,  the  plan  of  battle  seemed  to  have  been 
changed  and  the  troops  were  ordered  back  to  the  trenches. 
Before  my  own  division  returned  to  their  works  on  the  ex- 
treme right,  the  lines  were  assailed  at  that  point,  ;ind  my 
extreme  right  Avas  occupied  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy. 
But  I  successfully  repelled  their  further  assaults. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  General  Floyd  to  effect  the  retreat 
of  the  army  over  the  ground  Avhich  had  been  won  in  the 
morning,  and  the  troops  moved  from  their  works  with  that 
view  ;  but  before  any  movement  for  that  purpose  was  organ- 
ized a  reconnoisance  showed  that  the  ground  was  re-occupied 
by  the  enemy  in  great  strength.  General  Floyd  then  deter- 
mined to  retreat  across  the  river  with  such  force  as  could 
escape ;  but  as  there  were  no  boats  until  nearly  daylight  on 
the  1 6th,  he  left  with  some  regiments  of  Virginia  troops 
about  daylight,  and  was  accompanied  by  Brigadier-General 
Pillow. 

I  was  thus  left  in  command  of  the  remnant  of  the  army, 
which  had  been  placed  in  movement  for  a  retreat  which  was 


no 

discovered  to  be  impracticable.  My  men  were  in  a  state  of 
complete  exhaustion,  from  extreme  suffering,  from  cold,  and 
fatigue ;  the  supply  of  ammunition,  especially  for  the  artil- 
lery, was  being  rapidly  exhausted,  the  army  was  to  a  great 
extent  demoralized  by  the  retrogade  movement.  On  being 
placed  in  command,  I  ordered  such  troops  as  could  not  cross 
the  river  to  return  to  their  entrenchments,  to  make  at  the  last 
moment  such  resistance  as  was  possible,  to  the  overwhelming 
force  of  the  enemy.  But  a  small  portion  of  the  forces  had 
returned  to  the  lines  when  I  received  from  General  Grant 
a  raply  to  my  proposal  to  negotiate  for  terms  of  surrender. 
To  have  lefused  his  terms  would,  in  the  condition  of  the 
army  at  that  time,  have  led  to  the  massacre  of  my  troops 
without  any  advantage  resulting  from  the  sacrifice.  I  there- 
fore felt  it  my  highest  duty  to  these  brave  men  whose  con- 
duct has  been  so  brilliant,  and  whose  sufferings  had  been  so 
intense,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  terms  proposed  by  the 
Federal  commander,  who  overcome  us  solely  by  overwhelm- 
ing supoiiority  of  numbers.  This  army  is,  accordingly, 
prisoners  of  war;  the  officers  retaining  their  side  arms  and 
private  property,  and  the  soldiers,  their  clothing  and  blankets. 
I  regret  to  state,  however,  that,  notwithstanding  the  earnest 
efforts  of  General  Grant  and  many  of  his  officers  to  prevent 
it,  our  camps  have  been  a  scene  of  almost  indiscriminate 
pillage  by  the  Federal  troops. 

In  conclusion,  I  request  at  the  earliest  time  practicable,  a 
court  of  enquiry  to  examine  into  the  causes  of  the  surren- 
der of  this  army. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier-General,  C.  S.  A. 
To  CoL.  W.  W.  Mack. MX, 

Ass't  Adj't  Gkneral, 

Nashville,  Tenn. 


CORRESPONDENCE  REFERRED  TO  IN  GENERAL 
BUCKNER'S  REPORT. 


Headquarters  Fort  Donelson,  > 
February  16tb,  1862.  J 

Sir  :  In  consideration  of  all  tlie  circumstances  governing 
the  present  situation  of  affairs  at  this  station,  1  propose  to 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  Federal  forces  the  appoint- 
ment of  commissioners  to  agree  upon  terms  of  capitulation 
of  the  forces  and  post  under  my  command,  and  in  that  view 
suggest  an  armistice  until  12  o'clock  to-day. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed,)  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier  General,  C.  S.  A. 

To  Brig.  Gen.  U.  S.  Grant, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Forces  near  Fori  Donelson. 


Reply  of  General   Grant  to  a  proposal  for  ati  Armistice,. 

Headquarters  Armv  in  the  Fi.ei,d,  ) 

Camp  near  Donelson,  Feb.  lo,  1862.  y 

General  S.  B.  Buckner, 

Confederate  Army : 

Sir  :  Yours  of  this  date  proposing  armistice  and  appoint- 
ment of  commissioners  to  settle  terms  of  capitulation  is  just 
received. 

No  terms  except  unconditional  and  immediate  surrender 
can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to  move  immediately  upon  your 
works. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Brigadier  General.. 
9 


112 

[Copy.] 

Reply  of  General  Buckner  to  General  U.  S.  Grant. 

Headquarters, 
Dover,  Tenn.,  Feb.  16,  1862. 

To  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Grant, 

United  States  Army  : 

Sir  :  The  distribution  of  the  forces  under  my  command, 
incident  to  an  unexpected  change  of  commanders,  and  the 
overwhelming  force  under  your  command,  compel  me,  not- 
withstanding the  brilliant  success  of  the  Confederate  arms 
yesterday,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  and  unchivalrous  terms 
■which  you  propose. 

I  am,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier-General,  C.  S.  A. 


Agreement  of  General  Grant  to  allow  officers  taken  at  Donelson 
to  retain  their  side  arms,  Sfc,  Sfc. 

Headquarters,  Army  in  the  Field, 

Fort  Donelson,  Feb.  16,  1862. 

Special  Order. 

All  prisoners  taken  at  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson 
will  be  collected  as  rapidly  as  practicable  near  the  village  of 
Dover,  under  their  respective  company  and  regimental  com- 
manders, or  in  such  manner  as  may  be  deemed  best  by  Brig- 
adier-General S.  B.  Buckner,  and  will  receive  two  days 
rations  preparatory  to  embarking  for  Cairo. 

Prisoners  are  to  be  allowed  their  clothing,  blankets  and 
such  private  property  as  may  be  carried  about  the  person, 
and  commissioned  officers  will  be  allowed  their  side  arms. 
By  order.  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Brigadier-  General. 


RErORT  OF  THE    THIRD   BRIGADE— COL.    JOHN 
C.  BROWN. 


To  Major  G.  B,  Cosby, 

A.  A.  General, 
2nd  Division  C.  A.,  Kj. 

Sir  : — I  have  the  honor  to  report,  that  the  Srd,  ISth,  and 
32nd,  Tennessee  regiments,  composing  the  3rd  brigade  of 
your  division,  arrived  at  Fort  Donelson  on  the  9th  and  10th 
days  of  February,  and  were  assigned  position  hy  Brig.  Gen. 
Pillow,  then  in  command  on  the  riglit  of  the  line  of  de- 
fences,— (the  extreme  right  being  occupied  by  the  2nd  Ken- 
tucky regiment).  I  commenced  at  once  the  construction  of 
rifle-pits  and  forming  abatis  by  felling  timber,  but  the  sup- 
ply of  tools  was  wholly  inadequate,  and  before  the  works 
were  scarcely  half  completed,  the  enemy  appeared  in  our 
front,  on  Wednesday  the  12th,  about  noon.  After  this,  the 
incessant  fire  from  the  enemy's  sharpshooters,  rendered 
labor  upon  our  Avorks,  almost  impossible  during  the  day, 
and  large  fatigue  parties  were  necessary  during  the  entire 
nights  of  Wednesday,  Thursday  and  Friday,  although  the 
weather  was  intensely  cold.  On  Thursday  the  13th,  the 
14th  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Major  W.  L.  Doss,  and  the 
41st  Tennessee,  commanded  by  Col.  R.  Farquharson,  were 
temporarily  attached  to  my  brigade.  The  centre  of  my 
portion  of  the  line,  being  the  most  elevated,  and  command- 
ing point  was  defended  by  Capt.  Porter's  light  battery  of 
six  guns,  while  Capt.  Graves'  battery  was  posted  near  the 
left,  commanding  a  long  wide  valley  separating  my  left  from 
Col.  Heiman's  right.  The  position  was  an  admirable  one 
to  support  my  left  and  Col.  Heiman's  right,  while  it  also 
commanded  the  hills  immediately  in  front.  About  1 1  o'clock 
on  Thursday,  I  discovered  the  enemy  moving  in  considerar- 


114 

ble  force  upon  Col.  Heiman's  centre,  and  before  the  column 
come  within  range  of  Col.  Heiman,  and  indeed,  before  it 
could  be  seen  from  Col.  Heiman's  position,  I  directed  Capt. 
Graves  to  open  fire  from  all  his  guns,  which  he  did  with 
such  spirit,  and  fatal  precision,  that  in  less  than  fifteen 
minutes,  the  whole  column  staggered,  and  took  shelter  in 
confusion  and  disorder,  beyond  the  summit  of  the  hill,  still 
further  to  our  left,  when  Col.  Heiman  opened  fire  upon  it, 
and  drove  it  beyond  range  of  both  his  and  my  guns.  Later 
in  the  day,  the  enemy  planted  one  section  of  a  battery  on  a 
hill,  almost  in  front  of  Capt.  Graves,  and  opened  an  en- 
filading fire  upon  the  left  of  my  line,  and  at  the  same  time 
a  cross  fire  upon  Col.  Heiman.  Capt.  Graves  handling  his 
favorite  rifle  piece,  with  the  same  fearless  coolness  that  charac- 
terized his  conduct  during  the  entire  week,  in  less  than  ten 
minutes,  knocked  one  of  the  enemy's  guns  from  its  carriage, 
and  almost  at  the  same  moment,  the  gallant  Porter  disabled 
;)nd  silenced  the  other,  while  the  supporting  infantry  re- 
treated precipitately  before  the  storm  of  grape  and  canister 
poured  into  their  ranks  from  both  batteries.  Nearly  one- 
half  of  my  command  was  constantly  deployed  in  the  rifle- 
pits,  while  the  residue  was  held  under  arms,  and  in  position 
as  a  reserve,  but  on  Thursday,  Col.  Hanson,  on  the  extreme 
right,  being  attacked  by  a  large  force,  I  sent  by  General 
Buckners  orders,  the  18th  Tennessee  to  his  support,  which 
remained  with  him  until  Friday  night.  On  Saturday  morn- 
ing I  had  orders  to  move  my  command  towards  the  left,  so 
soon  as  Col.  Head  should  relieve  my  men  in  the  rifle-pits. 
He  was  late  in  reporting,  and  without  waiting  longer,  I  put 
the  column  in  motion,  directing  the  men  in  the  rifle-pits 
to  follow  us,  so  soon  as  relieved,  which  they  did  very 
promptly,  but  in  some  disorder.  My  whole  command  was 
provided  Avith  three  days  cooked  rations,  and  marched  with 
their  knapsacks,  the  purpose  being,  to  turn  the  enemy's 
right  wing,  and  march  out  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  to 
fall  back  upon  Nashville.  Arriving  at  the  point  where  the 
Wynn's  Ferry  road  crosses  the  entrenchments,  the  3rd 
Tennessee  was  deployed  in  the  rifle-pits,  while  the  remain- 
ing regiments  Avere  held  in  reserve.  The  enemy  had  already 
been  attacked  on  his  right  by  our  left  wing,  and  we  were 
awaiting  the  proper  moment  of  co-operation,  and  by  Gen. 
Buckner's  directions,  I  sent  the  14th  Mississippi  to  the  front 
as  skirmishers,  the  enemy  occupying  a  hill  in  considerable 
force  not  far  distant.     The  3rd  and    18th  Tennessee  regi- 


ii5 

ments,  (the  former  commanded  by  Lieut,  Col.  Thos.  M 
Gordon,  and  the  latter  by  Col.  J.  B.  Palmer,)  were  sent 
forward  in  quick  succession,  to  support  the  14th  Mississippi 
As  they  advanced  over  the  abatis  and  through  comparatively 
open  ground,  and  especially  on  reaching  the  summit  of  the 
hill,  they  were  met  by  a  murderous  fire.  Some  confusion 
ensued,  but  they  returned  a  steady  fire  until  the  enemy  re- 
tired under  cover  of  dense  timber  and  undergrowth,  with- 
drawing his  battery  which  had  been  pouring  a  heavy  five 
into  our  reserves.  Further  pursuit  being  impracticable  in 
that  direction,  and  companies  having  become  separated,  and 
somewhat  intermixed,  on  account  of  the  obstacles  ovcrAvhich 
they  had  marched,  the  command  retired  within  the  entrench- 
ments, and  immediately  reformed  to  renew  the  attack  still 
further  to  the  right,  whither  the  enemy  were  retiring.  And 
about  12  o'clock,  under  the  direction  of  Brig.  Gen.  Buck- 
ner,  I  led  the  3rd  and  18th  Tennessee,  as  well  as  the  3'2n(l 
Tennessee,  (Col.  Ed.  C.  Cook,)  across  an  open  field  on  the 
right  of  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  under  the  fire  of  a  battery 
posted  on  that  road.  As  we  appeared  upon  the  summit  ot 
the  hill,  the  force  supporting  the  battery  retreated  about 
300  or  400  yards,  still  farther  to  our  right  and  farther  from 
our  lines,  leaving  one  section  of  the  battery,  which  fell  into 
our  hands.  The  hill  to  which  the  enemy  retreated,  was  so 
densely  covered  with  trees  and  undergrowth,  that  our  skir- 
mishers could  not  ascertain  his  position  and  numbers,  but 
we  Avere  led  to  suppose  that  his  battery  at  that  point  was 
supported  by  a  force  not  exceeding  one  thousand  men,  bat 
it  was  afterwards  ascertained  that  his  strength  was  nearly 
7,000,  while  there  were  five  regiments  within  supporting 
distance. 

Acting  iipon  the  first  and  only  information  we  could  then 
obtain,  a  charge  was  ordered,  and  the  whole  command 
moved  forward  with  spirit  and  animation,  but  when  within 
about  100  yards  of  the  enemy,  who  was  upon  higher  ground, 
we  were  met  by  a  fire  of  grape  and  musketry  that  was  ter- 
rific, but  fortunately  passing  above  our  heads.  We  halted 
and  opened  a  fire  of  musketry  upon  them,  which,  althougii 
continuing  only  a  few  minutes  killed  and  wounded  not  less 
than  800  of  the  enemy.  Lieut.  Col.  Gordon  of  the  3rd, 
having  been  wounded,  ordered  the  regiment  to  fall  back  un- 
der cover  of  the  hill.  I  rallied  it  at  about  100  yards,  and 
placed  it  in  command  of  Col.  Chaires.  The  18th  and  32nd 
fell  back  a  short  distance,  and  just  then  being  re-inforced  l)y 


116 

the.  14th  Mississippi,  we  were  renewing  the  attack,  when  the 
enemy  left  the  field,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded.  While 
we  were  engaged,  the  gallant  Graves  came  in  full  speed  to 
our  assistance,  with  a  part  of  his  battery,  and  maintained 
his  position  until  the  enemy  retired.  Our  loss  in  this  en- 
gagement did  not  exceed  fifty  in  killed  and  wounded.  But 
the  brave  and  accomplished  Lieut.  Col.  Moore,  of  the  32nd 
Tennessee  regiment,  fell  mortally  wounded,  while  aiding 
his  no  less  worthy  commander  in  cheering  his  men  to  the 
cjiarge.  Just  as  the  enemy  left  the  field,  entirely  opening 
the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  my  command  Avas  ordered  by  Brig. 
Gen.  Pillow,  repeated  by  Brig.  Gen.  Floyd,  to  return  at  once 
to  its  position  on  the  right  of  our  line  of  defences.  My  men 
had  scarcely  deployed  in  the  rifle-pits,  when  I  was  ordered 
to  re-inforce  Col.  Hanson  on  the  extreme  right,  whose 
w,orks  had  been  stormed  and  taken  by  the  enemy  before  he 
had  re-occupied  them.  An  obstinate  fire  was  maintained 
until  dark,  but  we  held  the  ground  to  which  Col.  Hanson 
had  retired,  although  opposed  by  a  superior  force  of  fresh 
ti  oops.  Captains  Porter  and  Graves,  did  efficient  service  in 
their  engagement  with  their  batteries, — indeed,  they  excited 
the  admiration  of  the  whole  command,  by  an  exhibition  of 
coolness  and  braveay,  under  a  heavy  fire  (from  which  they 
had  no  protection,)  which  could  not  be  excelled.  Capt. 
Porter  fell,  dangerously  wounded  by  a  Minie  ball  through 
his  thigh,  while  working  one  of  his  guns — his  gunners  being, 
nearly  all  of  them,  disabled  or  killed.  The  command  then 
devolved  upon  Lieut.  Morton,  a  beardless  youth,  who  stepped 
forward  like  an  old  veteran,  and  nobly  did  he  emulate  the 
example  of  his  brave  Captain. 

Fatigue  parties  were  employed  until  two  o'clock  Sunday 
morning  strengthening  our  position,  when  an  order  reached 
mc,  to  spike  the  guns  on  my  line  and  march  my  command 
towards  the  left  as  on  Saturday  morning.  The  order  was  in- 
stantly executed,  but  before  the  column  had  proceeded  one 
mile,  I  was  directed  to  counter-march  and  re-occupy  the  works 
and  display  flags  of  truce  from  the  front  of  our  works.  At 
y  o'clock  the  same  morning  the  command  was  surrendered. 

My  command  was  so  much  worn  and  exhausted  from  in- 
cessant labor  and  watching  during  the  entire  week — expo- 
s.ure  to  intense  cold,  as  well  as  from  the  fatigues  of  the  bat- 
tle on  the  preceding  day,  as  to  be  wholly  unable  to  meet 
any  spirited  attack  from  the  enemy  on  Sunday  morning. 
Our  ammunition,  both  for  artillery  and  small  arms,  was  well 
nigh  exhausted. 


117 

It  might  do  injustice  to  others  to  particularize  many  in- 
stances of  daring  and  bravery  among  officers  and  men. 
With  but  few  exceptions,  they  all  deserve  the  highest  praise 
for  the  determined  and  gallant  spirit  with  which  they  bore 

themselves  under  their  first  exposure  to  fire 

My  killed  amount  to      -  -  .  33 

"    wounded  amount  to  -  -  244 

For  details,  reference  is  made  to  the  report  of  regimental 
commanders,  marked  respectively  A.  B.  C.  D.  and  E. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be  sir, 
Very  respectfully. 

Your  obedient  servant, 
JOHN  C.  BROWN, 
Colonel  3rd  Tennessee  regiment, 
„  ,  Commanding  3rd  brigade. 

February  16th,  1862. 


REPORT    OF    COLONEL    W.    E.    BALDWIN,   COM- 
MANDING SECOND  BRIGADE. 


Fort  Warren,      } 
Boston  Harbor,  March  1 2th,  1862.  j 

Major  George  B.  Cosbv, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General : 

Sir  :  Left  by  General  Buckner,  at  Cumberland  city,  on 
the  1 1  th  of  February,  on  the  night  of  the  1 2th  instant  I  re- 
ceived orders,  by  telegraph,  from  Brigadier  General  Pillow, 
commanding  at  Fort  Donelson,  to  hasten  to  that  place  with 
two  regiments  of  my  command.  The  26th  Tennessee,  Col- 
onel Lillard,  and  the  26th  Mississippi,  Colonel  Reynolds, 
were  immediately  embarked  and  arrived  at  Dover  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Thursday  the  IStli.  These  regi- 
ments were  at  first  posted  immediately  on  the  left  of  the 
centre  of  our  lines  of  rifle  trenches,  as  a  support  to  one  of 
our  batteries.  This  disposition  was  changed  after  daylight 
the  same  morning:  the  26th  Mississippi  being  placed  in  the 
trenches  on  the  extreme  left  and  the  26th  Tennessee  placed 
in  reserve  as  a  support  to  the  former. 

About  nine  o'clock  A.  I\I.,  the  enemy  commenced  a  brisk 
artillery  fire  apparently  on  our  whole  line.  This  fire,  kept  up 
with  but  little  intermission  throughout  the  entire  day,  pro- 
duced but  little  eifect  upon  the  left  until  late  in  the  evening, 
when,  the  enemy  having  reduced  his  charges,  several  of  the 
shells,  which  had  previously  passed  too  high,  fell  in  our 
midst,  mortally  wounding  one  man  and  slightly  wounding 
two  others  in  Colonel  Lillard's  regiment. 

On  the  14th  the  fire  was  not  resumed.  About  noon  Gen- 
eral Pillow  directed  the  left  wing  to  be  formed  in  the  open 
ground  to  the  left  and  rear  of  our  position  in  the  lines,  for 
the  purpose,  apparently,  of  attacking  the  enemy's  right. 


119 

My  command,  to  which  the  20th  Mississippi,  Major  Brown, 
was  temporarily  attached,  constituted  the  advance  in  the 
following  order:  first,  the  26th  Mississippi,  second,  the  26th 
Tennessee,  third,  the  20th  Mississippi. 

Formed  in  column  by  platoon,  we  advanced  in  a  road 
leading  from  a  point  about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  left 
of  our  trenches,  and  approaching  nearly  perpendicularly  the 
enemy's  right.  We  had  proceeded  not  more  than  one-fourth 
of  a  mile,  when  General  Pillow  ordered  a  countermarch, 
saying  that  it  was  too  late  in  the  day  to  accomplish  anything, 
and  Ave  returned  to  our  former  position  in  the  lines. 

Late  that  night,  commanders  of  brigades  were  summoned 
to  a  council  at  General  Pillow's  headquarters,  where,  after 
being  duly  advised  of  our  perilous  situation,  enveloped  by  a 
largely  superior  force,  which  was  being  constantly  increased, 
and  our  communications  already  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy, 
it  w^as  unanimously  determined  to  endeavor  to  extricate  the 
army  by  a  bold  and  vigorous  attack  on  the  right  of  the  Fed- 
eral lines,  early  on  the  morrow. 

The  regiments  composing  our  left  wing  were  to  form  at 
four  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  same  ground,  and  in  the  same 
order  as  on  the  previous  evening,  and  to  advance,  under 
command  of  General  Pillow,  to  attack  the  extreme  right  of 
the  enemy,  supposed  to  be  posted  in  force  at  a  distance  of 
one  and  a  half  or  two  miles. 

This  movement  was  to  be  supported  by  our  right  wing,  un- 
der General  Buckner,  who  Avas  to  move  from  the  lines  at  a 
later  period,  follow  up  the  first  blow,  and,  should  the  com  • 
bined  movement  not  prove  successful  in  creating  a  panic  in 
the  enemy's  ranks,  a  way  might  at  least  be  opened  by  turn- 
ing his  right,  for  the  egress  of  our  Avhole  force.  In  antici- 
pation of  thus  attemping  our  escape  the  men  were  directed 
to  take  knapsacks,  blankets  and  all  the  rations  that  cuuld  be 
immediately  provided. 

Precisely  at  ten  minutes  past  four  o'clock,  on  tlic  morn- 
ing of  Saturday  the  lath.  General  PilloAV  arrived  on  the 
ground  and  found  my  three  regiments,  Avhich  Avere  to  con- 
stitute the  advance,  formed  and  ready  to  march.  Some 
delay  Avas  caused  by  regiments  not  arriving  promptly,  and 
it  was  six  o'clock  jjcforc  the  column  Avas  put  in  motion. 
Marching  by  the  right  flank  in  a  narroAV  and  obstructed  by- 
road, the  head  of  the  column  had  advanced  not  more  than 
one-third  of  a  mile,  when,  ascending  a  slight  elevation,  the 
advanced  guard  composed  of  a  company  of  the  26th  Missis- 


120 

sippi  deployed,  was  fired  upon  by  what  was  supposed,  at 
first,  to  be  only  the  enemy's  pickets,  A  second  company  of 
the  same  regiment  was  immediately  thrown  forward  to  sup- 
port the  first,  but  both  were  soon  driven  back  by  a  brisk  and 
well  sustained  fire,  which  indicated  the  presence  of  consid- 
erable force.  Meanwhile,  the  column  was  formed  by  com- 
pany, and  the  leading  regiment  deployed  into  line  to  the 
right.  This  method  of  forming  line  of  battle  was  rendered 
advisable  by  the  peculiar  features  of  the  ground,  which 
sloped  gently  to  the  right,  thickly  covered  with  timber. 
About  ten  yards  to  the  left  of  the  road,  and  running  nearly 
parallel  was  a  fence,  which  bounded  on  that  side  an  open 
field  of  some  four  hundred  or  five  hundred  acres  extent. 
This  field  afi'orded  no  protection  to  our  troops  if  brought 
"  forward  into  line,  "  but  would  expose  them  in  executing 
the  movement,  to  a  destructive  fire,  should  the  enemy  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  position. 

In  executing  the  deployment  the  26th  Mississippi  was 
three  times  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  close  and  rapid 
fire  of  the  enemy  taking  the  men  in  flank,  and  three  times 
were  they  rallied,  finishing  the  movement  some  fifty  yards 
to  the  rear,  and  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  exact  point  where 
their  line  should  have  been  placed.  The  subsequent  con- 
duct of  this  regiment  fully  demonstrates  the  fact,  that  any 
other  than  forward  movements  are  extremely  dangerous  with 
volunteers,  for  during  the  remainder  of  the  day  both  ofiicers 
and  men  behaved  with  great  coolness  and  gallantry. 

The  26th  Tennessee  was  then  brought  forward  and  five 
companies  deployed  so  as  to  occupy  the  space  between  the 
fence  on  the  left  and  the  26th  Mississippi  on  the  right,  leav- 
ing the  remaining  five  companies  in  column  in  the  road  to 
strenghten  that  point,  which  would  evidently  become  the 
centre  and  point  of  operations. 

Soon  after  this  disposition  was  completed,  a  stafi"  officer 
having  been  sent  to  advise  General  Pillow  that  the  enemy 
was  before  us  in  force,  other  regiments  were  sent  forward 
from  the  rear  of  the  column  to  right  and  left.  Colonel  Mc- 
Causland,  of  Virginia,  with  his  command  formed  on  the  right 
of  the  26th  Mississippi,  the  1st  Mississippi,  Colonel  Gregg's 
Texas,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lyons  8th  Kentucky  regi- 
ments were  formed  still  farther  to  our  right,  the  latter  regi- 
ment thrown  back  perpendicularly  to  our  line  to  prevent  the 
enemy  taking  advantage  of  the  cover  afi'orded  by  the  slope 
of  the  ground  to  turn  our  right. 


121 

The  20th  Mississippi  was  sent  into  action,  as  I  have  since 
learned,  bj^  direct  order  of  General  Pillow,  and  caused  to 
take  position  in  the  field  on  the  left,  where  they  were  openly 
exposed  to  a  destructive  fire  which  they  were  not  able  to 
return  with  effect.  The. regiment  was  soon  recalled,  but 
not  before  its  left  Aving  had  suft'ered  heavy  loss.  Our  line 
advanced  some  50  or  lUi)  yards  up  the  slope  and  remained 
stationary  for  more  than  an  hour,  the  position  of  the  enemy 
being  so  well  chosen  and  covered  that  it  seemed  impossible 
to  gain  an  inch  of  ground.  A  small  detachment  of  Vir- 
ginia troops  on  the  left  of  the  26th  Tennessee,  and  in  the 
open  field  twice  endeavored  to  gain  ground  forward  to  a 
point  where  their  fire  could  be  effective,  but  were  unable  to 
stand  the  destructive  effect  of  the  minnie  balls. 

At  this  juncture  the  20th  Mississippi  again  came  up 
across  the  field  and  took  possession,  slightly  covered  by  an 
inequality  of  the  ground. 

Observing  a  regiment  or  more  of  our  troops  posted  inac- 
tive, some  300  or  400  yards  still  more  to  our  left,  where  the 
shallow  ravine  which  covered  our  front  spread  out  and  was 
lost  in  the  plain,  I  requested  the  commanding  officer  to  throw 
forward  his  left  and  advance  up  the  hollow  in  a  direction 
nearly  parallel  to  our  line  of  battle,  and  attacking  the  ene- 
my's right  flank.  This  movement  being  supported  by  the 
whole  line,  all  the  regimenia  on  the  left  throwing  forward 
their  left  wings,  we  succeeded  in  executing  a  change  ot  front 
to  the  right,  turning  the  right  of  the  enemy,  and  driving 
him  at  once  from  his  position. 

Up  to  this  time  our  condition  Avas  one  of  extreme  peril, 
and  nothing  but  the  native  gallantry  of  troops,  brought  for 
the  first  time  under  heavy  fire,  And  the  extraordinary  exer- 
tions of  many  of  the  field  and  company  officers,  saved  us 
from  being  thrown  back  in  confusion  into  our  trenches. 

From  this  time  the  enemy  were  slowly  driven  from  each 
position,  which  the  ground,  favorable  for  defence  enabled 
them  to  take.  Two  sections  of  artillery  were  taken.  These 
placed  to  bear  on  our  lines  of  rifle  trenches,  Avere  rushed 
upon  in  flanks  and  seized  before  they  could  be  turned  upon 
us  or  be  taken  from  the  field.  The  first  section  Avas  taken 
by  the  26th  Tennessee,  the  second  by  the  26th  Mississippi. 
Advancing  in  a  direction  nearly  parallel  to  our  line  of  de- 
fence, when  nearly  opposite  the  centre,  our  course  Avas  for 
some  time  impeded  by  the  desperate  stand  made  by  the  ene- 
my,  who   was  probably   reinforced,  and  occupying   ground 


122 

most  favorable  for  shelterinn;  liis  troops.  Our  ammunition 
had  been  so  rapidly  expended  as  to  entirely  exhaust  the  sup- 
ply of  some  regiments.  Numbers  had-  provided  themselves 
from  the  cartridge  boxes  of  the  dead  and  wounded  enemy. 
Our  force  had  been  considerably  reduced  by  casualties,  and 
the  numerous  attendants  ■\vlio  conveyed  the  "woun  ed  from 
the  field.  Having  no  mounted  officer  to  send  I  rode  up  to 
where  Captain  Graves'  battery  was  posted  in  the  trenches, 
and  requested  supplies  of  ammunition  and  reinforcements, 
if  any  could  be  spared,  giving  Captain  Graves'  an  intimation 
as  to  the  relative  positions  of  the  forces  engaged.  Imme- 
diately on  my  return  he  opened  a  fire  of  grape,  which  so 
disordered  the  enemy  that  we  were  again  enabled  to  advance, 
driving  him  from  his  camp  of  the  night  before.  lie  took  a 
new  position  still  further  retired,  holding  it  for  some  time, 
until  Colonel  Hanson,  with  the  2nd  Kentucky  regiment, 
coming  to  our  assistance,  poured  afire  into  the  enemy's  flank, 
who  immediately  fled  in  confusion.  This  completed  the  rout 
of  the  extreme  right  of  the  federal  forces.  Uncertain  sis  to 
the  movements  of  our  right  wing,  I  paused  to  obtain  the 
information  necessary  to  render  our  future  movements  effec- 
tive, and  to  restore  order  from  the  confusion  incident  to  a 
continuous  combat  of  nearly  six  hours  in  the  woods. 
•^  Here,  General  B,  R.  Johnson  came  up  to  me  for  the  first 
time,  although  I  leatn  that  he  Ifad  at  different  times  during 
the  morning  directed  other  portions  of  the  line.  He  could 
give  no  information,  but  soon  after,  whilst  my  attention  was 
directed  to  the  26th  Mississippi  and  26th  Tennessee,  moved 
off  all  the  other  regiments  including  the  2()th  Mississippi. 
I  saw  no  more  of  these  during  the  remainder  of  the  day. 

After  the  lapse  of  an  hour,  observing  troops  from  the 
right  returning  to  their  original  positions  in  the  lines^  I  di- 
rected the  tv/o  regiments  left  with  me,  also  to  return  to  the 
trenches. 

Three  times  during  the  day  I  had  sent  a  staff  officer  to 
General  Pillow  for  instructions,  advising  him  of  our  situa- 
tion. But  no  orders  or  directions  were  received  from  him, 
except,  to  do  "  the  best  I  could." 

Being  totally  unacquainted  with  the  topographical  features 
of  the  ground,  unadvised  as  to  the  movements  of  the  general 
command,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  do  more  than  simply 
dislodge  the  enemy  as  from  time  to  time  he  made  a  stand 
before  us. 

I  would  beg  leave  to  remark  here,  that  the  efficiency  of 


123 

the  smooth  bore  musket  and  ball  and  buckshot  cartridges 
was  fully  demonstrated  on  this  occasion,  and  to  recommend 
that  our  troops  be  impressed  with  the  advantage  of  closing 
rapidly  upon  the  enemy  Avhen  our  rapid  loading  and  firing 
proves  immensely  destructive,  and  the  long  range  arms  of  the 
enemy  lose  their  superiority. 

For  lists  of  killed  and  wounded  and  minor  details  re- 
counting the  conduct  of  subaltern  officers  and  men,  I  beg 
leave  respectfully  to  refer  to  reports  of  regimental  com- 
manders, which  accompany  this  report. 

Justice  requires  that  I  should  refer  to  the  coolness  and 
gallantry  of  Colonel  John  M,  Lillard,  who,  wounded  in  the 
early  part  of  the  engagement  remained  at  the  head  of  his 
command  during  the  whole  day.  It  is  difficult  to  determine 
which  deserves  most  commendation,  this  regiment  or  its 
commander. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Boone  and  Major  Parker,  26th  Mis- 
sissippi, both  conducted  themselves  as  officers  and  brave  men, 
and  this  regiment  bore  its  part  well  in  the  conflict. 

Major  Brown,  commanding  the  2()th  Mississippi  is  enti- 
tled to  honorable  mention ;  his  left  wing  thrown  in  the  early 
part  of  the  day  into  an  exposed  position,  by  an  ill  advised 
order,  held  its  ground  until  recalled,  and  afterwards  the  whole 
regiment  was  among  the  foremost  in  every  advance.  I  can- 
not forbear  to  mention  that  Colonel  MaCausland  ( — )  Vir- 
ginia, not  assigned  to  my  command,  voluntarily  tendered 
his  co-operation,  and  was  conspicuous  for  his  daring  intre- 
pidity. The  members  of  my  personal  staff  deserve  especial 
notice. 

Lieutenant  S.  D.  Harris,  14th  Mississippi,  xVcting  Assis- 
tant Adjutant  General,  was  of  great  assistance.  He  merited 
and  has  received  my  thanks. 

So,  likewise  did  Thomas  A.  Burke,  a  private  in  company 
I,  14th  Mississippi,  appointed  an  acting  aid-de-camp.  L.  F. 
Carrington,  a  private  in  company  K,  14th  Mississippi,  also 
an  acting  aid-de-camp  was  severely,  I  fear  mortally,  wound- 
ed in  the  early  part  of  the  action,  an  accident  which  de- 
prived me  of  the  services  of  a  valuable  aid. 

Captain  1).  H.  Spence,  of  Murfreesboro',  Tenn.,  volunteer 
aid  was  severely  wounded  in  the  head  whilst  gallantly  ex- 
posing himself  on  the  top  of  a  fence  and  urging  "  Tennes- 
seean's  onward." 

My  own  regiment,  the  14th  Mississippi,  Major  Doss  was 
sent  to  Fort  Donelson  some  days  in   advance  of  my  arrival. 


124 

The  4 1st  Tennessee,  Colonel  Farquharson, -was  brought  down 
on  the  13th. 

Both  regiments  were  posted  on  the  right  and  they  tempo- 
rarily separated  from  my  command. 

Neither  representations  nor  solicitations  on  my  part  could 
avail  in  inducing  such  change  as  would  reunite  these  regi- 
ments, or  place  me  where  I  desired  to  be,  under  the  imme- 
diate direction  of  my  proper  commander. 

The  reports  of  these  latter  regiments  have  been  made  to 
Colonel  John  C.  Brown,  commanding  3d  brigade,  under 
whose  orders  they  Avere  temporarily  placed. 

A  condensed  statement  of  killed  and  wounded  is  annexed. 
Respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

W.  E.  BALDWIN, 
Colonel  Commanding  2d  Brigade,  Gen.  Buckner's  Division. 


SUMMARY  OF  KILLED  AND  WOUNDED. 


2  xS 

f-     <  00 

<s:- 

Q 

-^  ^  ^ 

U 

s  ^  ^ 
<  3 

5^ 

Q 

o 

OFFICERS 


26th  Tennessee, 

33 

39 

31 

5 

1 

1 

7 

26th  Mississippi, 

1 

20th   Mississippi, 

5 

Staff, 

2 

Total  officers. 

108 

2 

15 

NON-COMMISSIONED  OFFICERS  AND  PRIVATES. 


26th  Tennessee, 

377 
404 
469 

11 
11 

18 

78 

26th  Mississippi, 

68 

20th  Mississippi, 

55 

Total  N.  C.  ofiTrs  &  priv'ts. 

1,250 

40 

201 

Aggregate, 

1,358 

42 

216 

REPORT  OF  COLONEL  A.  IIEIMAN,  COMMANDING 
BRIGADE. 


Richmond,  August  9th,    862. 


Major  G.  B.  Cosby, 

A.  A.  General 


Sir  :  My  imprisonment  since  the  surrender  of  the  troops 
at  Fort  Donelson  prevented  me  from  reporting  the  opera- 
tions of  the  brigade  under  my  command  during  the  action  at 
Fort  Donelson  before  now.  In  the  absence  of  General  Pil- 
low, who  commanded  the  division  to  which  my  brigade  was 
attached,  it  beconics  my  duty,  and  I  have  the  honor  to  sub- 
mit to  you  the  following  report : 

After  the  battle  of  Fort  Henry  on  the  6th  of  February 
last,  I  was  directed  by  General  Tilghman,  then  in  command 
of  the  defences  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers,  to 
retreat  with  the  garrison  of  the  fort  by  the  upper  road  to 
Fort  Donelson.  The  garrison  consisted,  besides  the  com- 
pany of  artillery  which  was  surrendered  with  the  fort,  of 
two  brigades,  the  first  commanded  by  myself,  and  the  second 
by  Colonel  Drake,  consisting  of  an  aggregate  of  about 
2600  men ;  after  a  very  tedious  march,  we  reached  Fort 
Donelson  at  12  o'clock  at  night,  where  Colonel  Head,  of  the 
30th  Tennessee,  was  in  command  during  absence  of  General 
Tilghman.  Expecting  tbe  arrival  of  General  B.  R,  John- 
son and  other  general  officers  in  a  few  days,  I  did  not 
assume  command,  which  Avould  have  been  my  duty,  being 
next  in  command  to  General  Tilghman. 

General  Johnson  arrived  on  the  8th,  General  Pillow  on 
the  9th,  General  Buckner  on  the  12th,  and  General  Floyd 
on  the  13th  of  February. 

The  brigade  assigned  to  my  command  consisted  of  the 
10th  Tennessee,  Lieutenant  Colonel  McGavock  ;  42d  Ten- 


127 

nessee,  Colonel  Quarles  ;  48th  Tennessee,  Colonel  Voorhies ; 
53d  Tennessee,  Colonel  Abernathy ;  27th  Alabama,  Colonel 
Hughes,  and  Captain  Maney's  light  battery,  amounting  in 
all  to  an  aggregate  of  about  sixteen  hundred  (1600)  men. 

This  brigade  formed  the  right  of  General  Pillow's  division, 
and  Avas  in  line  on  the  left  of  the  division  of  General  Buck- 
ner,  who  commanded  the  right  wing. 

The  ground  I  occupied  in  line  of  defence  was  a  hill  some- 
what in  the  shape  of  a  V,  with  the  apex  at  the  angle,  which 
was  the  advance  point  as  well  as  the  centre  of  my  command, 
and  nearly  the  centre  of  the  whole  line  of  defence.  From 
this  point  the  ground  descended  abruptly  on  each  side  to  a 
valley  ;  the  valley  on  my  right  was  about  five  hundred  yards 
in  width,  and  divided  ray  command  from  General  Buckner's 
left  wing ;  the  one  on  my  left  was  about  half  that  width,  and 
run  between  my  left  wing  and  the  brigade  commanded  by 
Colonel  Drake.  These  two  valleys  united  about  a  half  a 
mile  in  the  rear.  The  ground  in  front  of  ray  line  (2600 
feet  in  length)  was  sloping  down  to  a  ravine  and  was  heavily 
timbered. 

We  commenced  to  dig  rifle  pits  and  filling  abatis  on  the 
11th,  and  continued  this  work  during  the  following  night, 
under  the  directions  of  Major  Gilmer  and  Lieutenant  Mor- 
ris, engineers,  the  latter  belonging  to  General  Tilghman's 
staff.  The  pits  were  occupied  by  Lieutenant  Colonel 
McGavock's  regiment  on  the  right.  Colonel  Voorhies'  regi- 
ment on  the  left.  Colonels  Abernathy's  and  Hughes'  regi- 
ments and  Maney's  battery  in  the  centre.  Colonel  Quarles' 
regiment  I  held  in  reserve,  but  several  of  his  companies 
also  had  to  occupy  the  pits,  the  other  regiments  not  being 
sufficient  to  cover  the  whole  line.  Colonel  Head,  30th  Ten- 
nessee regiment,  occupied  the  valley  between  my  command 
and  Colonel  Drake's  brigade.  I  was  afterwards  informed 
that  this  regiment  also  was  placed  under  my  command,  but 
the  colonel  not  having  reported  to  me,  1  did  not  know  it. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  commenced  forming  liis  line 
of  investment,  and  his  pickets  were  seen  in  every  direction. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  he  had  two  batteries 
placed  in  range  of  my  position,  one  on  my  left  and  front 
and  the  other  on  the  other  side  of  the  valley  on  my  right. 
Both  were  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  under  cover,  while 
Captain  Maney's  battery  on  the  summit  of  the  hill  was  en- 
tirely exposed,  not  only  to  the  enemy's  artillery,  but  also  to 
their  sharp-shooters.  No  time  could  yet  have  been  spared  to 
10 


128 

protect  his  guns  by  a  parapet,  besides,  we  were  ill  provided 
with  tools  for  that  purpose ;  however,  our  battery  h^d  some 
advantage  over  the  battery  on  my  left  in  altitude,  and  had 
also  a  full  range  of  a  large  and  nearly  level  field  to  the  left, 
which  the  enemy  had  to  cross  to  attack  Colonel  Drake's 
position  or  my  own  from  that  direction.  In  that  respect  and 
some  other  points  the  position  of  my  battery  was  superb. 
The  enemy's  battery  on  my  right  had  only  range  of  part  of 
my  right  wing,  but  was  in  a  better  po.=<ition  to  operate  on 
General  Buckner's  left  wing.  Both  batteries  opened  fire  at 
7  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  kept  it  up  until  5  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  firing  at  any  position  on  our  line  within  their 
range.  Their  fire  was  returned  by  Maney's  battery.  Graves' 
battery,  of  Colonel  Brown's  command,  and  a  battery  at 
Colonel  Drake's  position.  The  enemy's  guns  were  nearly 
all  rifled,  which  gave  them  a  great  advantage  in  range  and 
otherwise ;  however,  with  the  exception  of  the  loss  of  two 
artillery  horses,  my  command  met  with  no  other  serious 
casualties  on  that  day.  At  night  I  strengthened  my  pickets 
and  directed  Lieutenant  Colonel  McGavock  to  throw  a  strong 
picket  across  the  valley  on  my  right.  There  were  no  rifle-pits 
or  any  other  defences  in  that  valley,  although  a  road  leading 
from  Dover  to  Paris  landing  on  the  Tennessee  River  runs 
through  it.  Colonel  Cook,  of  Colonel  Brown's  brigade, 
co-operated  with  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gavock  in  guarding 
this  point  afterwards.  Strong  parties  were  kept  at  work 
during  the  whole  night  in  improving  the  rifle-pits  and  filling 
abatis. 

Daylight  next  morning,  (13th,)  showed  that  the  enemy 
was  not  idle  cither;  during  the  night  he  placed  another  bat- 
tery in  position  on  my  left,  and  the  one  on  my  right  be  had 
considerably  advanced  to  get  a  better  range  on  my  right  and 
centre  and  on  Captain  Graves  battery,  lie  had  also  thrown 
across  the  main  valley  two  lines  of  infantry  (advance  and 
rear)  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile  from  our  line  and  the 
firing  of  all  his  batteries  was  resumed  early  in  the  morning 
and  was  promptly  answered  by  our  batteries.  One  of  our 
gunners  had  both  his  hands  shot  off  while  in  the  act  of  in- 
serting the  friction  primer. 

At  about  1 1  o'clock  my  pickets  came  in,  informing  me  of 
the  advance  of  a  large  column  of  the  enemy.  Having  myself 
been  convinced  of  that  fact  and  finding  that  they  were  de- 
ploying their  columns  in  the  woods  in  front  of  my  right  and 
centre,  1  directed  Captain  Maney  to  shell  the  woods  and  use 


129 

grape  and  canister  when  they  came  within  the  proper  range, 
which  was  promptly  executed.  Captain  Graves  seeing  the 
enemy  advancing  upon  ray  line,  with  excellent  judgment, 
opened  his  battery  upon  them  across  the  valley;  in  the  mean- 
time their  sharpshooters  having  approached  my  line  through 
the  woods,  fired  their  Minie  rifles  from  behind  the  trees, 
killing  and  wounding  Maney's  gunners  in  quick  succession. 
1st  Lieutenant  Burns  was  one  of  the  first  who  fell,  2nd 
Lieutenant  Massey  was  also  mortally  wounded,  but  the  gal- 
lant  Maney,  with  the  balance  of  his  men,  stood  by  their 
guns  like  true  heroes  and  kept  firing  into  their  lines,  which 
steadily  advanced  within  forty  yards  of  our  tifle-pits,  deter- 
mined to  force  my  right  wing  and  centre.  Now  the  firing 
commenced  from  the  whole  line  of  rifle-pits  in  quick  succcs- 
sion.  This  constant  roar  of  musketry  from  both  lines  was  kept 
up  for  about  fifteen  minutes,  when  the  enemy  was  repulsed 
and  fell  back,  but  they  were  rallied  and  vigorously  attacked 
us  the  second  and  third  time,  but  with  the  same  result,  and 
finally  retired.  They  could  not  stand  our  galling  fire.  The 
dry  leaves  on  the  ground  were  set  on  fire  by  our  batteries, 
and  I  regret  to  state  that  several  of  their  wounded  perished 
in  the  flames.  The  pickets  I  sent  out  after  their  retreat, 
brought  in  about  sixty  muskets  and  other  equipments  they 
had  left  behind.  I  learned  from  two  prisoners  who  were 
brought  in,  that  the  attack  Avas  made  by  the  17th,  48th,  and 
49th  Illinois  regiments,  and  have  since  learned  from  their 
own  report  th.it  they  had  lost  in  that  attack,  forty  killed 
and  two  hundred  wounded.  Our  loss  I  cannot  accurately 
state,  nor  am  I  able  to  give  the  names  of  killed  and  wounded, 
as  subsequent  events  prevented  me  from  getting  reports  of 
the  different  commanders,  but  I  am  sure  that  my  loss  is  not 
over  ten  killed  and  about  thirty  wounded,  nearly  all  belong- 
ing to  Captain  Maney's  battery  and  Colonel  Abernathy'e 
regiment,  which  was  at  that  time  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Winston.  The  firing  from  their  batteries 
continued  all  day.  Late  in  the  evening.  General  Pillow  re- 
inforced me  with  a  section  of  a  light  battery  under  Colonel 
Parker.  The  night  was  unusually  cold  and  disagreeable  ;- 
enow  and  sleet  fell  during  the  whole  night,  nevertheless,  Ave 
constructed  a  formidable  parapet  in  front  of  the  battery,  in 
which  I  was  actively  assisted  by  Major  Grace  of  the  lUth 
Tennessee.  This  hard  and  most  unpleasant  labor  was  chiefly 
performed  by  ('olon.!  Quarles'  regiment.  It  was  a  horrible 
night,  and  the  troops  suffered  dreadfully,  being  without 
blankets. 


ISO 

Next  day,  (14th,)  finding  the  enemy  again  in  line  across 
the  valley,  and  believing  that  he  would  attempt  to  force  my 
line  on  my  right,  I  directed  Captain  Maney  to  move  a  sec- 
tion of  his  battery  down  the  hill  in  range  of  the  valley.  The 
advance  of  the  enemy  towards  this  direction  would  then 
have  been  checked  by  Graves,  and  Maney's  batteries,  and 
tlie  fires  of  McGavock's  and  Cook's  regiments  from  the  right 
and  left,  but  no  demonstration  was  made  in  that  direction, 
although  I  considered  it  the  weakest  point  in  our  line. 

During  the  whole  day  my  command  was  exposed  to  a 
cross  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries  and  were  much  annoyed  by 
their  sharpshooters.  At  eleven  o'clock  at  night  I  was  sum- 
moned to  attend  a  consultation  of  General  officers  at  General 
Floyd's  headquarters. 

The  general  opinion  prevailed  that  the  place  could  not  be 
held  against  at  least  treble  the  number  of  our  forces,  be- 
sides their  gunboats,  and  that  they  could  cut  off  our  com- 
munication at  any  time  and  force  a  surrender,  therefore,  it 
was  agreed  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  wing  in  force  at  4 
o*clock^  the  morning,  and  then  to  act  according  to  cir- 
cumstances, either  to  continue  the  fight  or  to  cut  through 
their  lines  and  retreat  towards  Nashville. 

General  Buckner  was  to  move  a  little  later  and  attack  the 
enemy's  flank  at  the  moment  he  was  to  give  away  to  our 
forces  in  his  front,  I  was  directed  to  hold  my  position. 
Colonel  Bailey  was  to  remain  in  the  Fort  (near  the  river) 
and  Head's  regiment  was  to  occupy  the  vacated  rifle-pits  of 
General  Buckner's  command.  I  doubted  very  much  that 
these  positions,  isolated  as  they  were  from  each  other,  could 
be  held  if  attacked,  and  I  stated  my  fears  to  General  Floyd, 
who  replied,  if  pressed,  to  fall  back  on  the  Fort,  or  act  as 
circumstances  would  dictate.  At  the  appointed  hour  on  the 
15th,  the  different  brigades  moved  to  their  assigned  posi- 
tions. 

Major  Rice,  aid-de-camp  to  General  Pillow,  brought  an 
order  to  me  from  General  Buckner,  to  send  a  regiment  for- 
ward and  to  hold  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  until  the  arrival  of 
Gen.  Buckner's  division.  This  duty  I  assigned  to  Col.  Quarlea' 
regiment,  who  returned  after  the  fulfilment  of  this  order. 
Major  Cunningham,  Chief  of  Artillery,  directed  by  General 
Floyd,  reported  to  me  that  two  light  batteries  were  at  my 
disposal.  Having  more  guns  than  I  could  use  to  an  advan- 
tage, and  not  a  sufficient  number  of  gunners  to  work  them, 
I  respectfully  declined  the  offer,  but  requested  him  to  send  me 


131 

efficient  gunners  for  at  least  one  battery.  This  was  done. 
Major  Cunningham  came  with  them  and  remained  with  mc 
for  some  time.  During  the  day  my  guns  were  used  to 
the  best  advantage,  and  at  one  time  with  excellent  effect 
against  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who  immediately  after  were 
pursued  by  Forrest's  cavalry. 

About  noon  I  was  directed  by  an  aid-de-camp  of  General 
Buckner  to  guard  the  fire  of  my  battery,  as  he  intended  to 
send  a  column  to  charge  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  Seeing 
these  regiments  pass  my  left  in  the  open  field,  and  being 
aware  that  my  left  wing  could  not  be  attacked  at  that  tinu:, 
I  sent  tvo  regiments  from  my  left,  Colonel  Voorhics  and 
Colonel  Hughes  to  their  support,  but  before  they  could  reach 
the  ground  the  three  attacking  regiments  were  withdrawn. 
The  battery  was  not  taken  and  my  regiments  returned. 
Early  in  the  evening  the  different  troops  were  ordered  back 
to  their  respective  rifle-pits,  but  the  fighting  continued  at 
different  points  until  night.  At  two  o'clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  16th,  Lieutenant  Morman,  aid-de-carap  to  Gener  il 
Johnson,  brought  the  order  to  vacate  the  rifle-pits  without 
the  least  noise,  and  to  follow  the  movement  of  the  troops  ox\ 
my  left,  stating  at  the  same  time  that  it  was  the  intention  to 
fight  through  their  lines  before  the  break  of  day.  All  the 
forces  were  concentrated  near  Dover,  under  the  command  of 
General  Johnson.  In  the  meantime  white  flags  were  placed 
on  the  works  of  our  former  lines,  and  by  the  time  the  sun 
rose  above  the  horizon  our  forces  Avere  surrendered. 

Much  credit  is  due  to  Captains  Maney  and  Parker  of  the 
artillery,  for  their  gallant  conduct  during  the  action,  as  well 
as  to  many  other  officers  and  men,  whom,  in  the  absence  of 
reports  from  their  respective  commanders,  I  am  unable  to 
particularize,  but  it  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  state,  that 
with  very  few  exceptions,  they  all  have  done  their  duty  like 
brave  and  gallant  soldiers. 

To  Captain  Leslie  Ellis,  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral and  my  aid-de-camp  Captain  Bolen,  I  am  particularly 
indebted  for  their  untiring  exertions  in  assisting  me  in  the 
performance  of  my  duties. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

A.  HELM  AN, 
Colonel  Commanding  Brigade. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  EDWARD  C.  COOK,  COM- 
MANDING THIRTY-SECOND  TENNESSEE  REGI- 
MENT. 


Fort  Doxelson,  Stewart  Co.,  Tenn.,  > 
February  16th,  1822.      ] 

Colonel  John  C.  Brown, 

Colenel  Commanding  od  Brigade, 

2d  Division  Central  Army,  Kentucky  : 

The  thirty-second  Tennessee  regiment  reached  Fort  Don- 
elson  on  the  night  of  the  10th  instant,  with  five  hundred  and 
fifty-five  men  rank  and  file,  many  of  the  regiment  having 
been  left  sick  at  Russollville,  Kentucky,  many  at  Bowling 
Green,  Kentucky,  and  some  on  furlough  sick  at  home.  We 
were  placed  on  the  left  of  General  Buckner's  Division.  The 
entire  regiment  were  employed  making  entrenchments  till 
the  same  were  finished.  The  enemy  began  to  fire  upon  us 
with  artillery  and  sharpshooters  as  early  as  Tuesday  even- 
ing the  11th. 

The  weather  was  extremely  cold,  and  being  kept  contin- 
ually at  labor  and  on  duty  we  suffered  much  from  exposure. 
The  regiment,  although  held  in  readiness  at  every  moment, 
was  not  engaged  in  actual  fight  until  Saturday  the  15th.  On 
Friday  night  Ave  were  ordered  to  have  cooked  rations  for  three 
days,  and  Avith  knapsacks  packed,  to  be  ready  to  march  at 
4  o'clock  next  morning.  I  then  learned  that  it  had  been 
determined  by  the  Generals  in  council  at  that  hour  to  march 
to  the  extreme  left  of  our  entrenchments,  attack  the  enemy's 
riglit  wing  and  turn  it,  and  if  we  succeeded,  to  march  for 
Nashville,  The  next  morning  at  4  o'clock,  our  brigade 
marched  to  the  left  of  our  entrenchments.  Just  as  we  were 
approaching  the  extreme  left  of  our  entrenchments  General 
Backner  ordered  me  to  place  my  regiment  in  column  of  di- 
vision under  cover  of  the  hill  in  the  rear  of  Green's  battery 
and  to  sustain  it.  We  remained  here  until  about  ten  o'clock^ 


133 

A.  M.,  when  General  Pillow  ordered  me  to  move  my  regi- 
ment to  tlie  right,  and  to  cross  the  entrenchments  and  attack 
a  battery  of  the  enemy,  which  was  then  firing  at  us,  and 
seemed  to  be  situated  some  eight  hundred  yards  from  our 
entrenchments.  Just  as  we  were  marching  across  the  en- 
trenchments General  Buckner  and  Colonel  Brown  came  up, 
and  upon  learning  the  order  General  Pillow  had  given.  Gen- 
eral Buckner  ordered  me  to  proceed  to  attack  the  battery, 
and  ordered  Colonel  Palmer  with  his  regiment  to  sustain  me. 
I  forwarded  the  regiment,  crossed  the  entrenchments,  threw 
out  two  companies  as  skirmishers,  and  moved  forward  the 
regiment  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  battery.  The 
skirmishers  very  soon  engaged  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
drove  them  back,  killing  some,  taking  five  prisoners,  and 
capturing  some  five  Minnie  muskets.  We  moved  forward 
Ihrough  woods  with  thick  undergrowth  ;  the  bushes  were 
covered  with  snow  which  wns  melting  slowly  and  it  was  very 
difiicult  to  move  forward.  We  had  advanced  within  seventy- 
five  or  a  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  and  he  had  opened 
fire  upon  us  with  his  battery,  when  Colonel  Brown  rode  up 
and  ordered  me  to  move  my  regim?nt  to  the  right  and  attack 
the  battery  at  this  point.  The  bushes  Avere  very  thick  and  we 
could  Avith  great  difficulty  move  forward.  Our  skirmishers 
fired  upon  the  enemy  and  rallied  upon  the  battalion.  I  im- 
mediately ordered  the  regiment  to  kneel  and  fire,  and  to 
load  and  fire  kneeling ;  the  fire  began.  Colonel  Palmer  on 
my  left  immediately  opened  fire  from  his  regiment.  The  firing 
was  kept  up  rapidly ;  the  regiment  all  the  while  slowly  but 
gradually  moving  forward.  We  were  protected  by  cover  of 
the  timber  and  hill  from  the  enemy's  shot. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  W.  P.  Moore  fell  very  early  in  the 
action  wounded  in  the  right  knee  and  was  carried  from  the 
field  to  the  hospital.  This  left  me  with  no  field  officer  to 
aid  me,  Major  Brownlow  having  been  left  sick  at  Bussell- 
ville  ;  Adjutant  Jones  being  on  duty  part  of  the  day,  but 
was  not  with  the  regiment  in  this  engagement.  I  soon  dis- 
covered many  of  the  muskets  failed  to  fire,  the  priming 
being  wet.  (The  most  of  the  regiment  being  armed  with 
inferior  flint  lock  muskets.)  After  awhile  the  left  wing  of 
the  regiment  began  to  fall  back  slowly,  and  then  the  right 
wing  in  good  order,  and  being  satisfied  the  condition  of 
many  of  the  guns,  in  order  to  do  execution,  must  be  wiped 
out  and  dried,  and  knowing  the  regiment,  after  fivlling  back 
a   short   distance,   would    be    entirely    protected   from   the 


134 

enemy's  shot,  I  determined  to  let  them  fall  back.  After 
they  fell  back  about  one  hundred  yards  I  halted  the  regi- 
ment and  ordered  the  men  to  wipe  and  dry  their  guns. 
Upon  inquiry  as  to  why  they  fell  back,  the  officers  informed 
me  they  heard  an  order  "  to  fall  back  "  and  believed  it  came 
from  proper  authority.  After  the  guns  were  cleaned  I 
threw  out  two  companies  of  skirmishers,  who  proceeded  as 
far  as  the  "  Wynn's  Ferry  road,"  in  which  was  placed  the 
enemj^'s  battery,  where  we  attacked  it,  and  the  skirmishers 
returned  and  reported  that  the  enemy  had  retired  beyond 
the  road  and  could  not  be  seen.  After  waiting  some  time 
and  receiving  no  orders,  Colonel  Palmer  anti  I,  after  con- 
sultation, determined  to  march  our  regiments  back  to  the 
entrenchments,  where  we  had  crossed  and  Avhere  m}--  regi- 
ment had  left  their  knapsacks.  ^Vhen  we  reached  the  en- 
trenchments Major  Cosby  gave  me  an  order  from  General 
Buckner  to  march  my  regiment  immediately  back  to  the  en- 
trenchments we  had  left  in  the  morning.  At  this  moment 
we  felt  satisfied  that  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  was  clear  and 
the  way  to  Nashville  open.  "  That  fortune  had  smiled  upon 
us,  and  that  we  ought  to  prove  to  her  we  were  worthy  of 
her  favors."  We  marched  rapidly  back  to  our  entrench- 
ments and  took  position  in  them.  In  a  few  minutes  the 
enem}'  appeared  in  large  furce  in  front  of  us  and  threatened 
to  attack  us  until  night  came  on.  Early  at  night  I  received 
orders  to  have  three  days  cooked  rations  prepared,  and  with 
knapsacks  packed  to  be  ready  to  march  at  four  o'clock  next 
morning.  At  the  appointed  hour  we  marched  out  for  Dover, 
and  before  we  reached  Dover  we  were  ordered  to  return  to 
our  entrenchments  and  learned  that  capitulation  for  a  sur- 
render was  going  on. 

It  gives  me  pleasure  to  state  that  the  officers  and  privates 
of  the  regiment,  although  jaded  from  labor  and  exposure, 
at  all  times  exhibited  great  willingness  to  obey,  and  anxiety 
to  promptly  execute  all  orders  :  in  battle  they  behaved 
coolly  and  courageously,  and  not  one  of  the  regiment  ever 
left  the  line  or  his  post  of  duty.  The  morale  of  the  regi- 
ment Avas  not  corrupted  or  destroyed,  and  even  after  it  was 
known  we  Avere  surrendered  Ave  had  not  a  single  straggler 
from  the  regiment. 

During  the  engagement  on  the  15th,  Ave  lost  in  killed, 
and  had  wounded  in  company  A,  commanded  by  Captain 
Willis  Worley,  one  killed  and  three  wounded,  whose  names  I 
cannot  give,  as  I  have  no  report  from  company  A.     I  hereto 


135 

attach  a  list  of  the  other  companies  of  the  regiment,  giving 
the  names  and  numbers  engaged,  and  the  killed,  wounded 
and  missing. 

At  the  earliest  moment  it  can  be  obtained,  I  will  forward 
a  list  of  company  A  to  be  made  a  part  of  the  exhibit  hereto. 

Our  gallant  Colonel  Moore  died  from  the  wound  he  re- 
ceived. The  regiment,  as  well  as  all  who  knew  him,  deeply 
mourn  his  death. 

The  Surgeon,  James  F.  Grantt,  Quartermaster  John  T. 
Shepai'd,  Commissary  E.  Shields  Wilson,  Quartermaster's 
Sergeant  James  P.  Campbell,  were  all  at  their  post  and  did 
their  full  duty.  Captain  Jobn  D.  Clark,  a  drill  master,  was 
on  duty  during  the  entire  week,  and  in  the  engagement  of 
the  loth.  Captain  D.  C.  Sims,  a  drill  master,  assigned  to 
my  regiment,  was  on  duty  a  portion  of  the  Aveek,  but  not  in 
the  engagement  of  the  loth,  being  reported  sick. 


RECAPITULATION. 

Number  of  Regiment  rank  and  file  at  Fort  Donelson,  ooo 
Number  of    Regiment  at  Donelson    not  engaged  on 

Saturday 21 

Number  of  Regiment  at  Donelson  engaged  on  Satur- 
day    534 

Number  of  Regiment  killed 3 

Number  of  Regiment  wounded  and  surrendercil 15 

Number  of  Regiment  wounded  and  not  surrendered.  .  21 

Number  of  Regiment  missing 1 

Number  of  Regiment  escaped I 

Number  of  Kegiment  wounded 36 

Number  of  Regiment  surrendered 528  538 

Respectfully, 

ED.  C.  COOK, 
Colonel  S2nd  Tennessee  Regiment. 

Fort  Warren,  July  SiUh,  1862. 


REPORT   OF  MAJOR  N.  F.  CHEAIRS,  COMMAND- 
ING THIRD  TENNESSEE   REGIMENT. 


FonT  Vf  ARREN,  Boston  Harbor,  ) 

Massachusetts,  March  10th,  181)2.       \ 

To  Col.  John  C,  Brown, 

Commanding  Srd  Brigade,  27id  Division, 

Central  Army  of  Kentucky,  C.  S.  A.  : 

The  3rcl  Tennessee  regiment  of  volunteers  arrived  at  Fort 
Donelson  on  the  night  of  the  8th  of  February,  18132,  Avith 
an  aggregate  reported  for  duty  of  seven  hundred  and  fifty 
men.  On  the  day  after  reaching  Donelson,  the  ■whole  regi- 
ment was  employed  in  the  preparations  of  works  of  defence — 
rifle-pits,  trenches,  &c.,  at  Avhich  both  men  and  ofiicers  con- 
tinued night  and  day,  until  the  evening  of  the  12th,  at  which 
time  a  skirmish  took  place  with  the  Federals  about  a  mile  or 
a  mile  and  a  half  in  advance  of  our  trenches,  by  a  company 
of  the  ISth  Tennessee  regiment,  who  had  been  sent  out  on 
picket  duty.  Immediately  after  the  return  of  said  company 
to  the  trenches.  General  Buckner's  division,  which  occupied 
the  right  of  the  whole  line  of  our  defence,  was  arranged  in 
order  of  battle  for  the  general  engagement  which  ensued. 
The  Srd  Tennessee  regiment  occupied  the  4th  position  from 
the  right,  and  five  companies  were  deployed  in  the  rifle-pits, 
and  five  held  in  reserve,  commanded  by  myself  with  orders 
to  sustain  the  companies  deployed  in  the  pits  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  Colonel  S.  M.  Gordon,  and  to  support 
Porter's  artillery  on  my  right  as  circumstances  might  re- 
quire. Such  was  the  position  held  by  the  Srd  Tennessee 
regiment  until  the  morning  of  the  15th  February.  At 
about  4  o'clock  of  said  morning,  the  Srd  Tennessee  regi- 
ment was  ordered  to  be  put  in  motion  and  march  in  the 
direction  of  our  left  wing   with  knapsacks,  haversacks,  and 


137 

three  days  rations,  with  whatever  else  that  could  be  conve- 
niently carried.  This  order  was  immediately  executed,  and 
the  regiment  marched  out  beyond  and  to  the  right  of  Dover, 
where  it  was  halted  and  ordered  to  deploy  as  skirmishers  in 
the  rifle-pits — and  to  the  left  of  the  lith  Mississippi  and 
18th  Tennessee,  at  about  eight  and  a-half  or  nine  o'clock  in 
the  morning.  The  14th  Mississippi  and  the  .Srd  Tennessee, 
were  ordered  by  Colonel  Brown,  (General  Buckner  also 
being  present,)  to  attack  one  of  the  cncm;y's  batteries, 
located  some  three  or  four  hundred  yards  in  front  of  our 
trenches,  and  from  their  position  were  firing  heavily  upon 
us.  This  battery  was  supported  by  several  regiments  of 
infantry.  We  succeeded  (after  a  hot  contest  of  about  three 
quarters  of  an  hour.)  in  driving  the  enemy  back,  and  oc- 
cupied their  position  until  ordered  back  to  the  trenches  by 
Major  Cassaday  of  General  Buckncr's  staff.  The  3rd,  18th, 
and  32nd  Tennessee  regiments,  were  ordered  across  the 
trendies  to  attack  another  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries, 
supported  by  a  heavy  column  of  infantry  located  on  or  near 
the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  and  much  farther  from  our  works. 
The  3rd  Tennessee  was  on  tlic  left — the  18th  in  the  centre 
and  the  32nd  on  the  ri^rht,  in  the  arranf]:cment  for  this  at- 
tack.  The  trenches  were  soon  crossed  and  the  battalions 
formed  in  double  column  and  marched  in  the  direction  of 
the  battery.  When  in  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of 
it,  it  opened  upon  us  with  grope  and  canister,  and  seconded 
by  the  infantry.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gordon  being  in  com- 
mand of  the  3rd  regiment,  ordered  it  to  lay  down.  In  a 
few  seconds  he  was  wounded,  and  by  some  unfortunate 
order  being  given  just  at  that  time,  which  the  regiment  took 
for  retreat,  and  thereupon  did  retreat  some  hundred  or  hun- 
dred and  fifty  yards,  when  they  were  rallied  by  Colonel 
Brown  and  reformed  in  line  of  battle.  General  Buckner 
being  present,  and  discovering  the  enemy  had  aho  fallen 
back,  ordered  me,  as  next  in  command  to  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Gordon,  (he  having  retired  from  the  field,)  to  take  the  3rd 
Tennessee  regiment  back  to  the  trenches  which  order  I  obeyed. 
On  arriving  at  the  trenches,  I  met  with  Gen.  Pillow,  who  or- 
dered me,  (after  ascertaining  I  was  in  command.)  to  take  the 
Tennessee  regiment  back  to  the  position  we  had  occupied  on 
the  right  wing,  and  the  one  we  had  left  at  about  4  o'clock  in 
the  morning.  I  immediately  formed  the  regiment  and  exe- 
cuted the  order.  A  few  minutes  after  reaching  our  original 
position,  an  attack  was  made  upon  Colonel  Hanson,  the  2nd 


138 

Kentuck}'  regiment's  trenches,  by  the  enemy  in  strong 
force.  Colonel  Hanson  not  having  more  than  one  or  two 
companies  in  position,  fell  back  upon  the  18th  Tennessee, 
(Colonel  Palmer.)  and  I  was  ordered  to  bring  up  the  3rd 
Tennessee,  to  support  the  2nd  Kentucky  and  18th  Tennes- 
see, which  order  was  executed  at  the  shortest  possible 
notice, — and  in. justice  to  the  officers  and  soldiers,  must  say 
they  bore  themselves  most  gallantly, — notwithstanding  they 
were  completel}'",  or  nearly  so,  worn  down  by  incessant 
fighting  and  fatigue  duty,  for  eight  consecutive  days.  We 
succeeded  in  driving  back  the  enemy,  although  they  had 
fresh  and  we  had  exhausted  troo])S.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Gordon  was  in  command  of  the  regiment  from  the  time  we 
arrived  at  Donelson  on  the  night  of  the  8th,  until  about  1 
o'clock  P.  M.,  on  the  15th,  when  he  was  wounded  and  re- 
tired from  the  field.  I  was  then  in  command  until  the  sur- 
render, which  was  at  6  o'clock  Sunday  morning,  February 
16th,  1862. 

For  a  detailed  account  of  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the 
3rd  Tennessee  regiment,  during  the  entire  fight  at  Donelson, 
I  refer  you  to  the  subjoined  paper  marked  11. 

Killed  twelve,  wounded  seventy-six. 

The  foregoing  report  of  the  conduct  and  actions  of  the 
3rd  Tennessee  regiment,  and  of  its  casualties  at  Fort  Donel- 
son, I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  you. 

Very  respectfully, 

N.  F.  CHEAIRS, 
Major  conimandi7\g  Srd  Tennessee  regiment. 


REPORT  OF   MAJOR  W.   L.  DOSS,    COMMANDING 
FOURTEENTH  MISSISSIPPI  REGIMENT. 


To  CoLONKL  John  C.  Brown, 

Commanding  Fi  ■  st  Brigade  General  Buckncr's  Division  : 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  following  operations 
of  the  14th  regiment  Mississippi  Volunteers  during  the  en- 
gagement at  Fort  Donelson,  ending  on  the  15th  February, 
1862: 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  February,  at  three  o'clock 
A.  M.,  I  received  orders  to  have  my  regiment  in  readiness 
to  move  in  two  hours.  About  daylight  we  took  up  line  of 
march  in  the  direction  of  our  left  wing.  It  was  with  great 
difficulty  that  we  progressed  owing  to  the  country  which  was 
hilly  or  mountainous  and  covered  with  snow  and  ice. 

During  our  march  shells  were  constantly  falling  around 
us  without  doing  any  damage  until  we  halted  in  rear  of  the 
entrenchments,  where  I  formed  the  regiment  in  close  column 
by  company.  We  were  protected,  to  some  extent,  from  the 
shells  of  the  enemy  by  forming  on  the  hill  side,  which  was 
thickly  set  with  undergrowth.  At  this  place  Captain  J.  L. 
Crigler,  of  company  "  G,"  was  severly  wounded  in  the  right 
arm  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  and  was  unable  to  proceed 
farther  with  his  company. 

I  received  orders  to  deploy  two  companies  as  skirmishers, 
and  soon  after  the  battalion  was  ordered  to  dislodge  a  bat- 
tery in  position  apparently  about  four  hundred  yards  to 
our  front.  The  regiment  moved  off  by  the  right  flank  until 
it  reached  our  entrenchments,  when  it  advanced  in  line  of 
battle.  We  very  soon  came  to  a  small  field  containing  about 
ten  or  fifteen  acres,  where  our  march  was  somewhat  impeded 
by  an  abatis  made  by  the  enemy.  At  this  point  we  were  fired 
upon  their  skirmishers.  I  ordered  the  battalion  not  to  re- 
turn the  fire.     The  right  wing  of  the  battalion  was  faced  to 


140 

the  right  and  marched  up  the  hill  some  distance  under  a 
heavy  fire,  then  faced  to  the  front  and  ordered  to  open  fire 
upon  the  enemy.  In  the  meantime  the  left  wing  had 
marched  through  a  gap  in  the  abatis,  faced  to  the  right  and 
rejoined  the  four  right  companies  when  a  general  engage- 
ment ensued.  At  this  point  Capt.  F.  M.  Rogers,  of  company 
*'  E,"  fell,  gallantly  cheering^his  men  on.  The  engagement 
at  this  point  continued  for  about  an  hour  or  more,  the  men 
displaying  great  coolness  and  courage,  and  the  officers  great 
gallantry.  The  regiment  sufl'ered  severely  at  this  point 
and  was  ordered  to  retreat  by  Major  Cassiday,  who  had 
been  appointed  by  General  Buckner  to  assist  me.  (Coionel 
Baldwin  being  in  command  of  a  brigade  on  t'le  extreme  left.) 
After  falling  back  some  two  hundred  yards  I  endeavored  to 
rally  the  regiment,  on  the  18th  Tennessee  regiment,  but 
Major  Cassiday  insisted  and  gave  the  order  to  the  regiment 
to  fall  back  to  the  entrenchments  which  was  done.  After 
remaining  there  about  one  hour,  we  were  again  ordered  out 
by  General  Buckner  to  support  a  section  of  Captain  Graves' 
battery.  We  marched  down  the  '*  Wynn's  Ferry  road"  about 
one  mile  and  were  halted  on  the  top  of  a  hill  by  General  Buck- 
ner, when  the  enemy's  battery  opened  a  galling  fire  of  shot  and 
shell  upon  us.  It  was  soon  ascertained  that  Capt.  Graves'  bat- 
tery could  do  but  little  good  there,  and  was  ordered  to  fall 
back,  (I  think  by  General  Pillow  ;)  whereupon  my  regiment 
was  ordered  to  take  its  original  position  on  the  right.  Upon 
our  arrival  there  we  found  that  the  enemy  were  in  possession 
of  the  entrenchments  on  the  extreme  right,  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  I'nd  Kentucky  regiment,  and  which  was  then 
engaged  with  the  enemy  to  regain  their  original  position. 
My  regiment  was  immediately  ordered  to  their  support,  and, 
on  arriving  there,  we  found,  the  enemy  advancing  upon  us  in 
considerable  numbers,  when  we  were  ordered  to  open  fire 
upon  them,  which  was  kept  up  from  about  three  o'clock  until 
about  about  dark,  when  the  enemy  retired.  The  men  slept 
upon  their  arms  during  the  night.  About  one  o'clock  I  re- 
ceived your  order  to  have  my  regiment  ready  to  march  in 
an  hour,  which  order  was  countermanded  about  daylight. 
Respectfully  submitted, 

W.  L.  DOSS, 
Major  commanding  1 4tk  Regiment  Mississippi  Volunteers. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  JOSEPH  B  PALMER,  COM- 
MANDING EIGHTEENTH  TENNESSEE  REGI> 
ME  NT. 


Fort  Warren,  Boston  Harbor.  ) 
Massachusetts,  March  7th,  18G2.       ) 

To  Colonel  John  C.  Brown, 

Commanding  3cJ  Brigade,  2d  Division, 

Central  Army  of  Kentucky,  C.  S.  A.  : 

The  18th  Regiment  of  Tennessee  Volunteers,  arrived  at 
Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th  of  February,  1862,  with  an  aggre- 
gate reported  for  duty  of  six  hundred  and  eighty-five  (085), 
and  there  encamped  mainly  -without  tents,  or  other  protec- 
tion from  the  weather,  and  with  scarcely  any  cooking  uten- 
sils until  the  surrender  of  the  forces  at  that  point  on  the 
16th  day  of  the  same  month. 

On  the  day  after  reaching  Donelson  the  ■svliole  regiment 
was  employed  in  the  preparations  of  works  of  defence,  rifle- 
pits,  trenches,  etc.,  at  which  both  men  and  officers  continued 
without  relief  or  rest,  night  and  day  until  the  12th.  Early 
in  the  forenoon  of  that  day,  pursuant  to  orders  from  brigade 
headquarters,  I  ordered  out  company  C,  commanded  by 
Captain  W.  R.  Butler,  on  picket  service,  with  the  usual  in- 
structions. They  went  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  lines 
about  one-and-a-half  miles  and  took  position,  when  suddenly 
they  discovered  several  thousand  Federal  troops  advancing 
towards  our  encampment.  Capta/n  Butler  thus  finding  his 
position  greatly  exposed,  conducted  a  prudent  and  skillful 
retreat,  gradually  fiilling  back  so  as  to  keep  the  enemy  under 
constant  observation,  finally  fired  upon  them  and  came  within 
my  encampment,  subuiitting  a  report  of  this  intelligence 
which  I  immediately  communicated  to  you  and  General  Buck- 


142 

ner  in  person.  General  Buckner's  Division,  ■which  occupied 
the  right  of  the  whole  line  of  our  defence  was  therefore 
arranged  in  order  of  battle  for  the  general  engagement  which 
ensued.  The  2d  Kentucky  (Colonel  Hanson's)  was  first, 
and  my  regiment  second  on  the  right.  I  deployed  compa- 
nies A,  B,  and  G,  (Captains  Rushing,  Joyner  and  McWhirter) 
in  the  rifle-pits,  immediately  in  my  front,  placing  them  in 
command  of  Major  S.  W.  Davis.  The  other  companies 
were  formed  in  double  column  just  in  rear  of  the  former  in 
charge  of  myself  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  G.  Cardcn, 
with  orders  from  General  Buckner  to  sustain  the  line  cov- 
ered by  my  deployment,  to  support  Porter's  artillery  on  my 
left,  or  reinforce  Colonel  Hanson  on  my  right,  as  circum- 
stances might  require.  Such  was  the  position  held  by  me 
until  the  morning  of  the  15th  February.  I  had  occasion 
however,  on  the  13th  to  dispatch  companies  E  and  K  (Cap- 
tains Sorre  and  Bandy)  to  reinforce  Colonel  Hanson,  upon 
whom  the  enemy  was  opening  a  considerable  fire,  but  after 
a  very  spirited  engagement  the  attack  was  repulsed.  I  had^ 
occasion  also  on  the  14th  to  send  the  balance  of  my  reserve 
(Captains  Webb,  Wood,  Putman,  Butler  and  Lieutenant 
John's  companies)  to  reinforce  the  right,  where  it  was  ex- 
pected the  enemy  would,  on  that  day,  make  a  desperate 
attack,  simultaneously  with  a  fire  on  the  fort  from  their 
gun-boats.  But  owing  probably  to  a  failure  of  success  in 
the  latter — no  further  than  the  general  fire  was  made  upon 
us  at  that  time.  On  Saturday  morning,  1 5th  February,  at 
about  two  and-a-half  or  three  o'clock  1  received  orders  from 
brigade  headquarters  to  put  my  whole  command  in  motion, 
and  to  march  in  the  direction  of  our  left  wing,  with  knap- 
sacks, haversacks,  provided  with  -three  days  rations  and 
whatever  else  the  men  and  officers  could  carry.  Sending  all 
my  wagons  except  enough  for  the  transportation  of  ordnance 
stores  across  Cumberland  river,  I  proceeded  immediately 
to  execute  this  order,  and  marched  out  beyond  and  to  the 
right  of  Dover,  where  I  was  ordered  to  halt  and  take  posi- 
tion in  a  general  line-of-battle,  on  the  right  of  the  3d  Ten- 
nessee regiment.  Very  soon  afterwards  the  14th  Missis- 
sippi and  3d  Tennessee  were  ordered  by  Colonel  Brown  (Gen- 
eral Buckner  also  being  present)  to  attack  one  of  the  ene- 
my's batteries  just  in  our  front  and  about  three  hundred 
yards  beyond  the  trenches,  and  from  their  position  were 
firing  heavily  upon  us.  This  battery  was  supported  by  sev- 
eral regiments  of  infantry,  which  in  connection  with  it  turned 


143 

a  terrible  fire  on  the  two  regiments  just  named,  against 
which  they  fought  gallantly  and  bravely,  thus  making  a 
severe  engagement,  which  having  continued  for  some  con- 
siderable time  I  was  ordered  across  the  trenches  to  their 
support,  and  reached  there  just  about  the  time  the  enemy 
abandoned  their  position  and  yielded  the  ground.  Under 
the  order  of  Major  Cassidy,  1  returned  to  my  former  posi- 
tion in  connection  with  the  other  two  regiments  in  the  gene- 
ral line-of-battle.  The  3d  Tennessee,  32d  and  18th  Ten- 
nessee, were  then  ordered  across  the  trenches  to  attack 
another  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries  located  on  or  near  the 
Wynn's  ferry  road  and  much  further  beyond  our  works.  Col- 
onel (book's  regiment  was  on  the  right,  my  own  in  the  centre, 
and  Colonel  Brown's  on  the  left  in  the  arrangement  for  this 
attack.  Tlie  trenches  were  soon  crossed,  the  battalions 
formed  in  double  column  and  we  marched  on  to  the  supposed 
position  of  the  battery.  Colonel  Cook  being  in  advance  of 
my  regiment  with  skirmishers  in  his  fi'ont.  We  found  some, 
I  may  sa}'-  much  embarrassment  in  having  insufficient  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  the  enemy's  location,  as  we  could  only 
judge  in  reference  to  that  by  the  smoke  and  reports  of  pieces 
lately  heard  and  seen  in  that  direction.  We  found  also  very 
considerable  difficulty  in  marching  in  the  requisite  order 
owing  to  the  timber  and  denseness  of  the  undergrowth,  on 
which  the  snow  was  thickly  depositing  and  melting  some- 
what rapidly. 

We  advanced  forward,  however,  in  quick  time  until  nearing 
the  enemy,  when  we  halted  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  if  pos- 
sible some  more  definite  idea  of  his  position,  the  skirmishers 
having  rallied  on  their  battalion  without  (as  I  learned  from 
Colonel  Cook)  being  able  to  furnish  very  definite  informa- 
tion. Colonel  Cook  and  myself  advanced  a  few  paces  beyond 
our  commands  for  the  purpose  of  taking  such  observations 
as  would  enable  us  to  direct  the  movements  of  our  regiments 
to  the  best  possible  advantage.  We  discovered  portions  of 
the  enemy's  baggage  at  the  distance  of  about  one  hundred 
yards,  just  over  the  point  of  a  hill  in  our  front.  Being  thus 
better  satisfied  of  their  position  and  that  an  engagement 
must  immediately  occur,  we  accordingly  deployed  as  rapidly 
as  possible  in  line-of-battle,  my  right  resting  on  Colonel 
Cook's  left,  and  the  3d  Tennessee  on  my  left.  The  enemy 
opened  a  terrific  fire  upon  us  about  the  time  or  before  Ave 
had  fairly  executed  the  deployment.  The  force  here  against 
us  consisted  of  one  battery,  supported  by  six  infantry  regi- 


144 

ments,  all  of  -whicli  ultimately  engaged  in  the  fight.  I  order- 
ed my  entire  command  to  fire  and  load  kneeling  as  in  that 
position,  the  main  body  of  the  enemy's  fire  would  and  did 
pass  over  us. 

The  officers  and  men  under  me  on  this  occasion  evinced 
great  coolness,   bravery  and  determination  for  success  in 
this  most  unequal  contest.     They  directed  their  fire  with 
unusual  accuracy,  which  told  desperately  and  rapidly  upon 
the  enemy,   who,   under  its  terrible   effect  and  force,  gave 
ground,  while  we  advanced  upon  them  about  twenty  paces. 
A  further  advan  e  would  have  lost  on  our  part  an  advantage 
in  position,  by  which  we  had  been  very   considerably  bene- 
fitted.    And  although  the   enemy  continued  their  retreat 
until  they  had  gone  beyond  the  reach  of  our  guns,  it  was 
not  deemed  consistent  with  the  orders  for  the  movements  of 
our  whole  army  on  that  day,  as  made  known  on  the  previous 
night  from  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and  Buckner  to  myself 
and  other  commanders  of  regiments,  to  pursue  the  several 
forces  any  further  in  that  direction.     Besides  this,  many  of 
ray  arms,    (flint   lock  muskets,)  by   coming  in  contact  Avith 
the  melting  snow,  had  become  too  inefficient  for  further  use 
until  they  could  be  dried  and  put  in  proper  order.     My 
ordnance  wagons   were   more  than  a  half  mile  distant,  and 
the  men  only  had  a  few  rounds  of  ammunition  each  remain- 
ing in  their  boxes.     I  marched  my  regiment,  therefore,  back 
to  a  better  position  a  distance  of  say  one  hundred  and  fifty 
paces,  ordered  the  men  to  put  their  pieces  in  order  by  dry- 
ing as  rapidly  as  possible,    sent  for  an' additional  supply  of 
ammunition,  made  details  to  have  my  wounded  taken  from 
the  field  and  properly  cared  for,  and  threw  out  a  small  num- 
ber of  skirmisheis,  in  connection  with  Colonel  Cook,  to  no- 
tice the  movements  and  position  of  the  enemy,  Avho  reported 
that  he  had  gone  back  beyond  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Road,  and 
could  not  be  seen  at  all  from  the  position  of  our  late  engage- 
ment. 

I  was  informed  on  the  afternoon  of  the  lltli  of  February, 
and  again  at  a  late  hour  of  that  night  by  General  Buckner 
and  Colonel  Brown  that,  for  the  reasons  given  at  the  time, 
(not  material  here  to  recite)  the  generals  in  command  had 
determined  to  evacuate  Donelson  and  move  the  whole  of  our 
troops  to  Nashville,  or  in  that  direction,  and  orders  were 
given  me  by  Colonel  Brown  to  prepare  my  command  accord- 
ingly with  rations,  &c.,  for  the  march.  I  was  further 
informed  that  to  execute  this  purpose  our  whole  army  would, 


145 

at  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  loth,  move  upon 
the  right  wing  of  the  Federal  lines,  cut  our  way  through 
•and  march  out  in  the  direction  stated.  The  whole  of  the 
enemy's  right  having  been  driven  back,  thus  as  I  waa 
informed,  removing  all  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  exe- 
cuting our  purpose,  I  was  every  moment  expecting  to 
receive  orders  to  march  my  regiment,  together  with  the 
balance  of  our  troops,  in  the  direction  of  Nashville.  But 
before  I  could  get  all  of  my  dead  and  wounded  from  the 
field  and  have  them  provided  for  and  disposed  of,  an  order 
came  to  me,  said  at  the  time  to  come  from  General  Pillow, 
to  move  my  command  immediately  back  to  the  position  from 
which  I  started  on  tliat  morning,  and  which  I  ha<l  been 
holding  for  several  days.  I  accordingly  returned  to  my 
trenches.  In  a  very  few  minutes  after  I  reached  my  position, 
and  before  Colonel  Hanson  (just  to  my  right)  had  gained 
his  trenches,  several  Federal  regiments,  under  command 
■of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  commenced  their  attack,  and  took 
possession  of  a  part  of  Colonel  Hanson's  unoccupied  works. 
Unable,  under  these  circumstances,  and  against  such  re- 
markable odds,  to  drive  back  the  attacking  regiments,  Colonel 
Hanson  immediately  fell  back  with  his  command  to  my  line, 
when  reinforced  by  the  14th  Mississippi,  the  3d,  41st,  49th 
Tennessee,  and  parts  of  other  commands,  a  long  and  des- 
perate struggle  ensued,  closing  at  sunset  with  a  decided  and 
brilliant  victory  to  our  arms,  the  fight  having  lasted  for  at 
least  tAVO  hours.  The  losses  of  the  enemy  in  all  the  engaga- 
ments  above  referred  to,  as  ascertained  by  subsequent  visits 
to  their  grounds,  were  indeed  very  great,  exceeding  ours 
both  in  killed  and  W'Ounded;  I  must  say  in  any  moder.i.Je 
estimate  at  least  scve7i  to  one. 

Besides  the  conflicts  already  named  in  this  report,  the 
Federal  forces  made  several  attempts  upon  my  works,  but 
were  in  every  instance  gallantly  met  and  signally  repulsed. 
On  the  night  of  the  1  oth,  the  whole  of  my  command,  except 
the  detail  made  to  continue  the  work  of  strengthening 
and  extending  our  breastworks,  stood  to  their  arms,  con- 
stantly expecting  a  renewal  of  engagements  until  about  2 
o'clock  of  the  following  morning.  At  this  hour  I  receiviai 
orders  from  brigade  headquarters  to  move  my  regiment  jvs 
rapidly  as  possible  to  Dover,  a  distance  of  one  and  a  half 
miles,  where,  I  was  informed,  further  orders  would  be  given 
me.  It  was,  however,  well  understood  among  all  parties 
that  the  object  of  the  march  was  to  evacuate  our  entire  po- 


146 

aition,  I  reached  Dover  some  time  before  daylight  and 
reported  to  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and  Buckner,  all  of 
whom  were  still  there,  and  who  ordered  me  to  halt  and  await 
further  directions.  A  messenger  from  Colonel  Brown's 
headquarters  soon  came  ordering  me  back  to  my  trenches, 
and  on  returning  to  my  quarters  found  that  General  Buck- 
ncr's  whole  command  had  been  surrendered.  This  was  my 
tiirflt  notice  of  that  fact,  and  was  thus  received  on  Sunday 
morning  at  half  past  five  o'clock. 

Throughout  the  period  covered  by  this  report,  the  men 
and  officers  of  my  command  underwent  an  astonishing 
"amount  of  hard  labor  and  toil,  suffering  greatly  from  the 
want  of  rest,  from  terrible  exposure  and  fatigue,  and  in  the 
absence  of  nearly  all  the  comforts  even  of  camp  life.  But 
every  demand  upon  their  strength  and  energy  was  promptly 
met.  Every  order  was  unhesitatingly  obeyed,  and  every 
hardship  and  suffering  bravely  and  patiently  endured,  evinc- 
ing a  glorious  spirit  of  self  sacrifice  and  determination,  now 
mentioned  alike  in  simple  justice  to  them  and  with  the 
utmost  pride  and  satisfaction  to  myself.  On  the  field  my 
entire  field  and  staff,  company  officers  and  men  (Avith  scarcely 
a  noticeable  exception)  bore  themselves  nobly  and  gallantly, 
displaying  on  every  occasion  a  dauntless  courage  and  patriot- 
ism— alike  deserving  the  praises  of  their  chivalrous  State 
and  the  approval  of  a  glorious  country. 

Many  officers  and  men  of  my  command  are  justly  entitled 
to  the  merit  of  personal  honor  and  distinction.  Lieutenant 
W.  W.  Smith,  of  Company  C,  shot  and  killed  instantly  on 
the  field,  fell  covered  with  glory  in  the  gallant  discharge  of 
his  duties,  as  did  the  other  lamented  dead  and  wounded  of 
my  regiment.  With  a  very  grateful  recollection  of  my 
■whole  command  for  their  soldierly  and  manly  demeanor 
throughout  our  whole  campaign,  I  cannot  close  this  report 
without  submitting  with  it  acknowledgments  for  valuable 
services  and  kind  offices  done  me  by  Lieutenants  N.  Gooch, 
of  Company  C,  and  John  M.  Douglass,  of  Company  G, 
who  are  also  very  justly  entitled  to  all  I  have  heretofore 
stated  on  behalf  of  other  officers. 

Owing  to  the  sudden  and  unexpected  separation  from  my 
company  officers,  I  am  unable  to  submit  with  this  report  the 
names  of  the  killed  and  wounded  of  my  regiment,  and  can 
therefore  only  state  them  in  the  aggregate. 

There  were  killed  on  the  field,  4;  mortally  wounded,  6j 
(supposed)  not  mortally,  38;  missing,  4;  total,  52. 


147 


The  foregoing  report  of  the  conduct  and  action  of  my 
regiment,  and  of  its  casualties  at  Fort  Donelson,  I  have  on 
this  day  the  honor  to  submit  to  you. 

Very  respectfully, 

JOSEPPI  B.  PALMER, 
Col  Covtg  isth  Tenn.  Rcgt, 


REPORT  OF  THE  FORTY-SECOND  TENNESSEE 
REGIMENT,  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  FORT  DONEL- 
SON,  ENDING  FEBRUARY    I6TII,   1862. 


Corx'MBiAX  Hotel,  Richmond,  Ya., 
August   nth,  1862. 

Brigadier  General  Buckner  : 

Sir: — The  42nd  Tennessee  regiment.  Colonel  Quarles, 
w;is  quartered  at  Clarksville,  Tenn.,  and  on  "Wednesday  the 
12th  of  February,  received  orders  fi-om  Brigadier  General 
Pillow,  to  proceed  to  Fort  Donelson,  where  we  arrived  next 
morning  on  a  transport  under  a  heavy  fire.  The  companies 
"Were  formed  on  the  boat  and  marched  off  in  regular  order, 
and  in  passing  through  the  village  of  Dover,  we  had  two  or 
throe  men  wounded,  one  mortally  by  the  enemy's  shells. 
We  were  consigned  to  Colonel  Heiman's  brigade,  where  a 
hot  fire  was  then  being  carried  on.  Three  companies  were 
thrown  into  the  trenches  on  the  flank  of  Col.  Abernathy's 
regiment,  the  balance  were  retained  as  a  support.  Soon 
after  our  arrival  the  firing  ceased,  and  the  enemy  withdrew. 
Id  the  course  of  the  evening  the  whole  regiment  was  thrown 
into  trenches,  where  they  remained  until  Saturday  morning 
with  but  little  skirmishinij,  when  the  re<:riment  was  ordered 
about  half  a  mile  to  the  left  and  again  placed  in  the  trenches. 
Here  it  was  not  designated  to  what  brigade  the  regiment 
belonged.  A  heavy  conflict  was  hero  being  Avaged  in  our 
front  about  ten  o'clock  A.  M.  I  believe  it  was  your  brigade 
engaged,  and  it  was  here  the  coolness  and  daring  of  Colonel 
Quavles  first  became  conspicuous.  The  regiment  on  his 
flank  began  to  leave  the  trenches  under  a  heavy  fire  from 
the  enemy's  batteries.  Colonel  Quarles  rallied  the  stragglers 
and  returned  them  to  the  trenches.  The  regiment  remained 
here  until  about  4  o'clock  P.  M.,  Avhen  we  were  ordered  to 
the  extreme  right,  where  the  enemy   were  reported  to  have 


149 

taken  some  of  our  trenches.  Cold  and  benumbed,  as  were 
the  troops,  they  double  quicked  for  one  and  a  half  miles 
through  mud,  slush,  ice  and  snow,  formed  in  front  of  the 
enemy,  and  with  a  brisk  fire  of  some  twenty  minutes,  caused 
the  enemy  to  retire. 

I  believe  you  were  present  and  know  with  what  gallantry 
it  was  done.  Before  closing  my  report,  I  will  callyour  at- 
tention to  the  cool  gallant  conduct  of  Colonel  Quarles.  He 
was  always  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  and  set  a  gallant 
example  for  his  officers  and  men. 

The  loss  of  the  regiment  was  eleven  wounded,  four  mor- 
tally. The  number  engaged,  four  hundred  and  ninety-eight 
rank  and  file. 

The  above  report  is  respectfully  submitted. 

T.  McGINNIS, 
Acting  Adjutant, 
42d  Tennessee  Regiment. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  JOHN  GREGG,  COMMAND- 
ING SEVENTH  REGIMENT  TEXAS 
VOLUNTEERS. 


Richmond,  Va.,  Aug.  8th,  1862. 
Major  George  Cosby, 

A.  A.  General,  Richmond  : 

Major: — In  the  absence  of  any  one,  \vho  was  in  command 
of  the  brigade  or  division  of  which  raj  regiment  was  a  part 
at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Fort  Donelson,  I  make  my  re- 
port of  the  action  of  the  regiment  to  General  S.  B.  Buckner. 
1  hope  this  will  be  considered  proper,  as  it  is  the  only 
method  by  which  I  can  give  to  the  brave  men  under  my 
command  the  tribute  which  I  think  due  to  their  behaviour 
in  that  battle. 

The  regiment  was  assigned  its  place  in  the  line  designated 
as  our  line  of  defence,  on  Wednesday  the  12th  February, 
cleared  away  the  timber  in  our  front  and  completed  the  dig- 
ging of  our  rifle-pits  during  the  day  and  at  night.  The 
enemy  began  to  cannonade  our  entrenchments  at  9  o'clock 
A.  M.,  on  Thursday,  and  kept  it  up  until  4  o'clock  P.  M., 
during  a  greater  part  of  the  time  making  an  enfilading  fire 
with  shells,  Avhich  was  well  directed,  and  by  which  Lieuten- 
ant E.  B.  Rosson  of  company  A,  was  killed,  and  Thomas 
Jordan,  a  private  in  company  G,  was  slightly  wounded.  On 
Friday  we  were  not  engwaged.  But  on  Saturday  morning 
about  a  half  hour  before  sunrise,  we  set  out  with  other  regi- 
)aents  to  make  the  sortie  upon  the  enemy's  right  wing. 
After  filing  around  the  base  of  the  hill,  upon  which  the 
enemy  were  drawn  up,  Ave  came  to  our  position  at  the  dis- 
tance of  a  half  mile,  upon  the  right  of  our  line.  I  caused 
the  regiment  to  front  and  advance  up  the  hill-side,  under  a 
fire  from  the   enemy's  skirmishers.     Just  before  reaching 


151 

the  crest  of  the  hill,  their  line  drawn  up  behind  it,  delivered 
fire,  and  a  most  galling  one  it  was.  Here  fell  Lieutenant 
Colonel  J.  M.  Clough,  Captain  Wm.  B.  Hill,  of  company  H, 
and  Lieutenant  J.  W,  Nowlin,  of  company  A,  neither  of 
whom  spoke  after  being  shot;  and  here  also  quite  a  number 
of  our  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates  were  killed 
and  wounded.  But  our  line  continued  to  advance,  pouring 
a  most  destructive  fire  into  the  enemy's  ranks.  In  about  a 
half  hour  their  line  broke  and  we  pursued  them  to  the  next 
ridge,  upon  which  a  fresh  line  was  drawn  up.  I  caused  the 
regiment  to  continue  our  foward  movement  and  to  keep  uj) 
a  continuous  fire,  and  in  a  short  time  the  second  line  broke 
and  fled,  leaving  in  our  hands  one  six-pounder  with  ammu- 
nition and  horses.  We  continued  to  press  them  until  a 
third  force  was  seen  drawn  up  in  a  ravine  near  a  clearing; 
and  upon  this  we  pressed  and  continued  to  fire,  until  it  also 
broke  and  fled.  And  although  the  slaughter  of  the  enemy 
had  before  been  very  great,  their  difficulty  in  getting 
through  the  felled  timber  caused  our  fire  to  be  much  more 
destructive  upon  them  at  this  place.  For  more  than  the 
distance  of  a  mile  through  the  woods,  the  earth  was  strewed 
with  the  killed  and  Avonnded  of  the  enemy.  George  Blain, 
a  private  in  company  G,  captured  and  brought  to  me  INLajor 
Post,  of  the  8th  Illinois  infantry,  and  there  were  other 
prisoners  taken ;  but  all  this  was  not  done  without  severe 
loss  to  ourselves.  Of  the  three  hundred  and  fifty  or  sixty 
officers  and  men,  whom  I  led  into  the  figbt,  tAventy  were 
killed  on  the  field  and  thirty-four  were  disabled  by  Avounds. 
I  must  acknoAvledge  the  very  efficient  assistance  of  Major 
Granbury,  in  the  management  of  the  regiment  throughout 
the  entire  day.  Where  all  behaved  Avith  such  coolness  and 
courage,  it  is  hardly  admissible  to  name  particular  individ- 
uals ;  but  the  conspicuous  gallantry  of  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Clough,  of  Captain  Hill,  and  of  Lieutenants  Rosson  and 
Nowlin,  Avill  ever  be  thought  of  with  admiration  by  those 
who  Avitnessed,  and  cherished  as  a  glorious  memory  by  their 
friends.  Submitted  respectfully, 

JOHN  GREGG, 
Colonel  1th  regiment  Texas  infantry. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  JOHN  M.  LILLARD,  TWEN- 
TY-SIXTH TENNESSEE  REGLMENT. 
{In  the  action  at  Fort  Dondson,  Fehrvary,  1862.) 


To  Colonel  W.  E.  Baldwin, 

1  Ath  Mississippi,  Commanding  Brigade. 

The  regiment  went  into  action  on  Saturday  15th  Februa- 
ry, 1863,  with  400,  including  field  andstaft',  &c.,  &c.  There 
were  eleven  killed  and  eighty-five  Avounded,  many  mortally 
and  since  died — total  killed  and  wounded  (96)  ninety-six. 
The  enemy  were  driven  back  by  us,  their  right  wing  being 
driven  on  their  centre  and  left,  making  repeated  stands  and 
being  repeatedly  routed,  in  which  this  regiment  captured 
two  brass  cannon,  two  flags,  tlic  instruments  of  a  band  and 
several  prisoners.  Of  the  conduct  of  the  regiment  in  action 
it  is  left  for  the  brigade  commander  to  speak. 

The  killed  and  wounded  are  as  follows,  to- wit  : 

Field  and  Staff — John  M.  Lillard,  Colonel,  wounded  slight- 
ly in  shoulder;  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  J.  O'Dell,  wounded 
slightly  in  arm  ;  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Howell,  Adjutant,  slight- 
ly in  thigh. 

Company  A. — Haynord  Stephen,  wounded  in  shoulder; 
H.  Sails,  in  bowels  ;  Newton  Deathridge, in  side;  S.  Duck- 
worth, in  hip;  L.  H.  Horner,  in  shoulder;  P.  J.  Cade,  in 
arm;  Waih  Deathridge,  in  arm;  W.  Rhodes,  in  side;  Ed. 
Hutson,  in  side;  Jas.  Johnson,  in  hand — total  10. 

Company  B. — Killed,  Joshua  Collins.  Wounded,  D.  Jus- 
tice, in  thigh;  J.  Justice,  inarm  ;  Sergeant  W.  M.  Bayleas, 
in  arm. 

Company  C. — Killed,  John  Kcnserly.  Wounded,  Lieut. 
A.  Swaggerly,  mortally  ;  Lieutenant  McNabb,  slightly  ;  F. 
M.  Griffin,  slightly;  George  Brotherton,  severely;  T.  T. 
Bauldwin,  severely  ;  A.  Gray,  in  shoulder  ;  J.  A.  Hicks,  in 
thigh;  George  McMahan,  in  shoulder;  J.  A.  Sample,  in 
shoulder;  F.  M.  Jenkin.  in  hand. 


153 

Company  D.— Killed,  T  D.  Nasli.  Wounded,  S.  Tlamack, 
il.  Stratton,  J.  Williams,  R  Brooks,  J.  F.  Satertield,  J.  P. 
Godwin,  R.  D.  Godwin.  A.  Hcpslicr, 

Company  E  — Killed.  Sergeant  Jaa.  Fleming  and  Joseph 
Childress.  Wounded,  F  M.  Johns,  A.  T.  Mundy,  J.  P. 
Godsey,  A.  S  Bacon,  Corporal  Cunningham,  I).  Moore  and 
John  Mundy. 

Company  F. — Killed,  private  C.  Graham.  Wounded, 
Captain  II.  L.  McCling,  mortally  ;  Lieutenant  Butler,  slight- 
ly ;  Sergeant  Bruce,  slightly  ;  Sergeant  MeCalluma,  slight- 
ly ;  F.  Cloud,  J.  Starke,  W.  M.  Evans,  mortally ;  H.  L. 
Evans,  slightly;  J.  McDade,  J.  Rothchild,  W.  llarley,  W. 
Porter,  Ti.  La,  J.  Wright,  J.  L.  llout. 

Company  G. — Killed,  Corporal  Hancock.  Wounded, 
private  G.  W.  Guire,  in  arm. 

Company  H. — Killed,  George  Gross,  J.  R.  Young  and 
W.  Philips.  Wounded,  B.  A.  J.  Jones,  J.  Carter,  J.  W. 
Kelly,  J.  M.  Myers,  S.  Brock  and  J.  W.  Davie. 

Company  L — Killed,  private  F.  M.  Moss.  Wounded, 
Sergeant  11.  L.  AVhite,  F.  M.  Gilleland,  H.  II.  Goin,  J.  D. 
ilembree,  A,  J.  Kincade,  J.  W.  Kindrix,  J.  R.  Kincade,  P. 
R.  Kennedy,  G.  W.  Morrison,  W.  Netherly.  J.  II.  0.  Dome, 
Wm.  Worick,  A.  J.  Deathridge,  Roland  Ilatson,  John 
Cutis,  A.  East. 

Company  K. — Wounded,  L  D.  S.  Richards,  W.  Alford, 
J.  Green,  Walker  McCrony,  Ben  Emmet,  John  George;  Rich- 
ards and  Alfonl  thought  mortally. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

"  JOHN  M.  LILLARD, 
Colonel  267?  Regiment  Tennessee  Vols. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  ROGER  W.  HANSON,  COM- 
MANDING SECOND  KENTUCKY  REGIMENT. 


Richmond,  Va.,  August  Sth,  1862. 

To  Major  G.  B.  Cosby, 

A.  A.  General : 

On  the day  of  February,  in  pursuance  of  orders,  I 

proceeded  with  my  regiment  upon  the  cars  from  Russell- 
ville,  Ky.,  to  Clarksville,  Tenn,  When  I  arrived  there,  I 
■was  ordered  by  General  Pillow  to  embark  immediately  for 
Fort  Donelson.  I  arrived  there  that  night.  General  Bush- 
rod  Johnson  accompanied  us,  and  when  we  arrived  he  took 
took  command. 

General  Pillow  arrived  on  the ,  and  soon  after 

his  arrival  he  placed  the  troops  in  the  position  afterwards 
held  by  them.  I  was  assigned  to  the  extreme  right  of  the 
line  extending  to  the  right  of  Colonel  Palmer's  regiment  to 
a  slough  formed  by  tbe  high  state  of  water  in  the  river. 
The  position  was  about  a  half  mile  in  length,  and  was  a 
protection  in  front  and  to  the  right  of  the  original  line  of 
defence  marked  out  for  the  fort. 

I  was  directed  to  construct  rifle-pits,  which  I  did,  locating 
them  more  than  a  hundred  yards  apart,  at  points  best  com- 
manding the  approaches  to  the  positions ;  they  were  made 
in  a  day  and  night,  and  were  necessarily  very  imperfect  I 
Avas  directed  to  give  up  my  tools  to  be  used  upon  other  parts 
of  the  defences. 

On  Wednesday,  the  12th  February,  the  enemy  made  his 
appearance  in  large  force,  pressing  around  in  our  front  with 
the  evident  intention  of  investing  our  position.  Nothing 
was  done  to  oppose  or  prevent  his  progress,  and  the  follow- 
ing morning  found  his  lines  extending  from  the  point  of 


155 

their  disembarking  to  a  point  on  the  river  above  our  posi- 
tion. On  Thursday  morning  the  enemy  made  three  several 
attacks  upon  my  position,  in  all  of  which  they  were  repulsed 
with  but  slight  loss  upon  our  front  and  very  heavy  upon 
theirs.  In  resisting  these  attacks,  I  was  greatly  assisted  by 
Porter's  battery  upon  the  left ;  it  fired  always  at  the  ri%ht 
time  and  to  the  right  place.  On  Thursday  night  I  was  rein- 
forced by  Captain  Jackson's  Virginia  artillery,  four  pieces. 
Although  the  night  was  cold  and  inclement,  and  the  men 
much  exhausted  from  the  day's  fighting  and  several  days  of 
hard  work,  we  succeeded  in  getting  these  pieces  in  good 
position  and  well  protected.  On  Friday  I  was  reinforced 
also  by  Colonel  Palmer's  regiment.  We  remained  under 
arms  a,nd  in  ranks  all  day  Friday,  expecting  the  attack  to  be 
renewed.  The  firing  of  the  sharp-shooters  Avas  incessant 
from  Thursdey  morning  until  the  surrender,  disturbing  and 
almost  destroying  the  repose  of  my  command. 

On  Saturday  morning  I  was  conducted  by  yourself  to  the 
position  assigned  us  as  a  reserved  regiment  and  a  supporting 
force  for  Graves'  artillery.  I  was  directed  not  to  leave  my 
trenches  until  I  was  relieved  by  a  Tennessee  regiment  from 
the  fort.  The  failure  of  this  regiment  to  arrive  as  soon  as 
contemplated  delayed  me  in  reaching  the  point  assigned  me. 
A  small  detachment  of  Tennesseans  arrived,  and  I  placed 
them  in  the  trenches  and  immediately  thereafter  moved 
rapidly  to  the  battlefield. 

I  remained  in  rear  or  near  Graves'  battery  under  the  im- 
mediate supervision  of  General  Buckner  until  about  noon, 
when  Colonel  Baldwin,  of  Msssissippi,  announced  to  me  that 
he  was  out  of  ammunition,  and  stated  that  unless  he  could 
get  ammunition  and  reinforcements,  there  was  great  danger 
of  losing  the  ground  which  had  been  won.  I  had,  near  by, 
a  wagon  of  ammunition,  and,  with  the  perseverance  of  Quar- 
termaster Estep  and  Lieutenant  Semple,  tlie  ammunition 
was  soon  supplied.  Previous  to  this  period  some  one 
mounted,  and,  purporting  to  be  a  staflf  officer,  approached 
the  regiment  and  ordered  off  two  of  the  left  companies  to 
reinforce  Colonel  Baldwin's  command  ;  these  two  companies, 
supposing  it  to  be  the  order  of  General  Pillow  or  Buckner, 
moved  off  at  a  double-quick  and  were  soon  engaged  with  the 
enemy  and  against  greatly  superior  numbers. 

Colonel  McCausland,  of  Virginia,  arrived  and  said  that 
unless  they  were  reinforced,  the  enemy  would  retake  what 
they  had  gained ;  that  after  four  hours  of  hard  fighting  the 


156 

enemy  wore  Lringing  forAvard  new  troops  and  in  overwhelm- 
ing numbers.  I  examined  the  state  of  the  contest.  I  saw 
Colonel  Forrest  make  two  gallant  but  unsuccessful  charges ; 
I  saw  that  the  enemy  were  gradually  driving  us  back.  My 
men  Avere  eager  for  the  fight.  I  felt  confident  that  I  could 
dislodge  the  enemy  and  drive  them  from  their  position.  ] 
sent  for  General  Buckner.  He  had  gone  to  the  right  and 
was  conducting  another  movement.  There  was  no  time  for 
delay.  I  ccncluded  to  take  the  responsibility  and  make  the 
effort. 

I  marched  the  regiment  by  the  front  across  the  abatis,  a 
distance  of  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  When  I  reached 
the  little  ravine  where  Forrest  was  with  his  cavalry,  I  halted 
the  regiment  and  was  joined  by  the  two  detached  companies. 
In  front  of  us  was  an  open  space  which  had  formerly  been 
occupied  as  a  camp.  This  space  was  about  two  hundred 
yards  in  width;  beyond  the  space  in  the  timber  and  thick 
undcrgi-owth  the  enemy  were  posted.  I  directed  the  regi- 
ment, when  the  command  was  given,  to  march  at  quick  time 
across  this  space  and  not  to  fire  a  gun  until  they  reached  the 
woods  in  which  the  enemy  were  posted.  The  order  was  ad- 
mirably executed,  and  although  we  lost  fifty  men  in  killed 
and  wounded  in  crossing  this  space,  not  a  gun  was  fired 
until  the  woods  were  reached.  The  enemy  stood  their 
ground  until  we  were  in  forty  yards  of  them,  when  they  fied 
in  great  confusion  under  a  most  destructive  fire.  This  was 
not,  strictly  speaking,  a  charge  bayonets,  but  it  would  have 
been  one  if  the  enemy  had  not  fled. 

Graves'  battery  was  then  moved  up,  and  my  regiment 
moved  forward  several  hundred  yards.  "While  Graves  was 
moving  up  his  ammunition,  and  other  preparations  were 
being  made  to  hold  this  position,  the  order  came  from  Gene- 
ral rillow  to  return  to  the  trenches.  Up  to  this  period  the 
success  was  complete. 

When  I  returned  to  my  position,  and  before  the  companies 
had  reached  the  trenches,  the  enemy  attacked  in  large  force 
and  took  them.  I  fell  back  to  the  original  line  of  defence, 
and  being  reinforced  by  several  regiments,  this  position  was 
retrieved — General  Buckner  at  this  point  being  present  and 
in  command  This  position  was  a  stronger  one  than  the 
one  lost,  and  every  effort  was  made  that  night  to  construct 
defences,  but  the  men  were  so  exhausted  from  labor  and 
loss  of  sleep  that  it  Avas  utterly  impossible.  I  Avill  take  the 
liberty  to  add  that  up  to  the  tirne  when   we  were  ordered 


157 

back  to  the   trenches,   our  success   was   complete  and   our 
escape  secure. 

It  is  also  my  opinion  that  the  exhaustion  of  the  men  from 
loss  of  sleep  and  labor,  together  with  the  demoralization 
caused  by  the  loss  of  our  trenches  on  the  right  rendered  the 
surrender  unavoidable.  The  officers  and  men  of  my  regi- 
ment acted  with  great  gallantry.  The  list  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  I  have  heretofore  furnished. 

ROGER  W.  HANSON, 

Col.  2d  Kentucky  Reg't. 


REPORT  OF  COLONEL  ROBERT  FARQUHARSON, 
COMMANDING  FORTY-FIRST  REGIMENT  TEN- 
NESSEE VOLUNTEERS. 


In  obedience  to  an  order  from  General  Pillow  the  regi- 
ment arrived  at  Fort  Donelson  about  ten  o'clock  A.  M., 
Thursday,  February  13th,  1862. 

RECAPITULATION. 

Went  into  the  fight  with  575  aggregate. 

Killed — T.  B.  McNaughton,  commissary,  and  J.  K,  Wiley, 
private  company  C. 

Wounded  six — Mark  Collier,  Company  A  ;  H.  M.  Carter, 
company  A;  James  Hill,  company  E.  George  B.  Hamby, 
company  E ;  R.  M.  Dromgoole,  company  F ;  Geo.  Gregory, 
company  F. 

Missing  2C — Non-commissioned  officers  and  privates. 

The  regiment  executed  all  the  orders  given  to  it,  and,  as 
far  as  I  know,  each  man  did  his  duty. 

R.  FARQUHARSON, 
Colonel  4lsi  Regiment  Tennessee  Vohinteers. 


ESTIMATE  of  Killei  and  Wounded  in  those  portions  of  Gen- 
eral Pillow's  command,  reporting  their  operations  at  Fort 
Donelson,  Tenn.,  through  General  S.  B.  Backner  : 

Killed.  Wounded. 

Colonel  Heiman's  brigade 10  30 

Colonel  Gregg's  regiment 20  34 

Major  Brown's  regiment 18  55 

48  119 

Aggregate  167. 


159 

SUM^MARY  of  Killed  and  Wounded  in  the  Second  Division, 
Central  Army  of  Kentucky,  in  the  engagemaUs  at  Fort  Don- 
elson,  Tennessee.  In  the  J^ird  Brigade,  Colond  John  C. 
Brown  commanding :  ^ 

Killed.      Wounded.     Aggregate. 
38  246  284 

Second  Kentucky  regiment about     80 

Issaquena  battery about       3 

Porter's  battery about     25 

Total 392 

In  the  two  Regiments  of  the  Second  Brigade  {Colonel  Baldwin) 
detached  and  under  comma7id  of  Genital  Pillow. 

Killed.  Wounded. 

Twenty-sixth  Tennessee 11  78 

Twenty-sixth  Mississippi 11  68 

Staft'  and  other  officers 2  15 

A";ffreo;ate  165.     Total  557. 

DO        O  , 

The  proximate  aggregate  strength  of  the  various  Regiments 
was  as  follows : 

Third  Tennessee 750 

Eighteenth  Tennessc 625 

Thirty-second  Tennessee 400 

Fourteenth  Mississippi 650 

Forty-first  Tennessee 400 

Second  Kentucky 600 

3,025* 

Detached  and  under  ^  26  th  Tennessee 401 

command  of  Gen-  \  26th  Mississippi 443 

eral  Pillow.  )  844 

Aggregate  strength  of  Euckner's  division,  under  his  own 
command,  exclusive  of  two  batteries  artillery,  3,025. 

Aggregate  detached  under  General  Pillow,  844. 

Aggregate  infantry  of  Buckner's  division  under  him  and 
General  Pillow,  3,869. 

♦This  should  be  3,425  if  the  returns  arc  correct  -  [Ci:fk. 

n       •     " 


REPORT  OF  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  J.  F.  GIL-. 
MER,  CHIEF  ENGINEER,  UPON  THE  DEFENCE  OF 
FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 


Engineer's  Office,  ) 
Decatur,  Ala.,  March  17,  1862.      ) 

Colonel.  W.  W.  Mackall, 

A.  A.   General,  Western  Department, 

Decatui"*.  Ala.  : 

Colonel:  In  obedience  to  General  Johnston's  orders  of 
January  29th,  received  at  Nashville,  I  proceeded  the  next 
day  to  Fort  Donelson,  and  thence  to  Fort  Henry,  to  inspect 
the  works,  and  direct  what  was  necessary  to  be  done  at 
both. 

I  arrived  at  Fort  Henry  the  afternoon  of  the  31st,  when 
I  met  Brig.  Gen.  Tilghman,  commanding  the  defences  on 
the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers.  By  the  exertions  of 
the  commanding  General,  aided  by  Lieutenant  Jos.  Dixon, 
his  engineer  officer,  the  main  fort,  (a  strong  field  work  of 
fine  bastion  front)  had  been  put  in  a  good  condition  for  de- 
fence, and  seventeen  guns  mounted  on  substantial  platforms; 
twelve  of  which  were  so  placed  as  to  bear  well  on  the  river. 
These  twelve  guns  were  of  the  following  description :  One 
ten-inch  Columbiad,  one  rifled  gun  of  24-pounder  calibre, 
(weight  of  ball  62  lbs.,)  two  42-pounders,  and  eight  32- 
pounders,  all  arranged  to  fire  through  embrasures,  formed  by 
raising  the  parapet  between  the  guns  with  sandbags  careful- 
ly laid. 

In  addition  to  placing  the  main  work  in  good  defensive  or- 
der, I  found  that  extensive  lines  of  infantry  cover  had  been 
thrown  up  by  the  troops  forming  the  garrison,  with  a  view 
to  hold  commanding  ground,  that  would  be  dangerous  to  tlie 
fort,  if  possessed  by  the  enemy. 


161 

These  lines  aijd  tlie  main  work  were  on  the  right  hand  of 
the  river,  and  arranged  with  good  defensive  relations,  making 
the  place  capable  of  offering  a  strong  resistance  against  a 
land  attack  coming  from  the  eastward. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  river  there  was  a  number  of  hilh 
within  cannon  range,  that  commanded  the  river  batteries  on 
the  right  bank. 

The  necessity  of  occupying  these  hills,  was  apparent  to 
me  at  the  time  I  inspected  Fort  Henry,  early  in  November 
last,  and  on  the  21st  of  that  month,  Lieutenant  Dixon,  the 
local  engineer,  was  ordered  from  Fort  Donelson  to  Fort 
Henry,  to  make  the  necessary  surveys,  and  construct  the  ad- 
ditional works.  He  was  at  the  same  time  informed  that  a 
large  force  of  slaves,  with  troops  to  protect  them,  from  Ala- 
bama, would  report  to  him  for  the  work,  which  was  to  be 
pushed  to  completion  as  early  as  possible. 

The  surveys  were  made  by  the  engineer  and  plans  decid- 
ed upon  without  delay,  but  by   some   unforeseen  cause  the 
negroes  were  not  sent  until  after  the    1st  of  January  last. 
Much  valuable  time  was  thus  lost,   but   under  your   urf^ent 
orders,  when  informed  of  the  delay,  General   Tilghman^and 
his  engineers  pressed  these  defences  forward  so  rapidly  night 
and  day,  that  when  I  reached  the  Fort  (31st  January  la.?t,) 
they  were  for  advanced,  requiring  only  a  few  days  ad  litional 
labor  to  put  them  in  a  state  of  defence.     But  no  guns   had 
been  received  that  could   be  put   in  these  works,   except  a 
few  field  pieces;  and,  notwithstanding  every  effort  had  bee-n- 
made  to  procure   them  from  Richmond,  Memphis  and  other- 
points,  it  was  apprehended  they  would  not  arrive  in  time  to. 
anticipate  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  which,  from  the  full  in- 
formation obtained  by  General  Tilghraan  was  threatened  at 
an  early  day  either  at  Fort  Henry  or  Fort  Donelson,  or  pos- 
sibly on  both  at  the  same  time.     The  lines  of  infantry  cover, 
however,,  which  had  been  thrown  up  were  capable  of  making 
a  strong  resistance,  even  without  the  desired  artillery,  should 
the  attack  be  made  on  that  (the  left)  bank  of  the  river.     Ex- 
perimental firing  with  the  lU-inch   Columbiad,  mounted  in 
main  work  showed  a  defect  in   the   cast,  iron  carriage  and 
chapis,   which   threatened  to  impair  the   usefulness  of  this 
most  important  gun.     With  the  ordinary  charge  of  sixteen 
pounds  of  powder,  the  recoil  was  so  great  as   to  cause  most 
violent  shocks  against  the  rear   heuster,  threatening   each 
time  to  dismount  the  piece.     With  the  aid  of  an  ingeneous 
mechanic,  clamps  were  finally  made  which  served  to  resist  in 


162 

some  degree,  the  violence  of  the  recoil.  With  thia  excep- 
tion, the  guns  bearing  on  the  river  were  in  fair  working 
order. 

After  the  batteries  of  the  main  -work  were  mounted,  Gen- 
eral Tilghman  found  much  difficulty  in  getting  competent 
artillerists  to  man  them,  and  he  was  not  supplied  with  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  artillery  officers. 

Impressed  with  the  great  deficiency  in  the  preparations 
for  defending  the  passage  of  the  river  at  Fort  Henry,  the 
commanding  officer  expressed  to  me  his  fears  that  it  might 
cause  disaster  if  the  place  were  vigorously  attacked  by  the 
enemy's  gun-boats.     This  he  tliought  his  greatest  danger. 

In  conjunction  with  General  Tilghman,  I  made  every  ef- 
fort during  the  three  days  I  remained  at  Fort  Henry  to  get 
all  the  works  and  batteries  in  as  good  condition  for  defence 
as  the  means  at  hand  would  permit.  The  3d  of  February 
we  went  over  to  Fort  Donelson  to  do  the  same.  The  works 
there  required  additions  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  occupy- 
ing grounds  dangerous  to  the  river  batteries  and  the  field 
work  which  had  been  constructed  for  the  immediate  defence 
landward. 

It  was  also  important  that  better  protection  sh.ould  be 
made  for  the  heavy  guns  (mounted  for  the  defence  of  the 
river)  by  raising  the  parapet  with  sand  bags  between  the 
guns  to  give  greater  protection  to  the  gunners. 

The  3d  and  4th  days  of  February  were  devoted  to  making 
preparations  for  this  work,  and  locating  lines  of  infantry 
cover  on  the  commanding  ground  around  the  fort. 

In  the  midst  of  these  labors  on  the  4th,  heavy  firing  was 
heard  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Henry,  which  warned  Gene- 
ral Tilghman  that  the  enemy  had  made  his  attack  upon  that 
work.  This  was  soon  confirmed  i)y  a  report  from  Colonel 
Heiman  to  the  effect  that  the  gun -boats  had  opened  fire,  and 
that  troops  were  bejng  landed  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 
three  and  a  half  to  four  miles  below  the  fort.  The  General 
decided  to  return  to  the  Tennessee  riverat  once,  and  expressed 
with  some  anxiety  a  wish  that  I  would  accompany  him.  I 
finally  took  the  responsibility  of  doing  so,  with  the  hope  that 
my  professional  services  might  possibly  prove  useful  during 
the  defence.  On  arriving  at  Fort  Henry,  we  found  the  enemy 
had  landed  additional  troops  below,  and  that  every  prepara- 
tion was  being  made  to  attack  by  land  and  water. 

The  necessary  dispositions  for  defence  were  at  once  en- 
tered upon  by  making  a  special  organization  of  the  troops, 
and  assigning  commands  to  the  officers. 


163 

Early  the  next  morning,  5th  February,  the  troops  were 
drawn  out  underarms,  and  marched  to  the  respective  points 
each  body  was  to  defend — this,  with  a  view  to  ensure  order 
in  case  it  became  necessary  to  form  promptly,  in  face  of  the 
enemy.  The  main  body  of  the  forces  was  assigned  to  the 
defence  of  the  advanced  lines  of  Infantry  co?er,  where  they 
were  in  a  measure  beyond  the  range  of  shot  and  shell  from 
the  gun-boats,  and  the  troops  inside  of  the  main  fort  were 
to  be  limited  to  the  men  who  had  received  some  instructions 
in  the  use  of  heavy  guns,  and  such  additional  force  as  could 
be  useful  in  bringing  up  full  supplies  of  ammunition. 
Those  assigned  to  the  Fort  were  practiced  at  the  battery, 
under  the  immediate  supervision  of  the  commanding  officer, 
and  each  one  taught,  with  as  much  care  as  possible,  his  duty 
in  anticipation  of  the  threatened  attack. 

In  such  preparations,  the  day  was  consumed,  and  it  was 
only  at  nightfall  that  the  troops  were  relieved,  to  seek  food 
and  rest;  it  being  quite  apparent  that  the  enemy  would  not 
attack  until  next  day. 

ATTACK  ON  FORT  HF.NRV,  6tH  FKBRUARY,  1S62. 

During  the  early  part  cf  the  day,  preparations  of  the 
enemy,  for  an  advance,  with  his  gun-boats,  could  be  observ- 
ed from  the  Fort — also,  the  movements  of  troops  at  their 
encampments,  along  the  bank  of  the  river  below — making 
it  evident  that  we  were  to  bo  attacked  by  land  as  well  as  by 
water,     • 

About  half-past  eleven  o'clock,  one  of  the  gun-boats  had 
reached  the  head  of  the  Island,  about  one-and-a-third  miles 
below  our  batteries;  another  soon  followed,  then  a  third,  and 
a  fourth — all  coming  as  nearly  abreast  as  the  width  of  the 
river  would  permit.  As  soon  as  this  line  was  formed,  a  rapid 
fire  was  opened  upon  our  works — (about  half-past  twelve 
o'clock) — which  was  returned  with  spirit  by  our  gunners, 
who  were  all  at  their  places,  eager  for  the  contest.  In  a 
short  time  after,  the  rifled  cannon  burst,  killing  three  of  the 
men  at  the  piece,  and  disabling  a  number  of  others. 

The  effect  of  this  explosion  was  very  serious  upon  our 
artillerists — first,  because  it  made  them  doubt  the  strength 
of  these  large  guns,  to  resist  the  shock  of  full  charges — and 
eecondly,  because  much  was  expected  from  the  long  range 
of  rifled  cannon  against  the  gun-boats.  Still,  all  stood  firm- 
ly  to  their  work,  under  a  most  terrific  fire  from  the  advo,nc- 
ing  foe,  whose  approach  was  steady  and  constant. 


164 

From  the  rear  of  tlieir  lines  a  fifth  gun-boat  was  observed 
to  be  firing  curvated  shot,  many  of  •which  fell  within  the 
work,  but  to  the  rear  of  our  guns ; — many  shot  and  shell 
were  lodged  in  the  parapet,  making  deep  penetrations,  but 
in  no  case  passing  through,  unless  they  struck  the  cheek  of 
an  embrasure.  One  of  the  32-pounder  guns  was  struck  by 
a  heavy  shell  passing  through  the  embrasure.  All  the  gun- 
ners at  this  piece  were  disabled,  and  the  gun  rendered  unfit 
for  service. 

About  the  same  moment,  a  premature  discharge  occurred 
at  one  of  the  42-pounder  guns,  causing  the  death  of  three 
men,  and  seriously  injuring  the  chief  of  the  piece  and 
others. 

Not  many  moments  later,  it  was  observed  that  the  10- 
inch  Columbiad  was  silent;  the  cause  of  which  was  at  once 
examined  into  by  General  Tilghman,  and  it  was  found  that 
the  priming  wire  had  been  jammed  and  broken  in  the  vent. 
A  blacksmith,  [I  regret  I  cannot  recall  the  name  of  the  gal- 
.lant  soldier],  was  sent  for,  and  he  labored  with  great  cool- 
ness for  a  long  time,  exposed  to  the  warmest  fire  of  the 
enemy,  but  in  spite  of  his  faithful  and  earnest  efi'orts,  the 
broken  wire  remained  in  the  vent,  making  this  important 
gun  unserviceable  for  the  continued  contest.  By  this  time 
the  gun-boats,  by  a  steady  advance,  had  reached  positions 
not  over  six  or  seven  hundred  yards  from  the  fort.  Our  ar- 
tillerists became  very  much  discouraged,  when  they  saw  the 
two  heavy  guns  disabled,  the  enemy's  boats  apparently  unin- 
jured, and  still  drawing  nearer  and  nearer.  Some  of  them 
even  ceased  to  work  the  32-pounder  guns  under  the  belief 
that  such  shot  were  too  light  to  produce  any  effect  upon  the 
iron-clad  gides  of  the  enemy's  boats. 

Seeing  this.  Gen.  Tilghman  did  every  thing  that  it 
was  possible  to  do,  to  encourage  and  urge  his  men,  to  fur- 
ther efforts.  He  assisted  to  serve  one  of  the  pieces  himself 
for  at  least  fifteen  minutes ;  but  his  men  were  exhausted, 
had  lost  all  hope,  and  there  were  none  others  to  replace  them 
at  the  guns.  Finally,  after  the  firing  hgid  continued  about 
an  hour  and  five  minutes,  but  two  guns  from  our  batteries 
responded  to  the  rapid  firing  of  the  enemy,  whose  shots 
were  telling  with  efi'ect  upon  our  parapets.  It  was  then 
suggested  to  the  General,  that  all  was  lost,  unless  he  could 
replace  the  men  at  the  guns,  by  others  who  were  not  ex- 
hausted. He  replied:  "  I  shall  not  give  up  the  work,"  and^ 
then  made  an  efi"ort  to  get  men  from  the  outer  lines,  to  con- 


165 

tinue  the  struggle.  Failing  in  this,  he  sent  instructions  to 
the  commanders  of  the  troops  in  the  exterior  lines  to  with- 
draw their  forces.  As  soon  as  this  nlovement  was  com- 
menced, confusion  among  the  retiring  troops  followed 
— many  thinking  it  intended  for  a  rapid  retreat  to  escape 
from  the  enemy's  forces,  expected  to  approach  from  the  point 
of  landing  below.  A  few  moments  later,  the  flag  was  low- 
ered. 

From  information  received,  the  strength  of  the  enemy 
was  estimated  at  nine  thousand  men.  These  forces  were 
advancing  to  cut  off  the  communications  with  Fort  Donelson. 
Probably  the  movement  would  have  proved  a  success,  had 
the  garrison  remained  a  few  hours  longer. 

Our  force  at  Fort  Henry  was  about  3,200,  of  which  less 
than  lOO  were  surrendered  with  the  Fort. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  and  the  power  of  the  enemy  to 
strike,  at  once,  with  an  immense  force  at  Fort  Donelson, 
made  it  necessary  that  the  army  at  Bowling  Green,  should 
be  withdrawn  to  a  point  which  would  secure  a  prompt  pas- 
sage of  the  Cumberland  river.  The  vicinity  of  Nashville 
seemed  the  proper  position.  If  the  enemy  were  defeated  at 
Donelson,  with  prompt  reinforcements,  there  was  still  a 
hope  that  your  army  might  resist  the  invader,  and  defend 
that  city ;  if  Donelson  fell,  it  could  be  promptly  passed  to 
the  South  bank  of  the  river, 

DEFENCE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

The  capture  of  Fort  Henry  was,  for  the  enemy,  a  great 
■success,  which,  it  was  felt,  Avoukl  embolden  him  to  make  an 
early  attack  upon  Fort  Donelson. 

To  meet  this  every  effort  was  made  to  strengthen  the  de- 
fences. Lines  of  infantry  cover  were  laid  ©ut  on  command- 
ing grounds  around  the  place,  and  fatigue  parties  Avere  daily 
employed  in  their  construction.  To  aid  the  local  engineer 
in  the  Avork  of  defence,  I  remained  at  the  Fore  the  seventh, 
eighth  and  ninth  of  February,  when  General  PilloAV  took 
-command  of  the  Avhole.  At  his  recfucst,  I  asked  and  re- 
ceived authority  to  remain  and  aid  in  the  defence. 

Immediately  on  his  arrival  the  General  took  active  mea- 
sures to  inform  himself  as  to  the  character  of  the  defences, 
and  had  the  additional  works  pressed  forward  Avith  the  great- 
-est  activity.  Having  received  reinforcements,  and  others 
being  expected  daily,  the  lines  of  infantry  cover  Avere  ex- 


166 

tended  so  as  to  embrace  the  town  of  Dover,  where  many  of 
:;ur  munitions  were  stored.  The  train  for  thcs3  works  being 
decided  upon  they  were  at  once  pressed  to  completion,  and 
the  batteries  for  the  defence  of  the  river  strengthened. 

By  the  night  of  the  12th,  these  were  in  readiness,  and  the 
heavy  guns  recently  received  at  the  Fort  were  mounted. 
To  provide  an  ample  force  of  artillerists  to  work  the  heavy 
guns,  through  a  long  continued  attack,  General  Pillow 
detailed  Captain  R.  R,  Ross  and  his  company  of  well  drilled 
men  from  his  battery  to  aid  in  the  river  defence.  The  selec- 
tion of  this  officer  and  his  command  proved  most  fortunate, 
as  in  the  obstinate  attack  that  was  made  by  the  gun-boats 
they  performed  noble  and  eflfective  service. 

Brigadier  General  Buckner  arrived  at  Fort  Donelson  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  12th. 

In  the  meantime,  the  enemy  had  landed,  in  large  force, 
on  the  bank  of  the  river*  below,  and  other  troops  were 
brought  over  from  Fort  Henry.  The  smoke  of  his  gun- 
boats was  seen  in  the  distance,  warning  us  that  a  combined 
attack  wa5  to  be  expected.  Skirmishes  were  frequent  be- 
tween our  pickets  and  the  enemy's  forces  advancing  to  meet 
us. 

On  the  13th  the  besiegers  opened,  with  artillery,  upon  our 
land  defences;  and  their  sharp  shooters  annoyed  our  men 
constantly  whenever  exposed  above  the  infantry  covers  as  at 
the  field  batteries.  One  of  the  gun-boats  commenced  firing 
upon  the  river  batteries  early  in  the  day,  throwing  shot 
and  shell  at  long  range. 

The  same  morning  General  Floyd  arrived  with  reinforce- 
ments, including  three  batteries  of  field  artillery,  which  were 
pliiced  in  position  as  promptly  as  possible.  The  enemy's 
fires  were  kept  up  throughout  the  day,  and  responded  to 
■with  spirit  by  our  artillery  and  infantry.  In  the  afternoon 
an  attempt  was  made  to  storm  the  entrenchments  on  the 
heights  near  our  centre,  but  failed — the  assailants  being 
handsomely  repulsed.  One  of  the  guns  in  the  river  batteries 
was  struck  by  a  heavy  shot  from  the  gun-boat,  disabling  the 
carriage  and  killing  Lieutenant  Joseph  Dixon,  the  local 
engineer  officer.  Our  total  loss  during  the  day  was  considera- 
ble, but  I  am  unable  to  report  numbers. 

The  cpntest  of  the  day  closed.  The  enemy  had  gained  no 
footing  on  our  works,  or  produced  any  important  impression 
upon  them.  But  our  forces  were  much  fatigued,  having 
been  under  arms  all  day,  and  this  after  three  or  four  days 


167 

hard  labor  upon  the  entrenchments.  To  add  to  their  suflfer- 
ings  it  turned  suddenly  cold  in  the  afternoon,  and,  at  dark, 
commenced  snoAving  and  continued  the  greater  part  of  the 
night.  Inclement  as  was  the  weather,  it  was  necessary 
(to  guard  against  surprise)  that  the  troops  shonld  be  all 
night  in  position  along  the  lines  of  infantry  cover.  The 
next  day,  the  14th,  the  besiegers  brought  up  large  rein- 
forcements, just  landed  from  numerous  transports,  and  ex- 
tended their  lines,  in  great  strength,  towards  their  right, 
enveloping  our  extreme  left.  They  took  positions  that 
placed  it  in  their  power  to  plant  batteries  on  the  river  bank 
above,  and  cut  off  our  communications.  Such  appeared  to 
be  their  design.  In  consequence  of  these  movements  the 
firing  of  the  enemy  was  less  frequent  than  on  the  previous 
day. 

Early  on  this  afternoon  the  gun-boats  were  observed  to 
be  advancing  to  attack  the  river  batteries,  and  at  3  o'clock 
a  vigorous  fire  was  opened  from  five  boats  approaching  en 
echelon.  Our  gunners^rcscrvcd  their  fire  until  the  gun-boats 
had  come  Avithin  effective  range,  and  then  at  a  signal,  every 
gun  was  fired — twelve  in  number.  This  fire  told  with  great 
effect,  penetrating  the  iron  sides  of  the  boats.  The  firing 
now  became  terrific — the  enemy  still  advanting.  In  rear 
of  the  five  boats  first  engaged,  a  sixth  was  reported  throw- 
ing curvated  shot,  which  passed  over  our  works,  exploding 
in  the  air  just  above.  x\fter  some  time,  one  of  the  boats 
was  seen  to  pull  back,  probably  disabled  by  our  shot.  The 
others  continued  to  advance  keeping  up  a  rapid  fire. 

Our  batteries  were  well  served  and  responded  with  great 
effect,  disabling,  as  it  was  believed,  two  more  of  the  gun- 
boats. The  engagement  lasted  until  ten  minutes  after  four 
o'clock,  the  gun  boats  having  approached  to  within  three 
hundred  or  four  hundred  yards  of  our  guns,  when  they 
withdrew  from  the  contest.  Our  batteries  were  uninjured 
and  not  a  man  in  them  killed. 

The  repulse  of  the  gun-bjats  closed  the  operations  of  the 
day,  except  a  few  scattering  shot  along  the  land  defences. 
It  was  evident,  however,  from  the  movements  of  numerous 
bodies  of  troops  around  our  lines,  that  the  enemy  had  re- 
solved to  invest  us,  and,  when  prepared,  to  attack  us  in  over- 
whelming numbers,  or  press  us  to  a  capitulation  by  cutting 
off  supplies  and  reinforcements. 

Generals  Floyd,  I'illow  and  Buckner,  met  in  coun(Jil  soon 
after  dark — I  was  present.     After  an  interchange  of  views, 


168 

it  was  decided  to  attack  the  enemy  on  his  extreme  right  and 
right  centre,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.  It  -was  believed 
that  the  enemy  might  be  drawn  hack  and  an  opportunity  se- 
cured to  withdraw  in  safety  our  forces  ;  that  possibly  greater 
advantagea  might  be  gained  by  the  attack,  which,  if  well  fol- 
lowed up  on  our  part,  Avould  result  in  disaster  to  the  in- 
vaders. 

This  being  decicted  upon,  the  brigade  commanders  were  at 
once  sent  for,  and  the  positions  for  their  respective  com- 
mands in  the  order  of  attack  assigned.  Brigadier  General 
Pillow  was  to  direct  the  movement  against  the  right  of  the 
enemy.  Brigadier  General  Buckner,  that  against  his  right 
centre  advancing  along  the  Wynn's  ferry  road.  A  few  regi- 
ments were  to  remain  to  guard  the  lines. 

About  five  o'clock  next  morning  (the  15th,)  the  left  wing 
under  General  Pillow,  moved  to  the  attack.  Brisk  fires 
were  opened  and  kept  up  by  the  enemy,  and  responded  to  with 
spirit  from  our  lines,  his  men  generally  overshooting,  Avhile 
ours  Avere  constantly  warned  to  aim  low. 

The  enemy's  fire,  after  sometime,  extended  towards  their 
extreme  right,  indicating  a  design  to  turn  our  left.  To 
meet  this,  a  body  of  troops,  under  Brigadier  General  B.  S. 
Johnson,  made  a  flank  movement  and  met  the  foe.  After  a 
long  struggle,  the  enemy  finally  gave  way,  at  first  falling 
back  slowly.  Our  troops  pressed  forward,  and  about  half 
past  nine  o'clock,  his  right  wing  was  in  full  retreat.  Now, 
the  cavalry  on  our  extreme  left  was  brought  up  and  charged 
with  eflect  on  the  retreating  enemy.  Six  field  pieces  were 
captured  at  different  points,  and,  at  a  later  hour  of  the  day, 
brought  within  the  line  of  entrenchments.  Our  success 
against  the  right  wing  was  complete. 

I  now  accompanied  General  Pillow  across  the  field  to  the 
point  of  attack  assigned  to  General  Buckner's  division.  On 
our  arrival  there,  his  division  was  in  rear  of  the  lines  of  in- 
fantry covers,  the  General  and  his  officers  encouraging  the 
troops  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  enemy,  who  still  held  posi- 
tion in  their  front.  General  Buckner  stated,  that  he  had, 
soon  after  the  firing  of  General  Pillow's  forces  was  heard, 
opened  on  the  enemy  with  artillery,  and  followed  it  up  by 
sending  forward  two  of  his  best  regiments  to  the  assault, 
that  they  moved  forward  the  infantry  covers  with  spirit  over 
and  advanced  steadily  and  in  order  against  the  enemy. 
They  were  soon  exposed  to  heavy  fires  of  small  arms,  and  of 
a  field  battery  planted  in  their  front ;  and  they  responded 


169 

vrcll  for  sometime  to  the  volleys  of  the'besiegers,  but  finally 
their  ranks  ^vere  throAvn  into  confusion,  and  they  fell  back 
rapidly  in  rear  of  our  entrenchments.  General  Buckner 
continued  to  encourage  his  men,  feeling  that  a  little  time 
was  necessary  to  overcome  the  dispiriting  effects  of  the  re- 
pulse earlier  in  the  day.  In  the  meantime,  the  fires  of  our 
left  wing  -were  heard  steadily  advancing,  driving  the  enemy 
back  upon  his  right  centre.  This  was  referred  to  with  en- 
couraging effect  upon  General  Buckner's  division.  Artillery 
fires  were  kept  up  against  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  soon 
afterwards  he  moved  forward  with  his  division  to  renew  the 
attack.  The  enemy  being  now  pressed  in  front  of  his  centre 
by  this  advance,  and  on  his  right  flank  by  the  pursuing 
forces  of  General  Pillow's  divison,  retreated  rapidly  for 
some  distance  towards  his  left  Aving ;  but,  receiving  heavy 
reinforcements,  the  pursuit  was  checked,  and  finally  the  re- 
treating foe  made  a  firm  standi^  opening  from  a  field  battery, 
strongly  supported  by  masses  of  infantry. 

About  one  o'clock  an  order  was  given  by  General  Pillow, 
recalling  our  forces  to  the  defensive  lines.  Our  forces 
having  returned,'they  were  ordered  to  the  positions  they  oc- 
cupied the  day  previous,  involving  a  march  of  over  a  mile 
for  the  troops  on  the  extreme  right.  The  enemy  at  the 
same  time  advanced  with  his  re-inforcements  to  attack  that 
flank,  and  by  a  prompt  movement,  succeeded  in  effecting  a 
lodgment  within  the  lines,  just  as  our  exhausted  forces  ar- 
rived. 

A  vigorous  attempt  to  dislodge  him  failed,  and,  at  length, 
our  men  having  suffered  much,  fell  back,  leaving  him  in  pos- 
session of  that  portion  of  our  defences.  The  advantage 
gained  by  the  enemy,  placed  him  in  position  to  assault  our 
right  in  full  force  with  his  fresh  troops  next  morning.  Such 
was  the  condition  of  aftairs  when  the  darkness  of  night 
closed  the  bloody  struggle  of  the  day.  In  course  of  the 
night,  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow  and  Buckner,  met  in  council. 
I  was  not  present.  ^ 

The  following  morning  about  3  o'clock,  I  was  told  by 
General  Pillow  that  a  surrender  had  been  decided  on.  He 
invited  me  to  join  himself  and  staff,  as  they  were  not  in- 
cluded in  the  proposed  surrender.  This  I  accepted  ami  ac- 
companied him  to  Clarksville  and  Nashville,  where  I  had  The 
honor  to  report  to  3'ou  in  person. 

From  information  received,  the  strength  of  the  enemy  at 
Donelson  was  estimated  to  be  about  fifty  thousand.  Our 
effective  force  was  about  fifteen  thousand. 


17i) 

The  surrender  at  Fort  Donelson  made  Nashville  untenahle 
by  the  forces  under  your  command.  Situated  in  a  ■wide 
basin  intersected  by  a  navigable  river  in  possession  of  the 
invader — approached  from  all  directions  by  good  turnpike 
roads  and  surrounded  bj  commanding  hills  involving  works 
of  not  less  than  twenty  miles  in  extent,  the  city  could  not 
be  held  by  a  force  less  than  fifty  thousand.  "With  all  the  rein- 
forcements to  be  hoped  for,  your  army  could  not  be  raised 
to  that  number  before  the  place  would  have  been  attacked  by 
heavy  forces  of  the  enemy,  both  by  land  and  water.  The 
alternative  was  to  withdraw  to  the  interior  of  the  State  of 
Tennesse. 

[Signed,]  J.  F.  GILMER, 

Lieutenant  Colonel  and  Chief  Engineer, 

Western  J)epartniei\t. 


UI^ OFFICIAL  LETTER  OF  GENERAL  A.  S.  JOItN- 
STON  TO  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. 


Decatur,  Alabama, 
March  18th,  1863. 

My  Dear  General  :  I  received  the  dispatches  from  Rich- 
mond with  your  private  letter  by  Captain  Wickliffc  three 
days  since  ;  but  the  pressure  of  affairs  and  the  necessity  of 
getting  my  command  across  the  Tennessee,  prevented  me 
from  sending  you  an  earlier  reply. 

I  anticipated  all  that  you  have  told  me  as  to  the  censure 
which  the  fall  of  Fcrt  Donelson  drew  upon  me,  and  the  at- 
tacks to  which  you  might  be  subjected,  but  it  was  impossi- 
ble for  me  to  gather  the  facts  for  a  detailed  report,  or  to 
spare  time  which  Avas  required  to  extricate  the  remainder  of 
my  troops,  and  save  the  large  accumulation  of  stores  and 
provisions  after  that  disheartening  disaster. 

I  transmitted  the  reports  of  General  Floyd  and  Pillow 
without  examining  or  analyzing  the  facts  and  scarcely  Avith 
time  to  read  them. 

When  about  to  assume  command  of  this  department,  the 
government  charged  me  with  the  duty  of  deciding  the  ques- 
tion of  occupying  Bowlmg  Green,  Ky.,  which  involved  not 
only  military,  but  political  considerations.  At  the  time  of 
my  arrival  at  Nashville,  the  action  of  the  I^egislature  of 
Kentucky  had  put  an  end  to  the  latter  by  sanctioning  the 
formation  of  companies  menacing  Tennessee,  by  assuming 
the  cause  of  the  government  at  Washington,  and  by  aban- 
doning the  neutrality  it  professed,  and  in  consequence  of 
their  action  the  occupation  of  Bowling  Green  became  neces- 
sary as  an  act  of  self-defence,  at  least  in  the  first  step. 

About  the  middle  of  September,  General  Buckner  ad- 
vanced Avith  a  small  force  ot  about  4,"00  men,  Avhich  Avas 
increased  by  the  15th  October  to  12,01)0,  and  though  acces- 


172 

sions  of  force  were  received,  it  continued  at  about  the  same 
strength  until  the  end  of  November,  measles  and  other 
diseases  keeping  down  the  effective  force.  The  enemy's  force 
then  was  reported  to  the  War  Department  50,000,  and  an 
advance  was  impossible.  ***** 

Believing  it  to  be  of  the  greatest  moment  to  protract  the 
campaign  as  the  dearth  of  cotton  might  bring  strength  from 
abroad  and  discourage  the  North,  and  to  gain  time  to 
strengthen  myself  by  new  troops  from  Tennessee  and  other 
States,  I  magnified  my  forces  to  the  enemy,  but  made  known 
my  true  strength  to  the  Department  and  the  Gfvernors  of 
States.  The  aid  given  was  small.  At  length  when  General 
Beauregard  came  out  in  February,  he  expressed  his  surprise 
at  the  smallness  of  my  force,  and  was  impressed  with  the 
danger  of  my  position.  I  admitted  what  was  so  manifest, 
and  laid  before  him-  my  views  for  the  future,  in  which  he 
entirely  concurred,  and  sent  me  a  memorandum  of  our  con- 
ference, a  copy  of  which  I  send  to  you.  I  determined  to 
fight  for  Nashville  at  Donclson  and  gave  the  best  part  of 
my  army  to  do  it,  retaining,  only  14,000  men  to  cover  my 
front,  and  giving  16,000  to  defend  Douelson. 

The  force  at  Donelson  is  stated  in  General  Pillow's  report 
at  much  less,  and  I  do  not  doubt  the  correctness  of  his  siate- 
ment,  for  the  force  at  Bowling  Green,  which  I  supposed  to 
be  14,000  effective  men,  (the  medical  report  showing  only  a 
little  over  500  sick  in  the  hospital,)  was  diminished  more 
than  5,000  by  those  who  were  unable  to  stand  the  fatigue 
of  a  march,  and  made  my  force,  on  reaching  Nashville,  less 
than  10,000  men.     I  enclose  Medical  Director's  Report. 

Had  I  wholly  uncovered  my  front  to  defend  Donelson, 
Buell  would  have  known  it,  and  marched  directly  on  Nash- 
ville. There  were  only  ten  small  steamers  in  the  Cumber- 
land, in  imperfect  condition — onlv  three  of  which  were 
available  at  Nashville,  while  the  transportation  of  the  enemy 
was  great. 

The  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  was  imperatively  ne- 
cessary, and  was  ordered  before,  and  executed  while  the  bat- 
tle was  being  fought  at  Donelson.  I  had  made  every  dispo- 
sition for  the  defence  of  the  fort  my  means  allowed;  and  the 
troops  were  among  the  best  of  my  force.  The  Generals, 
Floyd,  Pillow  and  Buckner,  were  high  in  the  opinion  of  oflS- 
cers  and  men  for  skill  and  courao;e,  and  among  the  best  oiB- 
cers  of  my  command.  They  were  popular  with  the  volun- 
teers, and  all  had  seen  much  service.     No  reinforcements 


173 

were  asked.  I  awaited  the  event  opposite  Nashville,  The 
result  of  the  conflict  each  day  -was  favorable.  At  midnight 
on  the  15th,  I  received  news  of  a  glorious  victory — at  dawn 
of  a  defeat. 

My  column  during  the  day  and  night  was  thrown  over 
the  river — (a  battery  had  been  established  below  the  city  to 
secure  the  passage.)  Nashville  was  incapable  of  defence 
from  its  position,  and  from  the  forces  advancing  from  Bowl- 
ing Green  and  up  the  Cumberland.  A  rear  guard  was  left 
under  General  Floyd  to  secure  the  stores  and  provisions, 
but  did  not  completely  effect  the  object.  The  people  were 
terrified,  and  some  of  the  troops  were  disheartened.  The  dis- 
couragement was  spreading,  and  I  ordered  the  command  to 
Murfreesboro',  where  I  managed,  by  assembling  Crittenden's 
division  and  the  fugitives  from  Donelson,  to  collect  an  army 
able  to  offer  b;)ttle.  The  weather  was  inclement,  the  floods 
excessive,  and  the  bridges  were  washed  away,  but  most  of 
the  stores  and  provisions  were  saved,  and  conveyed  to  new 
depots.  This  having  been  accomplished,  though  with  seri- 
ous loss,  in  conformity  with  my  original  design,  I  marched 
Southward  and  crossed  the  Tennessee  at  this  point,  so  as  to 
co-operate  or  unite  with  General  Beauregard,  for  the  defence 
of  the  Valloy  of  the  Mississippi.  The  passage  is  almost 
completed,  and  the  head  of  my  column  is  already  with  Gen- 
eral Bratro;  at  Corinth.  The  movement  was  deemed  too 
hazardous  by  the  most  experienced  members  of  my  staff,  but 
the  object  warranted  the  risk.  The  diSiculty  of  effecting  a 
junction  is  not  Avholly  overcome,  but  it  approaches  comple- 
tion.    Day  after  to-morrow,  unless  the  enemy  intercepts  me, 

my  force  will  be  WMth  Bragg,  and  my  army  nearly 

thousand  strong.  This  must  be  destroyed  before,  the  enemy  can 
attain  his  object. 

I  have  given  this  'sketch  so  that  you  may  appreciate  the 
embarrassment  which  surrounded  me  in  my  attempts  to  avert 
or  remedy  the  disaster  of  Fort  Donelson,  before  alluding  to 
the  conduct  of  the  Generals. 

When  the  force  was  detached,  I  was  in  hopes  that  such 
disposition  would  have  been  made  as  would  have  enabled  the 
forces  to  defend  th6  Fort,  or  withdraw  without  sacrificing 
the  army.  On  the  14th,  I  ordered  General  Floyd  by  tele- 
graph, "  if  he  lost  the  Fort  to  get  his  troops  to  Nashville." 
It  is  possible  this  might  have  been  done,  but  justice  requires 
to  look  at  events  as  they  appeared  at  the  time,  and  not  alone 
by  the  light  of  subsequent  information.     All  the  facts  in 


174 

relation  to  the  surrender  Avill  be  transmitted  to  the  Secretary 
of  AVar,  as  soon  as  they  can  be  collected,  in  obedience  to 
his  order.  It  appears  from  the  information  received,  that 
General  Buckner,  being  the  junior  officer,  took  the  lead  in 
advising  the  surrender,  and  that  General  Floyd  acquiesced, 
and  they  all  concurred  in  the  belief  that  their  force  could 
not  maintain  its  position — all  concurred  that  it  would  re- 
quire a  great  sacrifice  of  life  to  extricate  the  command. 
Subsequent  events  show  that  the  investment  was  not  so  com- 
plete as  their  information  from  their  scouts  led  them  to  be- 
lieve. The  conference  resulted  in  the  surrender.  The 
command  was  irregularly  transferred,  and  devolved  on  the 
junior  General,  but  not  apparently  to  avoid  any  just  re- 
sponsibility, or  from  any  want  of  personal  or  moral  intre- 
pidity. The  blow  was  most  disastrous,  and  almost  Avithout 
a  remedy.  I,  therefore,  in  my  first  report,  remained  silent. 
This  silence  you  were  kind  enough  to  attribute  to  my  gene- 
rosity. I  will  not  lay  claim  to  the  motive  to  excuse  ray 
course.  I  observed  silence,  as  it  seemed  to  be  the  best  way 
to  serve  the  cause  and  the  country.  The  facts  were  not 
fully  known — discontent  prevailed,  and  criticism  or  condem- 
nation, were  more  likely  to  augment  than  to  cure  the  evil. 
I  refrained,  well  knoAving  that  heavy  censures  would  fall 
upon  me,  but  convinced  that  it  was  better  to  endure  them 
for  the  present  and  defer  to  a  more  propitious  time,  an  in- 
vestigation of  the  conduct  of  the  Generals,  for.,  in  the  mean- 
time, their  services  were  required  and  their  influence  useful. 
For  these  reasons,  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  were  assigned 
to  duty,  for  1  still  felt  confidence  in  their  gallantry,  their 
energy  and  their  devotion  to  the  Confederacy. 

I  have  thus  recurred  to  the  motives  by  which  I  have  been 
governed,  from  a  deep  personal  sense  of  the  friendship  and 
confidence  you  have  always  shown  me,  and  from  the  convic- 
tion that  they  have  not  been  withdrawn  from  me  in  adver- 
sity. 

All  the  reports  requisite  for  a  full  official  investigation 
have  been  ordered.  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  have  been 
suspended  from  command. 

[Here  follow  some  allusions  not  nece'ssary  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  main  objects  of  the  letter,  and  a  statement 
of  the  disposition  of  the  forces  in  command,  which  it  is  not 
deemed  necessary  to  publish.]     The  letter  closes  as  follows: 

I  have  troubled  you  with  these  details  as  I  cannot  proper- 
ly communicate  them  by  telegraph. 


17,5 

The  test  of  merit  in  my  profession,  with  the  people,  in 
success.  It  is  a  hard  rule,  but  I  think  it  right.  If  I  join 
this  corps  to  the  forces  of  General  Beauregard  (I  confess  a 
hazardous  exp"eriment,)  then  those  who  are  now  declaiming 
against  me  will  be  without  an  argument. 
Yonr  friend, 

A.   !^.  .K)HI«JSTO>\ 


INDEX 


Title  of  the  Report,         -             -             -             -             -             -  ] 

Resolutions  creating  the  Special  Ounuuittce,           .             .  3 

Members  of  the  Committee,         -             -             -             -             -  C! 

Special  Report,           -            -            -            -            -            -  4 

^Ie3sage  of  the  President,  transmitting  letter  of  Secretary  of 

War,            -            -           •-            -            -            -            -  5 

Letter  of  the  Sccretar}'^  of  War,  -  -  -  _  T 
Answers  of  War    Department  to    interrogatories  of  Special 

Committee,  -  -  -  *  -  -  -  9 
Letter  of  Ceneral  A.  S.  Joiuiston,  -  -  -  Hi 
Supplemental  Report  of  (ieiieral  J.  J3.  Floyd,  -  -  16 
Letter  of  General  J.  B.  Floyd,  to  Chairman  of  Special  Com- 
mittee, -_._..  2-T 
<ieneral  (lidcon   .1.  Pillow's   Report   on  the    Battles  at  Fort 

Donelson,    -  -  -  -  -  -  -2)* 

Response  of  General    (iideon   J.  Pillow,  to   the   order  of  the 

Secretary  of  War,  of  March  11th,  1862,        -             -  39 

Supplemental  Report  of  the  Battles  at  Donelson,         -             -  -14 

Testimony  of  Col.  Burch,     -             -             -             -             -  55 

"•        '    '•    Col.  Forrest,          -             -             -             -             .  58 

"            "    Major  Henry,              -             -             .             .  go 

'*           •'       "       Haynes,  "  -    .        -            -            -            -  G.S 

'•            "        "       Nicholson,        -             -             -             -  tUi 

Report  of  Major  W.  N.    Brown,  '20th   Regiment  Mississippi 

Volunteers,  to  Secretary  of  War,              -            -             -  (i9 

Statement  of  ('apt.  Jack  Davis-,  Texas  Volunteers,             -  7*1 

Responses  of  Col.  Leon  Trousdale,         -            -            -            -  80 

Statement  of  Lieut.  (Colonel  Milton  A.  Haynes.      -             -  83 

Answers  of  Major  Munford,      -             -             -             -             -  88 

Testimony  of  Col.  Jolin  McCausland,          -             .              _  01 

Testimony  of  Captain  F.  P.  Turner,       -             -             -             -  92 

Answers  of  Col.  Russell  to  Interrogatories,            -             -  90 

General   Buckncr's  Report,         -             -             -             -             -  1)5 

General  Buckncr's  original  Jieport,  -  -  -  109 
Correspondence    between    General    Buckiur    and    General 

Grant,          -            -             -             -     .        -                          -  111 

Report  of  Col.. John  C.  Brown,  3rd  Brigade,           -             -  il.'l 

Report  of  Col.  W.  E.  Baldwin,  commanding  2d  Brigade,          -  118 

Report  of  Col.  A.  Ileiman,  commanding  Brigade.  -  -  126 
Heport  of  Col.  Kdward  C.  Cook,  commanding  32d  Tennessee 

Regiment,    -             -             -             -             -             -             -  l.{2 


178 


Piu*:. 

Report  of  Major  N.  F.  Cheairs,  commandiDg  3rd  Tennessee* 

Regiment,    •      -             -             -             -            -            -  136 

Report  of  Major  W.   L.    Doss,  commanding  14th  Mississippi 

Regiment,  -  -  -  -.  -  -  -139 

Report  of  Col.  Joseph  B.  Palmer,  commanding  18th  Tennes- 
see Regiment,   -            -             -             -            -             -  141 

Report  of  the  42d  Tennessee  Regiment,            -            _            -  148 
Report  of  Col.  John  Gregg,  commanding  7th  Regiment  Texas 

Volunteers,,      -            -            -            -            -            -  150 

Report  of  26th  Tennessee  Regiment,  John  M.  Lillard  Col.,     -  152 
Report  of  Col.  Roger  W.  Hanson,  commanding  2nd  Kentucky 

Regiment,          -            -            -            -            -            -  164 

Report   of  the   41st   Tennessee   Regiment,   R.   Farquharson 

Colonel, -  158 

Estimate  of  killed  and  wounded,  &c.,          .            .            .  ]5S 

Summary  of  killed  and  wounded,  &c.,              .            .            .  159 

Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gilmer,        -            -            -  160 

UnofficiaMetter  of  General  A.S.Johnston  to  the  President,  171 


973.752        C748F  315337 


